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ABSTRACT
Recent research into the development of analogical reasoning has shown that young
children arc able to recognise and use relational similarity between situations. provided
that they possess the necessary domain knowledge (Goswami, 1992). However, in
most of the reported studies, the relational structure of the analogy has been made very
salient. Circumstances where the relational structure of a problem has to be represented
by the problem-solver themselves could result in differing performance. We do not
know whether. or in what circumstances, children can correctly construct a
representation of the relevant relational information.
This thesis reports a series of experiments which investigate the role and development
of structural representations for the purposes of analogical reasoning. The first two
experiments tested whether primary aged children are able to construct an integrated
external task representation by combining separate pieces of relational knowledge.
Using series problems as a domain, they provided evidence that performance was not
affected by the actual relation used, i.e. either spatial or non-spatial (abstract).
However, it was observed that the order in which the task information was presented
had an effect. The next four studies explored this by using spatial series problems.
They showed that tasks which required a novel item to be placed to the left of (that is, at
the front of) a partially ordered array inhibited performance. A further three
experiments found that the reason for the inhibition was that unless the different pieces
of relational information were highlighted as distinct items, they would be incorrectly
integrated by using simple 'add-to-end' ordering rules. The final set of studies, using
abstract cval uative relations in series problems, found that relational-highlighting effects
generalised to these types of tasks. Also. the results showed that some evaluative
relations were tied to either horizontal or vertical spatial representations and that
performance was allected by how consistent the representation was with the child's
experience of every-day life.
The thesis showed that the ahility to construct structural task representations is affected
hy lcaturcs which are inherent in the presentation of specific tasks, and that incorrect
structural representations in turn affect analogical mapping. These findings are
discussed in terms of the 'generalised schemas' used during analogical mapping. It is
suggested that these might be reconstructed using specific task information, rather than
being retrieved intact from memory.
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CHAPTER 1 THESIS OVERVIEW
This brief chapter gives an overview of the eight chapters which form the theoretical
JnD experimental components or this thesis. The research described is concerned with
investigating some of the circumstances in which primary aged children are able to
construct a relational task representation for the purposes of analogical mapping. The
contents or each chapter are as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews some of the past research with both adults and children within the
domain of analogical reasoning. A conclusion is reached from the adult literature that
whilst we have a good idea of the core process of analogical reasoning, that is, the
mapping of relations trorn base to target domains, more research is needed which
investigates the pragmatic task constraints which affect the application of this core
process, The review of the developmental literature accepts that children are capable of
recognising and using relational similarity at a much earlier age than that stated in
Piagetian stage-based theories of analogical reasoning. The last part of the chapter
considers the importance of the way in which different analogical tasks are structured.
It is suggested that those tasks which require the re-structuring of relational information
arc difficult for children. because they have difficulties in representing a task at a
structural level.
Chapter 3 describes the choice of task for the research undertaken in this thesis. Series
problems arc chosen because they involve the integration of separate pieces of relational
information into a single relational representation (Trabasso, 1975). If this is
successfully carried out, the problem can be solved by the mapping of relational
information from a 'generalised ordering schema' (Halford. 1992). Some of the past
research involving series problems is reviewed, and their suitability for addressing the
questions raised as part of this thesis is discussed.
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The first two studies are reported in Chapter 4. Experiment 1 is exploratory, using
series problems which involve a horizontal spatial relationship, and looking at the effect
of using abstract and concrete problems. It was found that there was no difference with
respect to context. However, it appeared that both 5 and 7 year old children were
unable to correctly integrate the relatiorial information into an external relational
representation. The second experiment replicated a previous study (Pears and Bryant,
1992) in which 5 year old children were successful when solving spatial series
problems in a vertical dimension. However, whilst some improvement over
Experiment 1 was demonstrated, the precocious performance demonstrated by Pears
and Bryants' subjects was not replicated. Because of the results from these two
studies, it was decided to further investigate factors which could be affecting children's
construction of a structural task representation.
Chaptcrs f and 6 are concerned with the role of the order in which the relational
information is presented to the subjects. Results from the four experiments in these
two chapters lead us to conclude that those orderings which require that a novel item be
placed to the left of (that is, at the front of) a partially ordered array result in inhibited
performance. This finding is replicated for 7 year olds working with both drawings in
an unfamiliar task and also when ordering familiar toys in a well-known context. It is
also shown that 9 year old children are susceptible to this effect, but only when the
novel item which needs to be placed to the left of an array is the last item required to
complete the array.
Chapter 7 describes the findings of Experiment 7. This was carried out to test the
hypothesis that children arc unable to correctly integrate separate pieces of relational
information because they arc unaware that this information contains redundant
information. However, there was no evidence to support this hypothesis.
Chapter Houtlines the results of three studies which were designed to investigate the
effect of task and information presentation relationships. Still using spatial series
problems, the actual task relationship (vertical or horizontal) was varied together with
the dimension in which the relational information was presented to the subjects. The
results showed that when these two relationships were incongruent (different)
performance was significantly better than when they were congruent (the same). This
finding was replicated when the subjects worked with toys in a familiar context, and
also when 5 year olds were integrating fewer items of information. These results are
interpreted with regard to the salience of the' gap' between different pieces of relational
information.
Chapter 9 exploits the results obtained in earlier chapters and goes on to investigate 7
year olds performance when ordering abstract evaluative relations in series problems.
The first experiment described in this chapter replicates the 'relational congruence'
effect described in Chapter 8, but when using an abstract relationship. The next study
explores the effect of using either horizontal or vertical base relationships when
ordering evaluative non-spatial relationships. The results show that some relationships
arc facilitated by the usc of one of these dimensions, whereas others appear to be
unaffected. The final study begins to consider the extent to which young children's
ordering schemas are tied to everyday experience. The results show that children are
more successful in integrating relational information when the base domain is closely
tied to familiar, plausible situations.
Chapter 10 begins by providing an overview of the research reported in this thesis and
discusses some of the main findings from the studies. These findings are integrated
into the following conclusions:
--
1. The development of children' s structural task representations are
adversely affected by features inherent in the task.
2. These Icaturcs prevent children from correctly using relational
inlormation.
3. The resultant incorrect structural representations adversely affect
analogical mapping.
It is also suggested that' generalised schemas' for performing analogical mapping are
not retrieved intact from memory, but might be reconstructed using information from
specific tasks. The second part of the chapter discusses the implications of this,
together with some suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW - THE NATURE OF
ANALOGICAL REASONING
The ability to perceive analogies is pervasive and is central for human cognition (Polya,
1957; Halford, 1992), being utilised in learning, problem solving and scientific
discovery. As we go about our everyday lives, we are required to reason about new
situations and experiences. This task would be much more difficult if we could not
utilise some of our pre-existing knowledge in order to make sense of novel data.
Analogical reasoning is a means by which we can apply our available knowledge to
new situations. There is a general consensus that this involves the transfer of relational
information from a domain which already exists in memory (known as the source or
base domain) to the new (or target) domain (Vosniadou and Ortony, 1989). This
emphasis on relational information is best illustrated by the use of an example. A
common analogy is that the hydrogen atom is like the solar system (Gentner and
Gentner, 1983). What is important is that the relations which exist between objects are
common to both domains, but not that the attributes of equivalent objects are common.
Thus the relations between the sun and the planets (e.g. internal forces) also exist
between the hydrogen nucleus and electrons, but the sun's attributes (e.g. yellow and
hot) are not attributes of the hydrogen atom.
Bearing in mind the centrality of analogy and its particular utility for learning, the
development of this type of reasoning in children has considerable significance for both
psychological and educational knowledge. This thesis is therefore concerned with
young children's ability to reason analogically, and particularly with the development of
the facility to represent a task in terms of its relations.
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2.1 OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review will begin by describing examples of the different uses of
analogy. Some of the psychological theories of analogical reasoning will then be
discussed. These have built mainly on empirical work with adults, and as such do not
emphasise the development of the ability. Nonetheless, they have added to our
understanding of the various components which make up the analogical reasoning
process. A review of these suggest some candidates which might be affecting
children's ability to reason analogically. We then continue by discussing current
developmental approaches, particularly the debate between structural (Piagetian) and
knowledge-based theories. It will be suggested that a currently under-researched area,
that of the development of the facility to represent tasks such that relational information
is salient, may add a new element to our understanding of the domain.
2.2 ANALOGY IN USE
There are many examples in the literature of scientists using already understood areas as
a source of information when working in novel and often problematic new domains
(Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard, 1986). The theory that sound consists of
waves is extremely old, probably dating back to the Stoics (Samburski, 1973). The
first discussion of the wave theory of sound comes from the Roman architect Vitruvius.
He was aiming to describe the principles by which the greek amphitheatre was able to
amplify sound. He concluded that the voice moved like the increasing circular waves
which appear when a stone is thrown into water, and which continues to spread until
prevented by an obstruction. Holland et al claim that the discovery of the wave theory
of sound depended on the crucial analogy with water waves.
Perhaps the most famous scientific analogy is that made by Archimedes in the 3rd
century Be. His task was to determine whether a crown made for the king was
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constructed from gold or base metal. Because the crown was so highly decorated, it
was impossible to calculate its volume. Archimedes was stepping into a bath of water
when he thought of the solution. He realised that as he got into the bath, an equal
volume or water was displaced hy his body. He then transferred the relation between
the volume of his body and the volume of water displaced to the problem concerning
the crown. In order to determine whether the crown was made of gold, he had to
immerse it in water. He would then know the crown's volume, and could therefore
calculate its weight.
It has to be pointed out that there is some argument in the literature concerning the
centrality of analogy in scientific discovery. It would be wrong to suggest that these
analogical insights occur without much prior painstaking work in the unknown area.
However, it does seem that analogical insight can provide a new way of thinking about
a domain which is novel and not fully understood.
Analogy has had a place in teaching for a considerable length of time, Secondary
school children. learning new scientific concepts, are often reminded of other systems
which they are familiar with. A frequently used example is the explanation of electrical
current by use of the water flow analogy (Gentner and Gentner. 1983). The base
domain is a plumbing system, and as water flows through the pipes of this system, so
electricity flows through the wires of an electrical system. The reservoir of water is
equivalent to the electrical battery, electrical current is similar to flowrate and electrical
voltage is like water pressure. This analogy enables the student to differentiate between
current and volts, as an increase in voltage occurs when two batteries are connected in
series, just as water pressure is increased when two reservoirs at different heights are
connected. Providing that the student understands the water flow system, new
concepts about electrical current will be learnt.
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In the psychological literature, there are many studies which look at people's abilities to
solve novel problems using information which has already been presented to them in
the form of a story. For example, Gick and Holyoak (1980) asked adults to solve
Duncker's 'radiation problem'. The problem was posed as follows:
"Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant
tumour ill his stomach. It is impossible to operate on the patient but
unless the tumour is destroyed the patient will die. There is a kind of
ray that in a sufficiently high density can destroy the tumour.
Unfortunately, at this intensity the healthy tissue that the rays pass
through on the way to the tumour will also be destroyed. At lower
intensities the rays are harmless to healthy tissue) but will not c ~ r r e c c the
tumour either. flow can the rays be used to destroy the tumour without
injuring the healthy tissue?"
In order to provide subjects with a potential base analog, the experimenters read out a
story about a general who wanted to attack a fortress. Many roads converged on the
fortress, hut they all had mines placed on them so that a large group of people, for
example an army, would detonate a mine and be blown up. A small group of people
would be able to pass over safely, however. In order to launch a successful attack, the
general needed to get his army, a large number of people, over to the fortress.
Different versions of the story described different solutions to the general's dilemma.
For example, in one version the army was divided up into small groups and each group
was sent down one of the roads so that all the groups met up at the fortress at the same
time. The alternative version described how the general came across an unmined road
and sent the whole army down that. All the subjects were then given the problem
described above and asked to give solutions. using the story about the attack on the
fortress to help them. Those subjects who had previously read the former story were
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more likely to suggest sending many weak rays from different directions which would
converge on the tumour. On the other hand, those who had read the latter story were
very likely to suggest sending rays down an open passage, such as the esophagus, thus
hitting the tumour without coming into contact with any healthy tissue.
The common features shared between these three examples of analogy form the basis
for its definition. In order for the usc of the analogy to be productive. attention must be
focused on the relations between the salient items in each of the initial situations (these
are termed source or base domains) When the relations have been extracted, they can
be transferred over to the new situation (termed the target domain) The point of the
analogy is that the relations between items in the base domain can be applied to the
items in the target domain. The 'convergence and summation of weak forces' relation
which exists between the smaller armies and the solution in the first example can be
mapped onto the target domain, and the 'avoidance of obstacles' between the unmined
road and the solution in the second example can also be similarly mapped.
It seems then, that the usc of analogies can facilitate scientific discovery, learning and
problem solving. Since the late 1970's, considerable work has been carried out to
investigate analogical thinking. The following section will review some of the theories
which have arisen from the experimental performance of adults, and which have
informed some of the developmental theories.
SOlVIE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO ANALOGICAL
REASONING
Researchers working in the information processing paradigm have been concerned with
identifying the different subprocesses that are used when reasoning by analogy.
Spearman (1923) has been credited with introducing the first information-processing
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model or analogy solution. However, he was concerned only with the solving of
classical analogies.
The term 'classical analogy' dates back to Aristotle, who defined analogy as 'an
equality of proportions..... .involving at least four terms......where the second is
related to the first as the fourth is to the third'. This definition concentrates on the
equivalence of relations which join the pairs of terms. This equality of relations is
conventionally represented in the format A:B::C:D (for example, up:down::big:small)
The relation which links the C and D terms should be the same as that linking the A and
B terms.
Spearman outlined three important processes in the solving of classical analogies: the
apprehension of experience, the eduction of relations and the eduction of correlates. In
simple terms, apprehension of experience is Spearman's term for the encoding of
separate terms in the analogy, eduction of relations is the search for a relation between
the first two terms of the analogy, and the eduction of correlates is the process whereby
the relation between the A and B terms is applied to the C term. However, this model
was neither tested or elaborated, probably due to a lack of appropriate experimental
techniques. The terminology used in the original model was updated by Sternberg to
bring it in line with modern cognitive psychology, and he also elaborated some of the
processes into smaller components. The resultant (1977) model is probably the most
well known and has inspired many further studies which have looked in more detail at
some of the component processes involved. A brief description of Sternberg's model
is given below.
The model describes the processes which Sternberg believed people went through in
order to generate solutions to classical analogies. An example of such an analogy is:
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Hospitals: Virginia:: Schools: 1. Peter 2. Paul
i\ B c D1 D2
Note The subjects had to select the correct 0 term
.'
. ~ ' ' ,
Sternberg divided the solution process into six components as follows:
Stage 1 : Encoding
When first presented with the analogy, each term is perceived, and the relevant
attributes for each of these terms have to be accessed from memory.
Stage 2 : Infcrencing
During this process the relationship between the A and B terms (Hospitals and Virginia)
is determined and encoded in working memory.
Stage 3 : Mapping
Here the relationship between the A and C terms (Hospitals and Schools) is
determined, thus linking the two halves of the analogy.
Stage 4 : Application
In this subprocess, a similar relationship to the one inferred at stage 2 (Inference) is
applied to the C term and both D terms (1 and 2) in turn.
Stage 5 : Justification
'--
When problems are presented in a forced choice format, there will be cases when
neither of the 0 terms correspond exactly to the relationship inferred between the A and
B terms. If this is the case, then one of the two options needs to be justified as the
closest match.
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Stage () : Response
Finally the chosen answer is given as a solution to the problem.
Since Sternberg first put forward his componential model. several researchers (e.g.
Goswami, 1992) have commented that the mapping subprocess is not always a
necessary step in the solving of analogies. In order to determine that the correct answer
to the analogy above is 'Peter', we do not need to determine the relationship between
'Hospitals' and 'Schools' (the A and C terms). We can simply decide that the A-B
relation is 'has government responsibility for' and then apply the relationship to the C
term. Sternberg himself has also stated that he now views this process as optional
(Sternberg and Rifkin, 1979) and so his original componential model has been slightly
modified.
It seems however, rather than just being unnecessary, that for many analogies the
mapping process described above would be at best inefficient. If one considers the A
and C terms in isolation, then there are many ways in which they are related. Some
examples might be that they arc both buildings, both publicly funded or both employ
many people. It is suggested that to generate these relationships without considering
the B and potential D terms would be a very inefficient, and potentially unsuccessful
strategy. It seems that we should be considering the structure of the task as an
integrative whole, rather than isolating two items and determining the relations between
them. It is not however within the aims of this thesis to investigate this claim.
One of Sternberg's aims in identifying the component processes was to test his claim
that there were four possible solution strategies for analogical reasoning in adults.
These models involve the same six subprocesses but differ along three different
dimensions.
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1. Exhaustion
1\ subprocess (inference, mapping or application) is termed exhaustive if the process
considers all of the information available from memory before initating another process
2. Self termination
A subprocess (inference, mapping or application) is termed self-terminating if the
process uses only the first piece of information available from memory and then
initiates the next process
3. Option scanning
This concerns stage 4 (application). In sequential option scanning, all the inferences
which have been made about the relationship between the A and B terms are applied to
the C and D1 term before they are applied to the C and D2 term. This is contrasted with
alternating option scanning where the first inference which has been made between the
A and B terms is applied to the C and D1 terms and then to the C and D2 terms. This
continues for each inference in turn.
Sternberg used a pre-cueing methodology to determine the time his subjects spent on
each of the six sub-processes. This involved presenting either 0, 1 or 2 parts of a
classical analogy to the subjects in the first half of an experiment, and then presenting
the full analogy in the second half. The difference in problem solving times which
resulted enabled Sternberg to hypothesise about which of the four strategies listed
above was being used. He found that people with differing analogical abilities use the
same strategy - exhaustive inference and self-terminating mapping and application but,
more importantly, that better problem solvers spent more time on the encoding of the
analogy, and less time on inference, mapping and application.
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This conclusion was arrived at by firstly presenting one cue analogies. Thus, the
subjects would be given the first part of the analogy:
Hospitals.
When they indicated they were ready, -they were presented with the whole analogy:
Hospitals:Virginia::Schools:1. Peter 2. Paul
The subjects then responded as soon as they knew the answer. Sternberg treated the
first score as the score for encoding the first term.
In a 2 cue condition, the subjects would be presented with the first part of the task:
Hospitals: Virginia.
When they indicated they were ready, they were presented with the whole analogy:
Hospitals: Virginia: :Schools: 1. Peter 2. Paul
The average encoding time times two (because there are two terms) was subtracted
from the total time, and the remainder was treated as inferencing time (the second sub-
process).
There are some problems with this approach, however. The subjects in Sternberg's
experiments completed many trials, and can therefore be viewed as experienced
problem solvers. Because the structure of all classical analogies are identical (the
relation which exists between the A and B terms must be applied to the C term) then it
seems very likely the subjects spent some time when being presented with the first term
in retrieving likely relationships, rather than solely attributes, as Sternberg suggested.
Also, it is unlikely that subjects would retrieve attributes for each of the four terms in
isolation. As more terms are presented, they would begin to constrain their search to
those relations which match with the terms they were already aware of.
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Indeed, Sternberg himself argued that spending more time on encoding is a superior
strategy as the later sub-processes can run more efficiently if a good problem
representation has been achieved. This suggests that the subjects were already
beginning to represent relationships, rather than with a potentially very large set of
attributes for each term. This is interesting, especially if we consider that Sternberg's
subjects were working only with classical analogies, where the structure of the task is
inherent in the task itself. As long as we are familiar with the layout of these types of
problems, we know that in order to arrive at the correct answer, we must apply the
relation which exists between the A and B terms to the C term.
The types of analogies used in scientific understanding, learning and more 'open-
ended' problem solving such as that studied by Gick and Holyoak are less well
structured. This is because the domains are richer, resulting in several potential
mappings which could be made between the base and target domains. Thus, as
successful analogical mapping depends on the mapping of relations, the relational
structure of these types of problems is much more important. The less salient these
relations are, then the more difficulty subjects will have. It would seem therefore that
the sub-process of encoding will also be crucial for 'ill-defined' analogical problems
(those where the relational structure is not salient). However, Sternberg's definition of
this sub-process as being concerned with perceiving each term and then accessing each
term's attributes may well need amending. It is suggested that the sub-processes of
encoding and inferencing in Sternberg's theory are not in fact separate components and
should be amalgamated. This analysis of the sub-processes of analogical reasoning is
consistent with one suggested very recently by Keane, Ledgeway and Duff (1994),
which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
As previously stated, Sternberg's theory has given rise to two later theories of
analogical reasoning which are often placed in opposition to each other. These, both of
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which are situated within the information-processing perspective, will be discussed
briefly below.
Gentner's structure mapping theory
The primary aim of the structure-mapping theory (SMT) is to define the crucial features
which constitute an analogy and the computational operators which are necessary for
processing analogies. Gentner describes the central idea in SMT as being the mapping
of knowledge from one domain (the base) into another domain (the target) such that a
system of relations which exists amongst objects in the base domain is carried over to
objects in the target domain. Thus an analogy focuses on and uses relationships which
exist between objects in a domain, without needing to take account of the actual objects.
The principle of systemacity is central to the SMT, which holds that people prefer to
map systems of relations rather than isolated predicates. The purpose of Gentner's
theory is to describe what is specific about analogy. She accepts that the reasoner's
plans and goals (the context of reasoning) can int1uence the reasoning process, and
therefore must be taken into account. However, she does not accept that they are
central to the analogical reasoning processor or indeed definitive of analogy. In view of
this claim, she has proposed an architecture for analogical reasoning in which plans and
goals influence reasoning before and after the analogical process, but not during it.
Thus the problem context determines the representation of the current problem in
working memory, which int1uences the retrieval of a potential analog from long term
memory. Once this is accessed, the analogical process of mapping systems of relations
from base to target begins. It ends by producing a candidate inference between these
domains. This inference is then evaluated to determine whether the extent of the system
match between domains is sufficiently extensive. If so, then the inference is further
evaluated to see if it satisfies the reasoner's original goals.
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In Gentner's model, therefore, the analogy processor is a separate cognitive module,
which acts on the working memory representation of the target problem. It produces
candidate inferences by mapping the relational structures of base and target domains.
These results from the analogy processing module then interact with other processes,
such as those which deal with contextual-pragmatic considerations.
Gentner claims that separating the context of the analogy from the analogy processor is
justified because many cognitive processes need to take account of pragmatic
considerations, whereas the matching process is unique to analogy and furthermore can
occur in many different pragmatic contexts. She argues that in order to account for the
use of analogy in scientific discovery, we must accept that the process can occur in the
absence of initial problem solving goals. The advantage of a structure driven rather
than a goal driven process, allows for the possibility of finding unexpected matches, or
even matches which contradict initial problem solving goals. This is illustrated by the
work of Poincare, a mathematician, whose intention was to prove a particular theorem
but who ended up by discovering a class of functions which proved the theorem to be
incorrect. Thus, although Gentner does not deny the relevance of plans and goals (the
pragmatic context) she firmly believes that the analogical reasoning process per se does
not include these features, though it interacts with subsystems which deal with these
considerations.
Holyoak's pragmatic theory
Holyoak (1985) proposed an alternative pragmatic account of analogical reasoning. He
argued that Gentner's syntactic, or structure-based, approach cannot accurately predict
the basis for analogical transfer because it fails to take account of goals. He stated that
there are many different factors which affect the perceived structure of an analogy.
Examples of these include which aspects of the source domain are normally considered
to be important (Ortony, 1979), the goal in using the analogy and the central causal
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relationships which exist in the base domain (Winston, 1980). These factors will then
in turn dictate which aspects of the base domain are transferred to the target. His
account of analogical reasoning allows these features a central part in the process, and
asserts that the structure of the analogy, far from being separable from pragmatic
considerations, is actually closely tied to such considerations as the problem solver's
goals and knowledge.
Holyoak also discusses the induction of generalised analogical schemas. He describes
work by Gick and Holyoak (1983) in which groups of subjects received two stories
which contained the 'convergence' theme discussed earlier. One involved a fire-
fighting incident where converging sources of retardent foam were used to extinguish a
large fire and the other was the army and fortress story described on page 8. Other
groups received one convergence story and one other which was unconnected to the
sol ution. All subjects were asked to write down accounts of how the stories were
similar, i.e. to produce a 'problem schema'. This was intended to lead to the
construction of a representation of the shared items. Subjects in the two analogy
groups were more likely to produce the convergence solution, and this was interpreted
as evidence that induction of a problem schema facilitated mapping between different
contexts.
However, it has been pointed out that two analogs might be better than one because
they offer two opportunities for similarities between base and target to be recognised.
In order to control for this Catrambone and Holyoak (1985) replicated this experiment
but varied whether or not subjects were asked to describe similarities between the two
stories. They reasoned that if comparison is critical for schema induction, provision of
two analogs will only be beneficial when subjects are asked to compare them.
However, if the analogs are retrieved independently, then the comparison condition
should have no effect.
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The results showed that the provision of two analogs did not facilitate transfer unless
the subjects were told to directly to compare them. Holyoak (1985) has interpreted
these results in terms of 'problem schemas'. These are abstract categories which are
linked to rules for categorising situations and constructing solutions. Once a person
has induced a general schema, novel problems can be solved without retrieving
examples of the original analogical situations, as the novel problems are categorised as
instances of the schema. Holyoak differentiates this from' strict' analogical reasoning
as "it does not involve the direct transfer from a representation of a particular prior
situation to a novel problem" (page 79).
In a similar situation, Halford (1992) argues that children use 'pragmatic reasoning
schemas' as a basis for solving new problems. He suggests that this is carried out via
the process of structure-mapping, i.e., the central feature in all current theories of
analogical reasoning. Because his is a developmental theory, it is discussed at more
length later in this chapter. However, it does seem that the construction of a problem
schema does not preclude the claim that analogical problem solving occurs. People
then map from the general schema to the target domain, just as when they map from a
particular previous problem structure to the target. Indeed, it is possible to argue that
the majority of analogical mapping involves the use of previously generalised schemas,
and the provision of a base analogy serves mainly as a cue for retrieving the schema.
Comparison of structure mapping and pragmatic theories
A closer consideration of Gentner and Holyoak's theories would suggest that they are
considering differing issues. Gentner is concerned with isolating the processes which
she considers are unique to analogy, and as such has concentrated on the mapping of
structural properties from base to target domains. Whilst she accepts that there is a
clear need for explanations of pragmatic considerations, she sees no need to include
these within a theory of analogical reasoning.
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Holyoak, on the other hand, sees pragmatic considerations as being inexorably linked
with the mapping process, such that a complete theory cannot exclude them. He feels
that they have a direct effect on the structure of the base domain, which will in turn alter
the nature of the analogical mapping. Thus to isolate processes which are unique to the
mapping process of analogy is not warranted.
The two theories also differ in that Holyoak's encompasses the production of
'generalised problem schemas', which people use to focus on the relational structure of
problems. Gentner does not deal with this, as she is concerned solely with structure-
mapping per se as the central and unique process in analogical reasoning.
However, a central feature in both theories concerns the importance of domain
structure. For Gentner, this is indeed the fundamental issue on which the structure
mapping theory hangs. Whilst Holyoak argues that the pragmatic content of the
reasoning task has a direct effect on the way the domains are structured, he is
nonetheless accepting that the way in which this structure is represented will have a
crucial effect on reasoning success. Thus these two theories differ from Sternberg's
information processing account in that they explicitly address the issue of
representational structure.
Sternberg's account, because it aimed solely to identify the subprocesses involved in
the solving of classical analogies, did not need to consider the way in which the domain
structure was represented. Classical analogies are of the form A:B::C:? . Here the
domain structure in which the reasoning process needs to occur is inherent in the task
presentation. As long as the reasoner is familiar with the format of these types of
problems, they cannot fail to be aware that the relationship which exists between A and
B has to be mapped onto the C term in order to produce a response. There are no other
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relationships or objects existing within this problem which are potential candidates [or
mapping.
As previously discussed, the situation is not as clearly defined if we consider the
analogical reasoning process in problems such as those described at the beginning of
this chapter, where the task structure is not explicit. It does seem that a full theory of
analogical reasoning needs to consider seriously the issue of the problem
representation. Whether or not it is encompassed within the analogical reasoning
process per se, as in Holyoak's theory, or is a precursor to the analogy module as
Gentner asserts, is not for the purposes of this thesis, particularly relevant. What is
important is
1. That the way in which a problem is represented at the structural level will have a
direct effect on the mapping of relationships between base and target domains.
2. That the use of common relational structures will induce the construction of
generalised schemas.
A meta-framework for analogy
Keane (1994), drawing on a rnetatheoretical framework first proposed by Palmer in
1989, suggests that neither of the above theories are comprehensive, as they are both
dealing with only the highest level of analysis. Palmer suggested that this level is
concerned with characterising the informational constraints in a task situation, that is
what an analogy is and what needs to be computed (cf. Marr's computational level,
1982). The midlevcl concerns behavioural constraints (equivalent to Marr's algorithmic
level), that is those which describe how people behave when solving different types of
analogies and the different sorts of errors which are made. The lowest level in this
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analysis is concerned with hardware constraints, that is the physiological factors which
affect analogical thought (Marr's hardware level).
Keane maintains that both Gentner and Holyoak, along with most other researchers in
this area, are working at the highest level. He identifies three differenttypes of
informational constraints which exist at this level :structural, similarity and pragmatic.
Structural constraints
These are concerned with finding a one to one mapping between two domains. They
exploit consistency between domains and favour systematic sets of relationships over
single ones. Much of Gentner's work fits in this area.
Similarity constraints.
These can be used to decide between alternative candidate matches, in that only identical
concepts will be matched between the two domains (Gentner, 1983).
Pragmatic constraints
These can also be used to disambiguate matches, as one match might be more goal
relevant than another and so will be preferred (Holyoak, 1985) Keane also suggests
that there are many other task demands, which have so far received little research
attention, which might impose pragmatic constraints on analogical mapping. These
include the specific instructions given or the way in which the materials are presented.
It is interesting to speculate on the way in which Keane feels these constraints might
affect analogical reasoning. Keane himself provides no further details on this. It
would seem that the way in which the task is presented might well affect the way the
way in which it is represented. For example, different objects might be presented as
more salient or the information might be presented in a certain sequence which could
differentially affect the way in which the domain representation was constructed. This
22
could be crucial when analogical mapping occurs, as we have already argued that the
task representation can affect what relationships are mapped from base to target. This
is an important point, and will be investigated during the empirical sections of this
thesis.
The second level of Keane's meta-framework, that of behavioural constraints, contains
fewer examples. He states that this is because much less work has been carried out in
this area. Two constraints are briefly discussed which he asserts exist at this level.
Working memory limitations
Keane (1990) found that domains which were more conceptually rich resulted in more
mapping errors. He suggests that this is due to parts of the problem representation
being lost or forgotten as working memory becomes overloaded with information.
Background knowledge
Recent work by Keane (1991) showed that a mapping task can be performed faster if
the mappings required are consistent with background knowledge than if they are
inconsistent or neutral.
This recent discussion of the current analogical reasoning literature is calling for a much
more comprehensive view of the domain, when compared to Sternberg's earlier theory.
It asserts that it is important to consider the importance of initial task representations,
their effects on the mapping process and what can alter the type of task representation
which is constructed. This is aptly summed up in Keane's (1994) description of the
stages of analogical thinking. He claims that there are five subprocesses which
constitute analogical thought: representation, retrieval, mapping, adaptation and
induction. These are described as follows.
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Representation
In order to problem solve by analogy, the problem must be represented. Novick, 1988
has shown that problem representation affects analogy success.
Retrieval
The next stage is to retrieve an analogous problem solution from long term memory
Mapping
Corresponding elements or concepts in both domains are matched. Some or all of the
relations in the retrieved base domain are then mapped across to the target domain on
the basis of the matched items. Keane agrees with Gentner in that mapping is the
crucial process in analogical reasoning, and is unique to the process. However, he also
calls for research in the other sub-processes, stating that the vast majority of studies
have been concerned with mapping.
Adaptation
In some circumstances. the first solution may not be totally correct in that it may need to
be tested or adapted to fit the situation.
Induction
A higher order schema might be induced based on the two domains.
This description of the subprocesses differs from Sternberg's in several ways. These
differences are mainly due to the fact that Sternberg's theory was explicitly developed
to explain classical analogy, whereas Keane appears to be thinking about problem
analogies. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the two important points which
arise from Keane's account are:
1. It acknowledges the importance of the initial problem representation construction.
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2. II allows for the induction of generalised schemas which can be held in long term
memory.
These are two themes which have been taken up in our research, and as such will be
returned to throughout this thesis.
The above conclusions concerning the importance of task representations and
generalised schemas were arrived at by considering adult performance in analogical
reasoning. This thesis is concerned with the way in which children develop structural
task representations and the effect this has on analogical reasoning. We will now
review developmental studies in the area, in order to investigate the current status of
knowledge concerning children's ability to reason by analogy, and particularly their
ability to represent a problem at the structural level.
2.4 DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES
Although a successful role for reasoning by analogy has always been presumed in
educational circles, the topic has not received much attention from developmental
psychologists until fairly recently. This seems surprising, considering the extensive
literature which has been built up in the last two decades in the domain of cognitive
psychology. Since childhood is a period in our lives when we have to deal with large
amounts of novel data, it seems reasonable that the ability to make use of pre-existing
knowledge would be of most use here. This was indeed the motivating force behind
the research which is described in this thesis. If we can add to current knowledge
concerning how children transfer knowledge to new domains, then we may be able to
make suggestions concerning the use of analogy in educational contexts.
25
It is suggested that the two factors which emerged from Keane et al's review of the
existing literature, namely the importance of the construction of the initial problem
representation and the induction of generalised schemas, are also crucial when we
consider the development of analogical reasoning ability. It will be argued that the
first of these points has a significant effect on children's analogical performance and
can account for some of the' failures' which are reported in the literature.
Before we can discuss the evidence which leads us to this claim, it is necessary to
describe the background to the current position concerning the development of
analogical reasoning." This was reviewed by Goswami (1992) and much of the
following draws heavily on her work.
Historically, the predominant research focus in this area has been based on Piagetian
perspectives. These viewed the ability to reason analogically as a late developing
cognitive skill, central to the' formal operational' stage of logical thought. This period
of reasoning typically emerged around the age of 11-12 years, only after children have
become competent at thinking with progressively more abstract representations by
passing through the preoperational and concrete operational stages. Because of these
claims, primary aged children (those younger than 11 or 12 years) were thought to be
incapable of reasoning using relational similarity and so, until relatively recently, very
few studies were undertaken with this age group.
2.4.1 Piaget's stage based theory of analogical reasoning
Piaget's work on the development of analogical reasoning ability used a pictoral version
of the classical analogy test, also used in psychometric testing. Most of these tests
make the need to reason using relational similarity very clear. Children are told to select
a D term from up to 4 or 5 alternatives which have been provided, such that the term
bears the same relation to the C term as the B term does to the A term. This criterion of
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equality of relations is generally accepted to be the hallmark of analogical reasoning
(Goswami 1992). According to Piaget, young children are unable to reason by analogy
because they are incapable of reasoning using relational similarity. Instead they attempt
to solve analogical problems by selecting D terms which are highly associated with the
C term but do not share the same relationship as the relationship which exists between
the A and B term. For example, a young child might well produce 'fat' as an answer to
the problem 'up: down :: big: ?'. 'Fat' is a word which is highly associated with
'big', but the two terms are not antonyms, as are 'up' and 'down'. They can often
explain their choice of response in terms of successive relations, such that they explain
the relation between the A and B terms and also that between the C and D terms.
However, they are unable to reason using relational similarity, that is they cannot
equate the relations which they are applying to the C term with the relation which exists
between the A and B terms.
Piaget's evidence for this claim came from a pictoral version of the classical analogy
task which has since been adapted in further research (Goswami and Brown 1989,
1990) In Piaget's (1977) task, children were required first to pair pictures that went
well together. This tested their ability to correctly link together the individual terms on
separate halves of the analogy - Piaget named these lower order relations. They were
then required to sort the pairs into foursomes that went well together and justify their
selection. Piaget termed the relations between pairs higher order relations' . The
majority of the children were able to pair up the pictures appropriately, but they found
the latter part of the test much more difficult. Increasingly more helpful hints were
therefore given to them when they were grouping the paired items into foursomes. If
the children were initially unable to complete a foursome, they would be asked a
question which highlighted the relationship between a pair. Following a continuing
" Ile maintained that the distinction between lower and higher order relations was psychologically
significant. In other words, the ability to reason using higher order relations develops separately and at
a later date from the ability to reason about lower order relations. Thus young children are unable to
reason using relational similarity because th.is involves higher order relations which, it is claimed, are
qualitatively different from lower order relations.
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lack of success, the experimenter would select the appropriate C picture and tell the
child that they should choose a picture which went with it in the same way that the A
and B pictures went together. Finally, if the child was still unable to complete the
analogy, they were shown three alternative pictures and asked to choose between them.
This was to test Piaget's claim that in order to demonstrate full analogical reasoning
ability a child should reject a 'counter suggestion' if it did not fulfil the relational
similarity constraint that a full analogy entails.
Piaget used the children's performance on these tasks to identify 3 progressive stages in
the development of reasoning by analogy. These correspond to his more general theory
of mental development: preoperational at around age 5 to 6 years, concrete operational
reasoning up to around 10-11 years and formal operational thereafter.
1. Preoperational stage
In this stage, the subject's pairings between pairs and the reasons for these pairings
were extremely non-systematic. Some of the children were not even able to form the
first pairings successfully (those of the A and B terms). Instead they linked terms
using egocentric and idiosyncratic relations. However, as Goswami (1992) has
pointed out, success in these task means choosing pairs of terms required by the
experimenter. The different associations made by the children are no less 'correct' per
se than those which were decided upon during the construction of the relational
materials. Some of the more' advanced' children were able to join the first and second
terms appropriately but they could not go on to link together two pairs of terms by
using equivalent relations for both pairings.
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2. Concrete operational.
Here, the children occasionally showed successful performance. Some children
however, could construct analogical foursomes by trial and error and were willing to
accept false counter suggestions. Others were able to resist these false suggestions, but
didn't do so consistently.
3. Formal Operational
This stage marked full successful performance in analogical reasoning. Here the
children could easily and consistently extract and use higher order relations, could
imagine alternative analogical relations and understand that mathematical notation can be
used to represent analogical problems ( e.g. glass/greenhouseebrick/house)
The children's performance in Piaget's tasks supported his three main claims about the
development of analogical reasoning:
1. Children are unable to reason about relational similarity until the formal operational
stage of development (around 11 to 12 years).
2. Reasoning about 'lower-order' relations (simple relations such as associative
relations) develops before and is separate from reasoning about 'higher order' relations.
This is needed in order to deduce relational similarity.
3. Younger children's lack of full understanding of the relational similarity constraint
as shown by young children accepting 'counter-suggestion' solutions whereas older
children and adults did not.
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Evidence in support of Piaget and criticisms thereof
A large number of studies were carried out which followed in the Piagetian tradition, in
that investigations were carried out into the three assertions referred to above. In most
of the studies, success was measured by the ability to solve analogies correctly, and
occasionally by the subjects being able to justify their choice by reference to relational
similarity. The experimenters claimed that their results upheld the structural theory.
However this evidence, which is commonly cited in support of Piaget's claims, has
been critically reviewed by Goswami (1992) She asserted that the studies which have
claimed to produce results in support of Piaget's stage theory can be re-interpreted in
terms of other constraints which could be affecting performance. The evidence,
together with the relevant criticisms, is summarised below.
1. Analogical reasoning (reasoning about relational similarity) does not occur until the
formal operational stage of development.
Gallagher and Wright (1979), working with 9 to 12 year old children, compared
performance on 'concrete' and 'abstract' classical analogies. The former were those
analogies which could be solved by "directly observable features of content". The
latter were described as those where "solution seemed to be based upon a movement
beyond observable features to a higher order rule" (page 116). It seems that the
researchers were claiming that in order to solve 'abstract' analogies, the children needed
to have conceptual knowledge of the problem domain. Their results showed that 9 to
10 vear old children could solve the 'concrete' analogies, but that there was a large
J
increase in performance on the' abstract' analogies around the age of 12.
Although the younger children were correctly solving the 'concrete' analogies,
Gallagher and Wright claimed that their success could be due to reasoning by
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association. Thus, although the children were giving the correct responses, they were
not using the relational similarity constraint.
However, as Goswami has pointed put, it is impossible to tell whether the younger age
group were using associative reasoning, because both associative and analogical
reasoning would result in the same response. Also, the' abstract' analogies required
more conceptual knowledge than the 'concrete' ones. The poorer performance
demonstrated by the 9 to 10 year olds on these types of problems could therefore be
due to lack of the appropriate knowledge, rather than a change in ability to engage in
reasoning using relational similarity. The children were not pre-tested for relevant
conceptual knowledge before the experiment, neither were any tests carried out to
determine which words were high associates of each other.
2. Reasoning about higher order relations (needed in order to deduce relational
similarity) develops at a later stage than reasoning about simple, associative relations
(termed lower order relations).
It seems that historically this claim was partly based on an assertion put forward by
Inhelder and Piaget (1958). This stated that reasoning about analogies involved
reasoning about proportions. Proportional reasoning was taken to be a corner-stone of
the formal operational stage. Thus the conclusion was reached that analogical
reasoning required formal operational skills. Following this argument, Piagetians such
as Lunzer have expressed the view that the logical structure of classical analogies such
as person:house::fish:pond is equivalent to proportional problems such as 3:4::15:20.
However, Goswami, quoting the original writings of Piaget and Inhelder, states that
their "actual beliefs about the connection between analogical and proportional reasoning
are not very clear" (page 27).
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Despite this lack of a claim of a strong link between the two types of reasoning, many
researchers, assuming that measurement of proportional reasoning provides a measure
of analogical reasoning, have investigated the former. Levinson and Carpenter (1974)
looked at the extent to which an understanding of proportional reasoning affected the
ability to reason analogically. They asked subjects to explain the reasons for their
correct responses to classical analogies. Those responses which described relations
within and between the two halves of the analogy were scored as demonstrating
proportional understanding. It was demonstrated that the number of these responses
increased significantly as the children got older. As there was also a relationship
between the ability to explain responses using proportional reasoning and successful
analogical reasoning, the researchers concluded that an understanding of proportionality
may have contributed to successful analogical reasoning. Goswami points out that in
these studies the measure of proportional reasoning was actually just another way of
measuring whether the children could explain the relational similarity constraint. Thus
the results of this study do not help in deciding whether analogical reasoning is related
to proportional reasoning and might therefore be similarly classed as a formal
operational skill.
Also, as Goswami has pointed out, some of the mathematical knowledge required to
solve the series problems was quite complex and may well not have been present for
the younger children. Thus they may have been unsuccessful because of a lack of
domain knowledge, rather because they did not understand about proportional
reasoning. It seems therefore that the claim for a link between proportional and
analogical reasoning has not been proven. This in tum throws some doubt on the
assertion made by Piagetian researchers that reasoning about higher order relations is
equivalent to reasoning about proportions.
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The claim that there exists an a priori distinction between higher and lower order
relations, such that children can reason about lower order relations at a developmentally
lower stage than higher order ones, has also been challenged (Goswami, 1992).
Lower order relations are those which exist between the A and B terms, and between
the C and D terms in a classical analogy. For example, in the analogy
horse:blanket::person:umbrella the lower order relations link together the paired items.
Thus possible lower order relations for the A:B pair would be 'protects from rain' or
'keeps warm'. Higher order relations are those which link the two parts of the analogy
i.e .. they link the lower order relations. In the example above this would be 'protects
from rain' because both of the pairs of relations share that same lower order relation.
Traditionally, children below the age of around 11 years were said to be incapable of
reasoning using higher order relations. They could reason only at the lower order
level, so resulting in successive lower order relations being generated between the
different pairs of items. Thus the younger children found it quite acceptable to use
different relations liking the A and B terms to that linking the C and D terms. A change
in reasoning competence was therefore brought about by the emergence of the ability to
reason using the same relation.
Goswami claimed that the distinction made in the literature between the two types of
relations was Hawed. She points out that the classification into lower and higher order
relations depends solely on the specific analogy used. So, in the example above, the
higher order relation is 'protects from rain'. In another analogy, the same relation
could be a lower order relation. Consider, for example, horse:blanket::person:hot
water bottle. Here, the higher order relation is 'keeps warm', as it links both pairs of
items. The relation 'protects from rain' is a lower order relation only, linking the items
'horse' and 'blanket'.
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Thus, what is important is not the actual relations themselves, but the fact that the two
halves of the analogy both share the same relations.
Therefore the status of relations cannot be defined independently as either lower or
higher order. What is actually important is the child's knowledge about how paired
items are related and their knowledge that the same relations must link both paired
items. Goswami has termed this the 'relational similarity constraint' and states that the
ability to recognise and use this constraint is the central issue which determines
analogical competence. In order to solve analogies like yacht:wind::car:?, the child
must apply the relational similarity constraint, such that the relation linking yacht to
wind (makes move) must be applied to the choice of the 4th term.
3. Young children (below the formal operational stage) will accept non-analogical
counter-suggestions, showing that they understand analogies only in terms of the
successive relations between the two terms in each half of the problem. Older children
reject such suggestions, as they are aware that a response must obey the relational
similarity constraint.
Work by Gallagher and Wright (1977) found that 9 year old children accepted a non-
analogical counter suggestion more often than the correct response. These responses
were often justified by the children using different relations to link the C and D terms
from the one which they had used to link the A and B terms. In other words, they were
reasoning with successive relations, rather than relational similarity. However, again
we are faced with the possible confound due to a lack of appropriate knowledge. This
could either be relational domain knowledge, or knowledge about the nature of the task.
If children do not know the relation on which the analogy is based, then they may select
a counter suggestion which is highly associated with the C term. Also, if they think
that the task requires the application of successive relations, then it is not surprising that
this is what they actually do! This result therefore does not necessarily mean that the
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subjects were unable to use the relational similarity constraint per se, rather that they
lacked the appropriate knowledge concerning either the nature of the task or the
relationships between the task items, to enable them to apply this constraint.
It has also been suggested that in some cases the children might have chosen the
counter suggestion because they felt that it did satisfy the relational similarity constraint.
This could be due to either a lack of the appropriate linguistic knowledge in order to be
able to make a distinction, or to not having a comprehensive understanding of the
nature of the task. This is not the same as being unable to reason using the relational
similarity constraint.
Goswami summarises her review of the evidence in support of Piagetian theory by
concluding that:
1. The evidence concerning analogical reasoning as a formal operational ability is
confounded by a possible lack of the relevant relational knowledge. A failure to test for
the presence of this knowledge means that the children's apparent failure could be
attributed to domain level issues, rather than to an inability to reason using the relational
similarity constraint.
2. The research which investigated a link between higher order reasoning and an
understanding of proportional equivalence is inconclusive. We have no evidence that
there is a strong link between the two, as the studies have been confounded by a
possible domain knowledge lack and a confusion between the measurement of
proportional reasoning per se and an understanding of the relational similarity
constraint.
3. Studies which claimed that children below the age of 11 years solved analogies by
reasoning about both of the two halves of the analogy in succession, or by associative
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reasoning, were flawed. The studies which cited an acceptance of false counter
suggestions as evidence for these claims could be explained by a lack of relevant
domain knowledge, or because of semantic difficulties or misunderstandings about the
task.
2.4.2 Empirlcal evidence which challenges Piaget's structural theory
Because of these fundamental flaws in the Piagetian evidence summarised above,
Goswami continues by considering more recent evidence which directly set out to test
some of the theory's assumptions. This is reviewed below.
1. Do children possess the relevant relational knowledge?
Before the child can determine the relations used in an analogy, they must have the
relevant domain knowledge. Without this knowledge, they will not understand why
paired items are related, and so it follows that they will not be able to apply the
relational similarity constraint. A child cannot select relations which are similar if he or
she does not know or understand the individual relations.
Consider the analogy wigwam: hide :: igloo: ?
If a child doesn't know that a wigwam is made from hide, then he or she cannot apply
the 'made from' relation to the second half of the analogy. Similarly, if the child
knows the relation between 'wigwam' and 'hide', but doesn't have the 'made from'
knowledge associated with 'igloo', then the task still will not be completed
successfully.
Surprisingly, Piaget and his colleagues failed to pretest their subjects (e.g. Lunzer,
1965, Gallagher and Wright, 1979) Thus their apparent failure to demonstrate
competence in applying the relational similarity constraint may have been due to their
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lack of relevant domain knowledge. If the relations involved in the task are too difficult
for the subjects, then they will necessarily fail.
Recent research has used simple causal relations and has pretested subjects for
possession of the relevant knowledge. Goswami and Brown (1989) gave 3, 4 and 6
year old children pictoral classical analogies based on relations such as cutting and
melting. They were required to pick out the correct D term to complete the analogy
from a choice of 5 pictures. For example in the 'cutting' analogy, subjects saw pictures
of a tub of playdoh and cut playdoh (A and B terms) and then a picture of an apple (C
term). Five alternatives were chosen to give children an associative choice (banana), a
different change to the same object (bruised apple), a similar appearance (ball) and the
same change with a different object (cut bread) In addition to the analogy condition, the
children's relational knowledge was also tested. This was done by showing the child
three pictoral examples of the action e.g. cut apple, cut cake and cut playdoh, and the
children were asked to choose the picture of the object which had caused the action
(again they had five alternatives) This study showed that the children who understood
the causal relations could also solve the analogies. The older children were more
successful with the analogy task, but they also knew more of the causal relations.
Similar results were obtained when the objects in the analogy underwent perceptual
change, for example a whole lemon and a slice of lemon. Thus it would seem from
these studies that the apparent inability in the Piagetian studies might be due to a lack in
the relevant relational domain knowledge.
2. Can children reason about proportions?
Piagetian research was based on the assumption that the skills required for proportional
and analogical reasoning are very similar, in that both require reasoning about relations
which are common to both halves of a problem. It was therefore reasoned that neither
type of problem would be solvable by children below the formal operational stage. In
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order to test this, Goswami (1989) required children to reason about proportional
classical analogies. She showed children pictures of proportions of shapes (for
example 112 circle) where the relevant portion of each stimulus was shaded. An
example would be 114 square:1/4 rectangle:: 112 square:? A correct response to this
problem required that the child had to reason about the proportions involved. Again
five alternative responses were provided which were designed to test whether the
subjects were reasoning using similarity matching, partial extraction of relations (that
is, just shapes or shaded areas) or proportional reasoning (the correct response). The
results showed that success in solving the analogies was related to relational
knowledge, that is, the children's knowledge about proportions.
It would seem that we have more evidence that the earlier failure reported in the
literature was due to a lack of relational knowledge. In Goswami's experiment,
children as young as 4 years could reason about proportions. Thus some
understanding of the equivalence of proportional, as well as analogical reasoning
ability, is present well before the formal operational stage.
Nonetheless, Goswami has made the point that the subjects in her study could have
been successful by using perceptually based proportional reasoning, whereas it seems
likely that Piaget was more concerned with a logical understanding of proportions.
However, this does not appear to have been clearly defined in the literature.
3. Do children reason about successive relations?
Piaget claimed that younger children try to solve analogies by reasoning successively
about the two halves of an analogy, and this is why they are willing to accept incorrect
counter-suggestions. Other researchers have claimed that children respond with words
which are high associates of the C term, rather than those which obey the relational
similarity constraint.
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Goswami and Brown (1990) tested this claim by careful selection of the alternative
responses provided [or the subjects. They based their choice on category sorting tasks,
which show that 3 to 5 year olds will sort items thematically rather than categorically
(Markham and Hutchinson, 1984). They therefore decided to provide a choice of
responses which were 'incorrect' but which were either highly related thematically or
categorically to the C term, or were similar in appearance to the 'C' term. These were
contrasted with the 'correct' analogical response which was less highly associated. An
example of this would be Spider:Web::Bee:?, where Honey is the highly associated
thematic relation, Ant is the categorical match, Fly is the appearance match and Hive is
the correct analogical response. The correct response was chosen by 4 year olds for
59% of the time, showing that the children were able to reason using relational
similarity rather than thematic, categorical or appearance matches.
Types of analogical tasks
In common with investigations into adult analogical reasoning, research into the
development of the ability has been carried out using both classical and problem
analogies. However, the above review was based mainly on the former, as problem
analogies have only been investigated within the last decade or so, compared with
classical analogies which were first used by Piaget and colleagues (Piaget and Inhelder,
1958: Piaget at al. 1977).
The problem analogies which have been used are similar to the ones used with adults
(e.g. Gick and Holyoak, 1980), in that the solution can be reached by mapping the
relational structure of a story (the base domain) into a novel problem (the target
domain). Typically, the problems and analogous stories are about everyday concepts
and relations with which children are familiar.
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Research using problem analogies has demonstrated successful performance at a
younger age than that of the Piagetian experiments which used classical analogies.
Indeed, this discrepancy was used as an argument for the early acquisition of analogical
reasoning skills (Goswami, 1992). Because the problems were concerned with
knowledge which was easily available to children, they did not come up against
inhibition of performance caused by a lack of the relevant relational knowledge.
Collins and Burstein (1989) suggest that problem analogies are simpler than classical
analogies because of the number of elements which need to be mapped. This is
therefore an alternative explanation for the discrepancy in performance referred to
above. They describe classical analogies as 4 element problems (i.e. the four terms)
which require both within and between group comparisons. Those between the A and
B terms and the C and D terms are within group, whereas those between the A and C
terms and the Band D terms are between group. In this system of analysis, problem
analogies are two element comparisons as there is a single item ( the base system) to be
compared with another single item (the target).
However, it is also possible to represent problem analogies in a classical format (that is,
as 4 element comparisons). Thus for the Gick and Holyoak Problem:
Small armies: fortress :: weak rays: tumour
Here the relation which links both halves of the analogy is 'converges on'. This
analysis highlights the relationship between items as the salient aspect of the mapping.
An alternative classical representation of the problem highlights the relationship
between problem and solution as the salient aspect:
Problem (base):Solution (base)::Problem (target):Solution (target). (Holyoak, 1984)
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This is consistent with Holyoak's claim that the two levels of analogy are different in
that in classical analogies the nature of the task (that analogical mapping is required) is
made clear and the goal is to solve the analogy, whereas in problem analogies the goal
is to solve the problem and the problem solver needs to recognise that an analogical
mapping is required. Thus there seems to be no a priori distinction between the
number of element comparisons required in the different types of analogy. It appears
that the initial discrepancy in the literature is due to the different types of knowledge
often used in classical and problem analogies. When classical analogies use simpler
relational knowledge children show successful performance at an early age, just as they
do with problem analogies.
However, another way of describing the distinction is that in classical analogies the task
structure is made clear, in that there can be only one base analogy (that between the A
and B terms). Thus the goal is to identify the items which complete the pattern of
relational similarity. On the other hand, in problem analogies, the initial goal is to
identify and represent the correct base relationship, such that it is possible to complete
the relational similarity pattern. This highlights again the importance of the initial
construction of the relational task representation for many analogies. In classical
analogies, this stage is often trivial, and the relational structure is explicit in the task
itself. In problem analogies, and in 'real-world' educational contexts, the relational
information which requires mapping is embedded within other descriptive elements of
the structure. Thus the explicit representation of the significant objects and their
relationship to each other (i.e. a representation at the structural level) is a non-trivial
process with the potential for error. It could be therefore that whilst both types of
analogical tasks involve the same core process, that of the mapping of relational
similarity, the richer context of problem analogies might mean that it can be more
difficult to isolate the appropriate relation. Thus, as we can represent both classical and
problem analogies as 4 element structures in Collins and Burstein's analysis, there are
other important differences between them which will differentiate effective
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performance. This performance difference is caused by affecting the ease by which
relational similarity is recognised and used. Some of the factors which affect the
application of relational similarity have already been investigated and are described
below.
2.4.3 Understanding the task requirements - the role of meta-
knowledge
As well as challenging the claims made by Piagetian theory, Goswami also drew
attention to the role of meta-knowledge. This refers to the knowledge that reasoning
using relational similarity, that is by analogy, is an appropriate way to solve the task.
Even if children know the relations and are competent in applying the relational
similarity constraint, they may still fail to look for relational similarities. Thus, if
children are unaware of the goal of the task, that is they do not realise the significance
of relational similarity, they will perform poorly. It would not necessarily be true,
however, to say that failure was due to a lack of competence in applying the relational
similarity constraint. Instead failure may be due to a misunderstanding of the nature of
the task.
As has been previously argued, the tendency to reason successively with classical
analogies (observed by Piagetian researchers), might have been due to a lack of
knowledge about the task requirements, rather than an inability to use the relational
similarity constraint. Research using simple problem analogies with young children
have provided support for the claim that meta-knowledge has a significant effect on
children's analogical reasoning skills.
For example, recent studies which have made the goal of the task explicit have resulted
in successful performance from young children. Brown, Kane and Long (1989)
provided one group of 7 year olds with explicit instructions concerning analogical
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mappmg. They did this by telling the children a story about the solution to a problem
which they had previously been unable to solve. They were then told that they could
use the story to help them solve another more difficult problem which they had also
previously been unable to solve. 46% of this group transferred the problem solution,
compared with only 20% of a group of children who received the same stories but
without any mapping instructions. However, although the experimental manipulation
resulted in an increase in successful performance, the larger proportion of subjects
(54%) still did not transfer the solution from the base to the target problems. Thus it
would seem that although the receiving of specific task instructions aided transfer, this
was not by itself sufficient to achieve total success.
The role of meta-knowledge was further investigated in the study discussed above.
They encouraged 7 year old children to transfer problem solutions by giving them more
than one analogy, as well as drawing their attention to the fact that the problem
solutions were the same. Thus the children who had received the initial problem a
second time were shown a series of pictures which demonstrated its solution. They
were then given a third analogical problem, but with no prompts about its similarity to
the other two problems. Their performance was contrasted with children who received
the same three problems in the same sequence, but with no prompts about any of the
problems. This time, the solution was successfully transferred to the third problem by
98% of the children in the experimental group, compared with 39% in the control
group. The full experiment therefore revealed the results given in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1: Results from Brown, Kane and Long (1989)
One analogy Two analogies
Instructions 46% 98%
No instructions 20% 39%
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Brown et al claimed that their results showed a 'learning to learn effect'. Highlighting
similarity between analogies and providing the opportunity to map this similarity onto
the target domain means that children will learn that the task goal is to apply the
relational similarity constraint. This knowledge about the nature of the task helps them
to focus on the relational structure of the base problem and map it across to the target.
This appreciation of the problem goal was shown to be important in a study by Brown
and Kane (1988). They designed three pairs of analogical problems, where the relation
which linked each pair of problems differed. Thus the two stories in Pair 1 were about
a stacking relation, those in Pair 2 were about a pulling relation and those in Pair 3 were
about a swinging relation.
3, 4 and 5 year old children in the experimental condition received all three pairs of
problems, whereas the children in the control group received only the third pair. For all
age groups, performance was greatly improved in the experimental groups. This
shows that when children are given the opportunity, they can learn that problem solving
using relational similarity is appropriate.
Focusing on structure is important.
Problem analogies have also been used to look at the role of the problem structure in the
development of analogical reasoning. Brown et al (1986) showed that questioning
children about the goal of the base story, a manipulation which was designed to help
them focus on the relational structure of the solution, significantly aided transfer to the
target problem.
An experiment carried out by Chen and Daehler (1989) investigated whether the ability
to abstract a generalised solution schema, in which the relational structure was made
explicit, would aid transfer. They gave 6 year old children two analogous stories,
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followed by an analogous problem. All the subjects were asked how the two base
stories were similar. Their responses were scored for the degree of abstraction. Those
children who talked about the structure of both stories independently and in terms of the
actual objects in the stories scored lower than those who integrated both stories and
who had abstracted the relational solution. All the children who had abstracted solution
schemas were successful in mapping the solution to the target problem, whereas only
38% of the' non-abstraction' responders had successfully transferred the solution.
These types of studies are providing us with some evidence which is relevant to the
issues raised at the end of the review of the literature on adult analogical reasoning.
These were:
1. The importance of the construction of the initial problem representation.
2. The induction of generalised schemas which can be held in long term memory.
The work discussed by Chen and Daehler is directly relevant. It does seem that
children can abstract generalised schemas, at least from problems which have been very
recently presented, and that these schemas have a significant facilitation effect on
analogical mapping.
Brown et al's research demonstrates that highlighting the structure of the base
problems facilitates performance. However, it does not directly address the issue of
how the structural representation is constructed. Problem analogies are inherently ill
defined and as such the crucial relations are embedded within a narrative which contains
some irrelevant details. It would therefore be difficult to explicitly ask children to
represent the relational structure of the problem, as they may not be aware of exactly
what we are requiring them to do. Asking them questions about relational structure as
we see it does mean that we can highlight its importance, but provides no insight into
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how children would represent relationships if they had not been cued to do so by the
experimenter. We therefore need a task which falls between classical analogies, where
the problem structure is explicitly presented to the child as part of the task, and problem
analogies, where we often need to remind children about the importance of task
relations by beginning to structure the task for them. A suitable analogical task would
be one where the child needs to construct the relational task representation himself, but
where the requirement to construct it is salient, such that no prompting by the
experimenter is needed. This is an important point, and will be returned to at the end of
this chapter and at the beginning of Chapter 3.
Before this, we must consider the current knowledge-based theories of the development
of analogical reasoning ability, which have been put forward to counter Piaget's
structural theory. It will be argued that these accounts also demonstrate a need to
investigate the way in which children structure their knowledge, that is, their ability to
construct relational task representations.
2.4.4 Knowledge based accounts of the development of analogical
reasoning
The criticisms listed above, and the studies which have challenged Piagetian
assumptions have led to an alternative view of the development of analogical reasoning.
Researchers who have disagreed with the late emergence of analogical competence all
share the belief that the development of analogical reasoning is knowledge based.
Thus, in certain circumstances, children as young as 10 months old are able to apply
the relational similarity constraint (Wagner et al, 1981).
Goswami (1992) has argued for an extreme version of the knowledge-based account.
She states "the ability to recognise relational similarity may not develop at all. Children
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may be able to recognise relational similarity at any point in their development" (page
13). Nonetheless, current research (Gentner and Toupin, 1986; Brown, 1989)
has still found that analogical reasoning improves with age. There are several subtly
different theories which claim to account for this persistent age-related change, whilst
still accepting that young children are competent in applying the relational similarity
constraint, given optimum conditions. These theories focus on differing factors to
account for age-related change in analogical performance.
1. Conceptual system development
There are several theorists which focus on the nature of the underlying conceptual
system as a constraining factor in children's performance. Vosniadou (1989) claims
that "what develops is not so much the ability to engage in analogical reasoning per se
but, rather, the conceptual system upon which analogical reasoning must operate"
(pA28) Thus mapping of an explanatory structure from a source to a target domain will
occur when the structure is present in their source domain knowledge and is also
consistent with their developing knowledge of the target domain. If the knowledge
base is still immature and does not contain sufficient constraining features, then
inappropriate transfer may occur, often where surface features are inappropriately
mapped across domains. Adults also engage in this type of reasoning when their
domain knowledge is not structured with the necessary relational information, as
shown by the research conducted by Chi, Feltovich and Glaser (1981) on novice and
expert physicists.
In a similar vein, Gentner (1989) puts forward evidence (Gentner and Toupin, 1986,
Gentner, 1988) for a developmental shift in analogical reasoning. She also views the
ability to reason about relational similarity as the hallmark of this ability. However, her
theory differs from Vosniadou' s in that she states that young children show a
propensity to reason using surface similarities, with the shift to relational reasoning
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occurring with age. Nonetheless, it must be recognised that this account is not
necessarily arguing for a genuine lack of competence in young children. Gentner has
also suggested that domain novices rely on surface similarities (object matching) and
has said that this reliance in both young children and novices may well come about
because of a lack of relevant domain knowledge. Of course there may be analogies in
which base and target domains share surface similarities as well as relational
similarities. Gentner (1989) has therefore suggested that children will find this type of
analogical problem (termed a 'near' analogy) easier than those which only share
relational similarity (termed 'far' analogies). She cites evidence from Gentner and
Toupin's study (1986) in support of this claim. Here, 6 year olds could only solve
analogies which shared surface and relational similarities, whereas 9 year olds could
solve analogies which only shared relational similarities.
In order to determine the cause of the shift demonstrated by Gentner and colleagues,
Goswami (1991) reviewed the literature and concluded that because the studies did not
test the subject's domain knowledge, there was no evidence to support the increasing
cognitive competence hypothesis. Recent studies which have ensured an understanding
of the relevant domain knowledge have obtained successful performance in children as
young as 3 years. Thus it would seem that the relational shift demonstrated by Gentner
could be due to developing knowledge rather than a change in analogical competence
per se. When children and adults are unable to reason using relational similarity
because of a lack of appropriate relational knowledge, they fall back on surface
similarities.
Vosniadou's account, discussed overleaf, shares many features with Goswami's
(1992) work. Both are concerned with the ability to recognise and use relational
similarity. Goswami states that "Children may be able to recognise relational similarity
at any point in development.. ....Their ability to do so will depend on the difficulty of
the relations on which the analogy is based" (p.13). This is very similar to
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Vosniadou's argument - there is a need for relations to be worked out and represented
in a conceptual system so that their similarity becomes apparent. The difference
bet ween these two theories seems to be that Goswami focuses on the recognition or
discovery of the relevant relationships, whereas Vosniadou concentrates on the
development of the representation of those relationships. However, as Goswami
points out, recognition will depend on the degree of difficulty of the specific relation
involved. The depth of knowledge contained in the conceptual system will also depend
on the degree of difficulty involved, so it seems that the two theories differ only in
focus, rather than in any essential feature.
We can draw a common implication from these theories - children need to possess
relational domain knowledge in an appropriate structure such that relational
similarities can be noticed and therefore used.
2. Information processing capacity development.
A rather different way of looking at the development of analogical reasoning concerns
constraints imposed by limited information processing capacity development. Halford
(1992) claims that children pass through four stages of structure mapping ability,
determined by a maturational increase in the amount of information they are able to
process. Each of these stages refers to the number of relations which the child can
process in anyone time. A more complex task will impose a higher processing load
due to more relations being involved. Thus the theory hinges on the number of relations
involved rather than an increase in the analogical mechanism per se.
In particular, Halford claims that children below the age of 5 years can only reason
about single relations, and before the age of about 2 years, they cannot reason about
relations at all. However, evidence exists from other studies which suggests that very
young children are capable of relational mapping. Willatts (1991) gave infants problem
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solving tasks in which they had to plan a series of actions which would result in a
desired goal. In order to reach a toy they had to remove a barrier between themselves
and the toy and then pull on a cloth to bring a container towards them which contained
the toy. The subjects had previously practised both actions separately, but in order to
plan retrieval of the toy, they had to relate them together, and hold them both in
memory at the same time. This can therefore be construed as evidence that babies can
reason about one type of relation at a time. Of course, these combinations are between
objects which exist in the real world, and not between mental representations. This
leads us to a discussion concerning the nature of base and target domains for analogical
reasoning. However, this is not explicitly referred to in most of the approaches we
have already discussed.
In both the classical analogy and the problem solving studies, mapping has been
between base and target domains which exist in some sense in the real world. Halford,
however, argues that the reason some mapping tasks can be solved by very young
children is because "it is not necessary to map from one mental representation to
another, as occurs in analogy" (page 201). This of course adds weight to his working
memory capacity argument, as presumably more complex mental representations will
occupy more space in working memory.
His theory of analogical reasoning describes the mapping process as being between the
base domain of an abstract reasoning structure (c.f. Holyoak's pragmatic reasoning
schema, 1985) and the target domain (usually the problem) As he has previously
described the reasoning schema as being retrieved from semantic memory, then this
description implies a mapping between two mental representations (i.e. the schema and
the problem solution). It is difficult to see where we can make a clear-cut distinction
between mental and non-mental representations, however, as we have no way of
saying how task representations are shared between the environment and the problem-
solver's internal resources. It could be that they rely on real-world representations of
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the base domain for both classical and problem analogies. In the former type of
problem, the C term is also represented in the real world, so the only element which has
to be based on a mental representation is the actual relation between terms and the
application of this to the C term. For the target domain in problem analogies, the
relation between the relevant task features is often already known. What needs to be
represented mentally is the mapping of the appropriate relation from the base domain
into the target. It seems therefore that Halford's definition of analogical reasoning is
doubtful for two interconnected reasons:
a. If we accept the core concept of analogical reasoning as being solely the ability to
map relational similarity from base to target domains, then it does not follow
necessarily that distinctions made between mental representations and real-world tasks
have any significance with respect to a theory of analogical reasoning per se.
b. As pointed out by Goswami (1992) in her commentary on Halford's thesis, we
have no way of knowing whether or not children map between real world tasks by
constructing mental representations of both base and target domains.
What is more appealing about Halford's work is the emphasis on abstract reasoning
schemas, which he argues arise from the child's everyday experience. In a manner
similar to that previously described, children abstract generalised relational information
which can be used as base domains for analogical problems. He thus argues that much
of reasoning is carried out through analogical mapping from these types of schemas.
However, he does not really address the issue of how the structuring of base and target
domains occurs. He appears to believe that schemas are represented as complete
structures which are retrieved intact and mapped across in their entirety. However, it
seems doubtful whether this is the case. Children often build up their knowledge of the
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world gradually and as such, it seems likely that schemas will be gradually constructed,
with potential for errors along the way.
If this is the case, then we might expect these schemas to be initially rather fragile, with
the potentiality for interference from irrelevant features in the target domains. Again,
we arrive at the importance of the way in which the child constructs the initial task
representation containing the important relational information. This representation
could be an abstracted generalised ordering schema, or a specific representation of a
single base domain.
An alternative information-processing account put forward by Sternberg and colleagues
focuses on the sub-processes used in analogical reasoning. Whilst we have already
discussed this methodology to look at analogical competence in adults, it has also been
used to address developmental issues. By breaking down the ability into various
component skills, researchers have been able to investigate whether developmental
differences in analogical performance are caused by the differences in the various
components.
As previously discussed, Sternberg claimed that six different components were
involved. These are:
a. Encoding the analogy
b. Inferring the relation between the A and B terms
c. Mapping or discovering the relation between the A and C terms
d. Applying this relation to the B term to generate a solution
e. Justifying the goodness of the match
f. Responding
Sternberg and Rifkin (1979) tested the componential theory by giving 8, 10 and 12 year
old children classical analogies to solve. These were based on drawings of people who
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either varied on the basis of external features (hats, suits, footwear etc.) or who varied
due to integral features such as height, weight, sex etc. They found that use of the
different components did not differ qualitatively with age, rather that children just got
faster. However, they found no evidence of mapping (item c) by the 8 year olds. They
concluded that this provided evidence for the Piagetian argument in that it involves
recognition of higher or second order relations. However, as previously discussed, the
use of mapping is optional. Item d, the application of the relation, corresponds most
closely to the children's ability to apply the relational similarity constraint. If mapping
is not necessary for reasoning by analogy, then failure to use this component cannot be
cited as evidence for failure to reason using relational similarity. Sternberg and Nigro
(1980) also tested the hypothesis that children were reasoning by association. They
used verbal classical analogies, but again did not ensure that the subjects understood the
relations involved in the analogies. Thus the fact that the children problem solved using
associative reasoning rather than relational similarity cannot be used as evidence of a
lack of competence in analogical reasoning per se.
Whilst componential accounts such as Sternberg's have provided us with a useful
methodology, again most of the research carried out in this area can be criticised
because the children were not pre-tested for the appropriate domain knowledge. Also,
as with the same approaches to analogical reasoning in adults, the description has been
concerned solely with the solving of classical analogies. Goswami (1992) has pointed
out that both the Inference and Application components in Sternberg's description refer
to the ability to work out relations, that is to their relational knowledge. The
Application component also concerns children's understanding about the similarity of
relations. Because of this, it is not possible to use Sternberg's componential analysis to
isolate children's understanding of the relational similarity constraint.
Sternberg's theory is therefore limited in its application. Its concentration on classical
analogies means that the initial representation of the relational structure of the task was
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not considered. On the other hand, Halford's emphasis on the structure of generalised
schemas highlights the significance of the representation of relational information.
3. Metaconceptual Development
Brown (1989) has put forward a 'coherent knowledge hypothesis'. This argues that
not all knowledge is equal, and that one of the reasons that older children are more
successful in unassisted analogies is because their knowledge is better structured.
Citing the experiments which manipulated the instructions given to the subjects (Brown
and Kane, 1988) and those which provided assistance with structuring the knowledge
contained in the base analogy (Brown, Kane and Echols, 1986), she concludes that the
better performance demonstrated by the older children is due to two reasons:
1. They possess more efficient general strategies for' learning to learn', in that they do
not need instructional help.
2. These strategies mean that the child has a better understanding of the form or
structure in which their knowledge needs to be represented, such that mapping is
facilitated.
It is difficult to directly test metaconceptual understanding. However, it seems from the
studies referred to above that the way in which children build up integrated
representations of the knowledge which they acquire will have an effect on their ability
to map analogical relations across domains.
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2.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF RELATIONAL
TASK REPRESENTATIONS
We now have considerable evidence that Piaget's claim that children do not reason
analogically until the formal operational stage (i.e. around the age of 11 years) is
wrong. It seems that when children possess the necessary domain information and it is
represented such that the relational structure is highlighted, they can recognise and use
relational similarity between domains. All the current developmental approaches,
whilst highlighting the crucial importance of the possession of relational knowledge,
have therefore also emphasised the importance of how it is structured. The possible
exception to this is Sternberg's theory, because he has restricted his account to classical
analogies.
c..;
Work by Halford has provided us with a way of thinking about how constraints
internal to the individual might affect their ability to map relational structures. This
thesis will investigate constraints inherent in a task, i.e. those external to the individual,
which affect the way in which relational information is represented. This is consistent
with Keane's call for further research in the area of pragmatic constraints, discussed
earlier in this chapter. It is suggested that this will throw some light on the reasons
why some analogical problems are still difficult for children, even though they are able
to reason using the relational similarity constraint.
What we are particularly concerned with is children's ability to construct an initial task
representation which correctly represents all the significant relational information. This
is because many analogical tasks in the real world are concerned with complex
domains, with more than one potential item of information which could be mapped.
Because of this, it will not be appropriate to use classical analogies, as the domain
information has already been structured as part of the task. On the other hand, problem
analogies arc too poorly defined, such that it is difficult to look at the actual
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construction of the task representation. This is because in order to ask the child
about the relational structure of the problem, we would have to ask questions which
begin to structure it for them.
In order to deal with these constraints, we have decided to select a task in which the
structure is explicit, but is not given as part of the task. This way, we can examine the
influence of task constraints on the integration of separate pieces of information into
one systematic relational representation, such that this relation can be used for
analogical mapping. The next chapter deals with the selection of the task for the
research which is reported in the following chapters.
56
CHAPTER 3 : SERIES PROBLEMS AS AN ANALOGICAL
REASONING TASK
3.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Chapter 2 identified a need to investigate the role of structural task representations in the
development of analogical reasoning. It was suggested that the representation of a
domain or problem at the structural level (that is, a representation which depicts salient
items and the relationships between them in an integrated manner) would have a
facilitatory effect on analogical mapping. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that the
early competence in analogical reasoning demonstrated by Goswami and others can
often be masked by an inability to represent base and target domains at a common
structural level. Such an inability will prevent analogical mapping and so result in poor
performance, even though competence in recognising and using relational similarity is
firmly in place. In other words, it was suggested that the representation of problem
domains with respect to entities and their relations to each other in an integrated system
is a necessary precursor to analogical reasoning. Thus the rest of this thesis will
explore some of the factors which affect the construction of these types of structural
task representations. This will enable us to understand some of the difficulties children
encounter when mapping objects and relationships across base and target domains.
It is necessary, therefore, to identify a simple task which would enable a rigorous and
systematic investigation of the factors which constrain the internal description of task
objects and their relationships to each other in a single, integrated representation. This
chapter addresses the choice of task for the subsequent group of experiments, which
are then reported in Chapters 4 to 9.
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3.2 CHOICE OF TASK
The main aims of the research are as follows:
1. To investigate some of the factors which affect how young children combine
relations and objects into a single integrated systematic representation.
2. To investigate how this integrated representation can used to map between problem
isomorphs in analogical reasoning tasks.
In order to satisfy these aims, a list of task requirements was constructed.
The task should be:
- simple, such that it is concerned solely with objects and their relationships
with each other i.e. with no irrelevant details which might inhibit the
representation of structural features
_commonly solved by the construction of an integrated structural representation
i.e. one which represents domain objects and their relationships
- within the ability range of young children
_able to be used as a base domain in analogical reasoning tasks
_applicable to a variety of domains (both concrete and abstract)
It was decided that the group of tasks known as series problems met the prerequisites
listed above. In order to demonstrate the reasons for this, it is necessary to first
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describe the task and then to give a brief review of the existing literature.
requirement will then be discussed with respect to the task.
3.3 SERIES PROBLEMS - A DEFINITION
Each
Series problems are based on direct comparisons between two items contained within
one premise. Two or more premises are presented, and the task is to make inferences
about those items which are not directly related in anyone premise:
John is taller than Peter
-
Peter is taller than Robert
--
Who is taller, John or Robert?
(premise 1)
(premise 2)
(inferential question)
There is some considerable literature (e.g. Hunter, 1957, Breslow, 1981) concermng
this type of task, both in the adult problem solving literature and in that of cognitive
development. Much of the research which has addressed the development of children's
ability to perform this task has been concerned with whether successful performance
requires formal logical competence. This tradition of research began with Piaget's
stage theory of cognitive development (1921) He viewed series problems as important
because they enabled him to investigate the logical concept of transitivity. A transitive
relationship is one in which the relationship between' John' and 'Peter' and between
'Peter' and 'Robert' (see above) is such that 'John' is necessarily similarly related to
'Robert'. In a further example, the relation 'more intelligent than' is transitive, because
it supports valid deductions of the form:
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A is more intelligent than B
B is more intelligent than C
Therefore, A is more intelligent than C
(premise 1)
(premise 2)
(conclusion)
N.B. By convention, task items or elements are referred to as ABC et
" c.
Non transitive relations, on the other hand, do not support a similar relation between A
and C. For example, the relationship 'likes' is non transitive:
A likes B
B likes C
No valid conclusion
(premise 1)
(premise 2)
3.4 PIAGETIAN RESEARCH CONCERNING TRANSITIVE
REASONING
For Piaget and colleagues (1921, 1970) transitive reasoning* was important as it was
viewed as a central element of the concrete operational child's thought. They
maintained that a child's concept of relations, causality, time etc. progresses through a
series of developmental stages, each one having a qualitatively different structure. This
means that the child's conceptions in a certain area of relations (e.g. transitivity) were
reorganised as the child attained a different developmental stage.
Inhelder and Piaget (1964) looked at the development of transitive inference [rom the
point of view of the child's developing understanding of different kinds of
* Because the literature has been fundamentally concerned with the understanding of transitivity, the
problems described above are commonly referred to as transitive inference ~ r o b l e m s s This t b ~ s i i
continues to refer to them as series problems as it's aim is not concerned with the understanding of
formal logical competence i.e. transitivity
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relationships. According to them, the child begins with only a categorical
understanding of different kinds of relations. For example, taller and shorter are taken
to be mutually exclusive, such that an object cannot at the same time be taller than some
objects and shorter than others. Once children reach the stage of relativistic
understanding of relations (in the concrete operational stage) they can understand that a
term can be both tall in relation to A and short in relation to C and so they can deduce
the relationship between A and C.
According to Piaget (1972), concrete operational thought is characterised by 8
'groupings'. Transitivity is a property of half of these, those four which are concerned
with relations (the other four are concerned with logical classes). A grouping consists
of a set of elements (a 'field') and an 'operation' which may be performed between
pairs of elements of the field. Grouping V describes the addition of asymmetric
relations. These are relations where, when A is related to B this does not imply that B
is related to A in a similar relationship. For example, Jane is bigger than Mary is
asymmetric as this statement does not mean that Mary is bigger than Jane. However,
Jane is married to entails that Bob is married to Jane and so this relation is symmetric.
Thus the' field' of Grouping V is composed of a series of asymmetric relations between
two items. Each pair of items which are in relation to each other is known as an
'element'. Thus Jane is bigger than Mary is one element, as the two items 'Jane' and
'Mary' are in relation to each other. When these relations are also transitive, a
relationship which exists in two elements in the field which also have one item in
common means that the two elements can be joined together. This joining is such that a
deduction can be made about the items which are not common to both elements. The
joining of elements is termed addition, and is the 'operation' which is performed on
pairs of elements in Grouping V. For example, using the transitive relation 'bigger
than':
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Jane is bigger than Mary
Mary is bigger than Janet
Thus, Jane is bigger than Janet
(element 1)
(element 2)
(as 'bigger than' and
'Mary' are common to
both elements)
This addition can be represented symbolically as follows: (A>B) + (B>C) = (A>C)
Also, either one or both of the elements listed above can be inverted e.g. Jane is bigger
than Mary becomes Mary is smaller than Jane. Transitive inference between only direct
relations is known as isotropic (as in the example above, where 'bigger than' is the
relation used in each 'element'), whereas that between both direct and inverse relations
is heterotropic. Within the domain of relational thought, the ability to co-ordinate
inverse relations is also considered to be an essential part of the concrete operational
stage. This action may take two forms:
1. The translation of a relation (Jane is bigger than Mary) into its inverse (Mary is
smaller than Jane) and back again.
2. The co-ordination of inverse relations which are not inverses of each other around
the same term. For example:
Jane is bigger than Mary
Jane is smaller than Sue
(element 1)
(element2)
Although the relations in the two elements are inverses of each other, the actual
elements are not as Jane is the only common item. Thus as well as understanding that
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Jane is bigger than Mary entails that Mary is smaller than Jane, it is also necessary to
understand that Jane can be bigger than Mary and at the same time be smaller than Sue.
Item 2 is especially important for a complete conception of the addition of transitive
relations. This is because an understanding of the relative nature of relations is
essential for the co-ordination of premise relations around their common term.
Crlticisms of Piagetian assumptions
Later research has concentrated on methodological issues concerning transitivity.
Various factors have been discussed which could lead either to false positive
assessment (subj ects are judged to be reasoning transitively when they are not) or to
false negative assessment (subjects are judged to be failing to reason transitively when
in fact they are)
Reasons [or false positive assessment have centred around subjects using alternative
methods, such as attaching absolute relational markers to the items (Smedslund, 1963).
Thus, in the case of Jane is bigger than Mary, Jane would be designated as big. When
asked a question about Jane and Janet, the subject would therefore conclude that Jane
had to be bigger than Janet without considering the second premise (Janet is bigger than
Mary). These concerns have been easily overcome, however. Smedslund used more
than three items, e.g. Jane, Mary, Janet, Sue, for each problem. This ensured that the
mid-items, Mary and Janet, were both the larger and smaller items in different
premises, e.g. for the item Mary:
Jane is bigger than Mary
Mary is bigger than Janet.
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Absolute relational markers can therefore not be associated with 'Mary' and so any
inferential questions involving this mid-item, e.g. Who is bigger, Mary or Sue?,
requires that premises are combined in order for the correct answer to be inferred.
Several researchers have suggested that one reason for false negative assessment is the
difficulty young children experience in memorising task information (e.g. Bryant and
Trabasso, 1971). In order to control for this Trabasso (1975) trained subjects to
criterion on premise relations and then questioned them on all possible pairs of items
(both premise and inferential comparisons). Direct perceptual comparisons were
controlled for by using different coloured sticks as premise items and presenting them
through a viewing box such that their relative length could not be seen. They were
referred to only by their colour, so that no perceptual cues were available.
Subjects as young as 4 years were successful in answering the inferential questions
correctly, provided that they received sufficient training. Age differences were due
only to the length of time it took for the subjects to learn the premises to a criterion
standard, and to the greater difficulty which the youngest subjects (aged 4 to 5 years)
had in training with verbal rather than visual feedback. Trabasso therefore argued that
previous failures in transitivity tasks by children younger than 7 or 8 years was not due
to a lack of conceptual understanding of transitivity, as Piaget claimed. Instead, it was
due to the high memory demands which these tasks placed on the subjects, both in
initially remembering the premises and in making use of feedback.
Trabasso, Riley and Wilson (1975) continued the research concerning young children's
successful performance by examining the relative ease with which subjects made
various item comparisons in the 'coloured sticks' task described above. The main
finding from these results was termed the distance effect. This concerns the number of
deductions required to make the item comparisons. Thus questions concerning the
comparisons made in the original premises require no deductions, comparisons made
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between the first and third items or the second and fourth items . 1 d d .require e uction and
a com parison between the first and fourth items require 2 deductions. Consider the
task below:
The red stick is longer than the blue stick
The blue stick is longer than the yellow stick
The yellow stick is longer than the green stick
The green stick is longer than the orange stick
Questions comparing the red stick with the blue stick, the blue stick with the yellow
stick, the yellow stick with the green stick or the green stick with the orange stick
require no transitive deductions as they are concerned with information given in the
premises. Questions comparing the red stick with the yellow stick, the blue stick with
the green stick or the yellow stick with the orange stick require one transitive deduction
as only two premises need to be considered. Comparisons between the red stick and
the green stick or the blue stick and the orange stick involve co-ordinating information
contained in three premises, resulting in two deductions being made.
The results showed that the greater the number of deductions required to make the
comparison, then the faster it was solved. If subjects were encoding the premises
separately, and only combining them inferentially when asked to make specific
comparisons, one might expect that an increase in the number of deductions required
would result in slowing down of the response rate.
Trabasso at al argued that the distance effect provides evidence for the fact that subjects
integrate the premises into a single ordered representation. They then used this to
answer the questions posed by directly making comparisons between individual items
in the ordered representation. This eliminated the need for inference per se. Thus pairs
of sticks which are further apart in the integrated representation will be more easily
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picked out than those which are closer together and therefore comparison speeds in the
former will be shorter.
If we accept Trabasso's argument, then it follows that subjects are not reasoning by
transitive inference in the test phase at all, but are making direct comparisons from a
fully integrated representation. However, Trabasso maintained that subjects do use
transitive inference in order to form the array in the training phase. That is, 'the red
stick is longer than the blue stick' is combined with 'the blue stick is longer than the
yellow stick' to form
RED BLUE YELLOW (where the left side of the ordering denotes 'LONG')
Nonetheless, it remains unproved whether this use of transitive reasoning demonstrates
any explicit conceptual understanding of formal logical procedures, as described in
Piaget's stage theory.
3.5 THE CURRENT POSITION CONCERNING TRANSITIVE
INFERENCE
The argument therefore, appears to be whether or not young children (typically below
the age of about 9 years - the concrete operational stage) are capable of reasoning using
transitive inference. Piaget's definition is based on theories of formal logic. If we
accept this definition, then the literature to date has not clearly demonstrated a true
conceptual understanding of transitivity in young children (below the age of about 9
years). It seems probable that the children Trabasso et at tested were solving the
problems 'nontransitively', in as much that premises were combined in an additive
fashion during the training phase to form a single integrated representation. The
additive nature of the process, where each new item is joined onto those which have
already been ordered, means that it is perfectly possible to produce a correctly ordered
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single representation without an explicit understanding of what a transitive relation
entails. By using the correctly ordered internal item array, direct comparisons between
items could be made during the test phase, and so the use of inferencing was not
required. As Breslow (1981) has pointed out, it is not surprising that children will
construct and use such a representation in the tasks, as "direct comparisons are clearly
more convenient and efficient than inferences" (pg. 347).
The debate (which is still unresolved) seems to have now shifted from the age at which
children can reason by transitive inference to considering what the 'transitive task' is
actually testing. For example, consider the task below
The red stick is longer than the blue stick
The blue stick is longer than the yellow stick
The yellow stick is longer than the green stick
The green stick is longer than the orange stick
(premise 1)
(premise 2)
(premise 3)
(premise 4)
In order for the children's performance to unequivocally demonstrate a full conceptual
understanding of transitivity in the Piagetian sense, we would expect to see the
premises above encoded separately in memory during the training phase of the
experiment. The comparisons required of the subjects in the test phase would mean
that the relevant individual premises were retrieved and the appropriate inferences
made.
In the current example, a comparison between the red stick and the green stick would
necessitate retrieving premises 1-3 and using the relations given in these to infer the
required relationship. In contrast to this, the construction of a single ordered
representation means that as the subjects were learning the premises, they would
gradually integrate each premise into an integrated ordering as it was presented, in the
following manner:
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presentation of premise 1
RED BLUE
presentation of premise 2
RED BLUE YELLOW
(initial representation, left side denotes 'long')
(updated representation)
presentation of premise 3
RED BLUE YELLOW GREEN (updated representation)
presentation of premise 4
RED BLUE YELLOW GREEN ORANGE (updated representation)
There is now a consensus that children can and do solve these tasks by constructing an
single ordered representation during the training phase (Trabasso 1975, Trabasso and
Riley 1975, Breslow 1981). The point at issue is whether or not this still constitutes an
adequate test of the conceptual understanding of transitive relations, as described in
Piagetian structural theory. It could be that children are demonstrating appropriate
conceptual knowledge of transitivity as they are constructing the integrated
representation. However, it is possible to build such a representation in the absence of
this explicit knowledge. Each novel item can simply be added in accordance with the
relationship described in the new premise without appreciating any necessary inferences
which could be made directly from the premise information, due to the transitive nature
of the relationship.
For the purposes of this thesis, the issue of a 'transitivity test' is not relevant. The
important point is that children can and do solve series problems by the construction of
an single integrated array i.e. a structural representation. This behaviour is similar to
that of adult novices, although there is also evidence of the later emergence of task
dependent strategies (Wood, 1969). He demonstrated that when adult subjects are
familiar with transitive reasoning problems, they begin to focus on only the relevant
premises which they need in order to make specific comparisons.
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3.6 THE NATURE OF THE ORDERED REPRESENTATION
In the examples of Trabasso's research discussed above, the array has been ordered
horizontally, such that the left side of the ordering denotes 'long'. However, it must be
emphasised that the original research papers contained no details as to the dimension of
the ordered array, simply referring to it as a 'single linear array'. The decision to
represent the array above in this manner was made solely for illustrative reasons. In
fact there is very little discussion in the literature as to it's actual nature. However,
work by DeSoto, London and Handel in 1965 is of relevance here. They suggested,
like many other researchers, that the crucial step in the solving of series problems is the
combination of premise information into a unitary representation. They claimed that
this unitary representation consists of a visual image of a vertical or horizontal array.
More importantly, they claimed that relationships such as 'better-worse' have a fixed tie
to the vertical axis, whereas other relationships (e.g. lighter-darker) are not spatially
tied. This theory was expanded on by Handel, DeSoto and London, 1968, who
claimed that relationships which have a linguistic linkage to a vertical dimension (for
example 'better-worse' employs terms such as 'upper crust' or 'top dog') are tied to a
vertical ordering array whereas relationships such as 'farther-nearer' do not have
consistent spatial assignments.
Halford, 1992, when discussing series problems as a type of analogical mapping, is
unclear as to the dimension of the generalised ordering schema. He states that this is
usually 'left to right' or 'top to bottom', but seems to make no distinction between the
two. However, his diagrammatic representation of the mapping process, reproduced in
Fig. 3.1 below, is labelled using vertical relationships (' above '), but the schema is
represented graphically as being in the horizontal dimension.
69
Fig. 3.1: Series problem mapped into ordering schema (Halford, 1992)
above above
taller than
base schema
target schema
TOP .MIDDLE BOTTOM
JOHN PETER TOM
taller than
From Halford (1992)
It would therefore seem that there is no real consensus in the literature concerning the
dimension of the internal array. Although work by DeSoto and colleagues suggests a
preference for vertical orderings, Halford has not taken up this point, as he states that
either dimension could be used.
Why do series problems fit with the task requirements listed on Page
58?
1. Objects and their relationships.
These are very clearly defined problems, with no objects which are irrelevant to the task
structure which might mislead the subjects. It was felt important to focus in on the
representation of relational systematicity, initially without introducing other features
which might make this task more difficult and thus confound the data. For this reason,
more real world, educationally relevant problems were felt to be inappropriate at this
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stage of research, as they are often couched in narrative forms which inevitably
introduce contextual detail which is unrelated to the relational structure of the task. It
seems likely that they might therefore result in problems when children are focusing on
the structuring of new knowledge.
2. Solvable by the construction of a structural task representation.
As previously discussed, there is ample evidence in the literature to support the view
that children and adult novices solve series problems by the construction of an internal
ordered array.
3. Within the ability range of young children
Several researchers have used this type of task to investigate young children's problem
solving. Obviously written premise information could be a problem, depending on
reading ability. In order to avoid this problem, researchers have introduced either
concrete objects or drawings of objects. Pears and Bryant (1990) achieved successful
performance with 4- 5 year old children when making comparisons about the spatial
position of coloured bricks in a tower (see below for a full description) In a study
using comparisons such as height or happiness, Riley (1976) found that 7-8 year old
children were successful when using drawings of children's faces.
4. Usability as a base domain in analogical reasoning tasks
Halford (1992) has explained children's success in transitive inference tasks by stating
that they map the relationship inherent in the problem onto an ordering schema with
which they are familiar. Everyday interaction with their social environment provides
experience in ordering people, toys and objects according to height or size etc. Halford
suggests that this experience is generalised into an ordering schema, which the child
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can easily internalise due to the extent of its presence in day to day living. This
schema, together with its mapping onto a series problem, is represented
diagrammatically in Fig. 3.1 on page 70.
In other words, Halford believes that series problems are solved by analogy to very
commonplace orderings which the child learns at an early age. The frequency of
occurrence of these orderings means that a generalised ordering pattern is internalised
by the child. This can be used as a base domain for the purposes of analogical
mapping. This description is very similar to Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) work
concerning the use of pragmatic reasoning schemas in analogical reasoning. They
define these as abstract knowledge structures induced from everyday experience. Thus
the arranging of premise elements into an ordered set amounts to mapping them into a
pragmatic reasoning schema, in that it requires using a previously internalised general
schema to reason in a new domain which has the same relational structure i.e. is
structurally isomorphic.
5. Ease of adaptability to a variety of domains
One of the reasons for investigating the building of structural representations is to
consider their importance to the analogical mapping process. Therefore it is desirable
that the task selected for study will be able to be used in a variety of domains, both
concrete and abstract, as the ease of mapping of the base structure may be differentially
affected by the level of abstraction (Gentner, 1989). There are many types of relations,
ranging from spatial ('above') to abstract ('happier than') which can be used as a basis
for series problems. Spatial relations such as 'above', because they share the surface
features of the base schema represented in Fig. 3.1 above, are 'concrete' analogies,
whereas relations such as 'happier than' are 'abstract' analogies to the base domain
because they share only the deep, relational structure.
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For the reasons listed above, it was decided to use series problems to investigate the
construction of structural task representations. The following chapter describes the first
two studies, which were exploratory in nature. This is followed by Chapters 5 to 9.
describing a further eleven experiments in which aspects of the construction of
relational representations are systematically investigated.
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CHAPTER 4 : THE ROLE OF STRUCTURAL TASI(
REPRESENTATIONS
This chapter describes two preliminary studies which begin to investigate the role of
" .f. • e '
structural task representations in the development of analogical reasoning, using series
problems as a domain. The first of these was carried out in order to ascertain the
appropriate age groups and task presentation which it was felt would identify the richest
area for the development of further studies. The results obtained in this experiment
identified some unforeseen difficulties. The second study was therefore a replication of
a previously reported experiment by Pears and Bryant, and was carried out in order to
identify a possible source of these difficulties.
4.1 EXPERIMENT 1 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABILITY TO
REASON ABOUT SERIES PROBLEMS IN A SPATIAL DOMAIN
Background
For the reasons listed in Chapter 3, it was decided to use series problems to investigate
the construction of structural task representations. One of the overall aims of this
research is to ascertain whether some of the apparent age differences in analogical
reasoning tasks can be explained by age differences in the ability to represent a task at
the appropriate structural level. In view of this the upper limit of the age range chosen
for study was fixed at 9 years of age. This is because from the age of 10 to 11 years
(the concrete operational stage) analogical competence is no longer questioned by any
of the competing theoretical accounts. 5 years of age ( the commencement of
compulsory education) was selected as the lower age limit for study. This was because
the tasks required a level of concentration which would be problematic for
preschoolers. An informal pilot study carried out with 3 to 4 year old children showed
that they had very little interest in carrying out series problem tasks. The choice of the
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young age group posed potential problems concerning a suitable type of series
problem. Obviously, any task involving reading would not be possible with 4 to 5 year
olds. Trabasso's paradigm using coloured sticks of differing lengths was considered,
but this involved an extensive training phase in which the individual premises had to be
memorised. Again, an informal pilot study at a local nursery school showed that 4 to 5
year olds were not able to learn the premise information to criterion on a task similar to
that used by Trabasso et al, though whether this was due to a lack of motivation or
memory capacity was unclear.
One of the studies which obtained success with 4 to 5 year old children solving series
problems was Pears and Bryant (1992). They considered the problem of young
children's poor memory span and suggested that there were three ways to overcome
this. The first of these was to give children plenty of prior experience with the
premises, so that they have the opportunity to learn them thoroughly. There are,
however, several objections to this.
The first of these, borne out by the pilot study referred to above, is that young children
find memorising the task very difficult (Kallio, 1982). Some researchers have
presented the premises serially:
A is bigger than B, B is bigger than C, C is bigger than D, D is bigger than E.
This usually results in eventual success, but this could be due to simply remembering
the order of the premises rather than an understanding of the relationships which hold
between individual items (Adams, 1978). In the studies which rely on memorising the
premises, several of the subjects do not reach criterion in the training phase and so are
not tested. It is assumed that these children simply have too short a memory span.
Halford and Kelly (1984) have pointed out, however, that their failure could also be
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due to an inability to understand the information contained in the premises. Thus the
exclusion of these children could mean that an artificially high success rate is obtained.
The second solution was an attempt to deal with the objections to the solution discussed
above. Studies have been carried out which attempt to lessen or remove the memory
load by providing memory aids which symbolise the premise relationships (usually
concerned with size) by using spatial position. For example, Halford (1984) used a
pegboard with pairs of coloured pegs. The children were required to make transitive
judgements about the length of sticks which were the same colour as the pegs. The
pegboard remained present throughout the experiment, with the left-hand peg in each
pair always being used to represent the longer of the two sticks in each premise. This
study showed demonstrated a very low level of success. As Pears and Bryant have
commented, this could stem from a difficulty in using one type of relationship to
represent another.
Their solution to this was to use spatial relationships, giving premise information using
real objects. The spatial relation used was 'higher than' and the premise information
was given by means of paired towers of two different coloured bricks. The child is
asked to construct a tower of five bricks, using the information given in the premise
towers to work out the correct position of each colour. Before the children built the
tower, they were asked inferential questions about the relative positions of pairs of
bricks. The spatial relation chosen meant that information from two premise towers
had to be combined in order to reach the correct answer. This is very different from
previous studies, which commonly use length as the task relation. This means that the
actual length of individual items cannot be available to the subjects during the test
phase, as they would be able to answer any questions by making a direct comparison
between the sticks. Thus the use of a spatial relation removes much of the memory
load required, as premise information can be visible throughout the study. It also does
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not require the introduction of any symbolic memory aid, as information can be given
using the actual task relation.
Description of Pears and Bryant's study
In view of the above, it was decided to use a similar methodology to that of Pears and
Bryant for the current experiment. Their study is therefore explained in detail below,
and Figure 4.1 overleaf also gives a diagrammatic representation of the experimental
phase. This phase was preceded by an introduction where the children were made
familiar with the task materials and requirements. The experimental phase was then
split into four sections.
Note The participants were given three types of problem. These differed only in the
number of items (bricks) used in the problem - either two, three or four.
Section 1
The premise information was presented to the subject in the form of small premise
towers i.e. towers consisting of two different coloured bricks. Thus towers of four
items would have three premise towers, towers of five would have four premise towers
and towers of six would have five premise towers. These were presented in random
order, so that the children could not solve the problem by reading off the order of the
colours as they were presented to them.
Section 2
The children were then given duplicates of the different coloured bricks used in the
premise towers i.e. four bricks for the 'tower of four' etc.
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Section 3
The children were then asked inferential questions concerning the order of colours in a
tower which they would build if they preserved the relationships displayed in the
premise towers. The questions were always about non-original pairings, for example,
using the orderings represented in Fig 4.1 for the 'tower of four':
'Which will be higher, red or blue ?'
'Which will be higher, yellow or green ?'
Similar questions concerning the relationship between the blue brick and the black brick
were added for the tower of five and also between the green brick and the orange brick
for the tower of six. Those questions concerning the relationship between the yellow
and green bricks (towers of five and six) and also between the blue and the black bricks
(tower of six only) were deemed to be 'critical questions'. This is because both of
these bricks were as shown as both higher and lower than other bricks. Thus for the
tower of five example, the yellow brick is shown in one premise tower as being lower
than the red brick, and in another tower as being higher than the blue brick. Also, the
green brick is shown in one premise tower as being lower than the blue brick, and in
another tower as being higher than the black brick. Therefore, in order to correctly
answer a question about the relationship between the yellow and green bricks, the
children had to combine information from different premise towers. In contrast, in the
tower of five example, correct answers could be given to questions concerning either
the red or black bricks by using only one premise tower, as these bricks are' end-
anchors' and are only present in one premise tower. Thus the red brick is always
shown in the relation 'higher than', because it is only shown in the premise tower
where it is higher than the yellow brick, and the black brick is always shown in the
relation 'lower than', because it is only shown in the premise tower where it is lower
than the green brick.
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Section 4
When the children had answered the inferential questions described above, they were
asked to build a tower using the bricks they had been given, and again preserving the
relationships displayed in the original premise towers. This was not considered by
Pears and Bryant to be a particularly important part of the experiment, as they were
using the study to investigate the ability young children to make transitive inferences,
rather than to correctly construct an appropriately ordered large tower. They pointed
out that "It is in principle possible for the child to use each premise serially to construct
the larger tower without ever co-ordinating the information across pairs" (p. 503).
Nonetheless, they reasoned that those children who could make transitive inferences
about spatial position have at least one appropriate strategy to help them construct the
large tower and should therefore be reasonably successful.
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Fig. 4.1: Diagram to show Pears and Bryants methodology.
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The four year olds in this study performed at significantly above chance on all
questions and when constructing the larger towers. Thus there is evidence of early
competence in constructing an integrated structural task representation, providing that
the relationships relevant to the structure are made explicit and salient by the use of
concrete spatial descriptions.
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4.1.1 Introduction
In view of the findings reported by Pears and Bryant, it was therefore decided to use a
similar paradigm in order to investigate the development of structural reasoning. This
first experiment was designed to ascertain whether the precocious performance
demonstrated by Pears and Bryant's subjects could be elicited in similar age children
when reasoning with another simple spatial relationship, i.e., a horizontal rather than a
vertical array" . If an explicit and salient structural relationship is sufficient for success
in these types of series problems, then we can expect comparable performance using a
similar relationship. It could also be that the use of a simple spatial relationship might
facilitate the use of a generalised ordering strategy, as hypothesised by Halford. This
would enable reasoning to occur in other more abstract task domains, where the spatial
nature of the task structure is not as salient. For example, reasoning about a relation
such as 'higher than' which Halford has suggested forms the basis ordering schema for
series problems, might encourage subjects to retrieve this schema from memory in
order to reason about similar problems based around the relation 'clever than'.
Gentner's (1989) work on analogies, discussed in Chapter 2, also has relevance here.
She has differentiated between 'near' and 'far' analogies and has provided evidence that
near analogies, i.e. those in which base and target domains share many common
surface features, are easier than those which share few or no surface features (' far'
analogies). This has been shown both with adult subjects, who typically solve more
analogical problems if many surface features are shared, and also with children aged
around 6 years, who were successful with problems involving surface analogies.
whilst being able to solve those involving deep analogies. An explicitly spatial
relationship is, in Gentner's terminology a 'near' analogy, as it shares many surface
features in common with the base domain (the ordering schema internalised from
. . hi' di ision [Iowcver it must he
* This will also enable us 10 investigate tea ternanve array ImCI '. .'. ., h
. . Ierri b t '1 e aluauvc relal1onshlps, rather I an
remembered thai the work discussed earlier was re ernng to a s rae v
to concrete spatial ones
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every' lay Iilc). 0 . J t h h
u nc mig 1· expect t at t e successful use of an int t d
egra e array,
internalised from cveryday life, to reason about an explicitly spatial d ' ( ,
ornatn a near'
analogy), would encourage the use of the same strategy to reason about an abstract
domain (a 'far' analogy). This is because the 'near' analogy will highlight the
importance of the relations between the task items (due to the large am t f f
. oun 0 surace
similarity shared between the base schema and the spatial series problem), thus
enabling the same relational structure to be made more salient in the 'far' analogy,
which involves an abstract relational series problem.
Aims
This study had two aims:
1. To provide further evidence that the ability to construct an ordered array is a pre-
requisite for the ability to solve series problems,
2. To test the following hypotheses:-
a. 4-5 year old children will perform successfully in series problem tasks which are
concerned with a simple spatial relationship, such as that used in the Pears and Bryant
study, but will be unable to utilise this method of reasoning when given an 'abstract'
series problem (a 'far' isomorph of their generalised schema). This is motivated by the
work by Gentner discussed above. Based on this, it is hypothesised that 4 to 5 year
olds will not yet be able to utilise deeper relational similarities between their generalised
schema and the task, without also having surface similarities to act as a cue for
analogical reasoning. Furthermore, these children will also be unable to use similarities
between the relational structures of the spatial and abstract domains as a cue for
analogical reasoning, even when they have just successfully solved the spatial
reasoning task, This is because their abstracted schema (Halford, 1992) contains an
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explicitly spatial clement (sec Fig. 3.1 on page 70) which they will be unable to isolate
from the relational structure, as they are still also relying on surface similarities such as
the actual relation used. Thus they will be unable to use the schema to reason about a
non-spatial domain, even when it is presented immediately after a spatial task.
Note The relationship 'behind' was chosen, so as to investigate the use of a horizontal
array. Work by Walkerdine and Sinha (1975) has shown that children of this age can
order objects horizontally, as long as the objects are those which display canonical
backs and fronts. For this reason, drawings of different family members, viewed
'side-on' were chosen as the obj ects. The' distant' problem isomorph chosen was that
of 'happier than'. It was felt that this would carry very few potential preconceptions
concerning the relative states of happiness of the different characters used in the study,
based on knowledge which the children might import from their everyday interaction.
A relationship such as 'cleverer than', on the other hand, might carry with it
preconceived ideas that adults are always clever than children, and this would probably
influence the way in which the characters were ordered.
b. There will be a developmental progression concerning the use of a generalised
ordering schema for the solving of abstract series problems by analogy. Piaget's
work has demonstrated that, by the age of about 11 years, children are able to
successfully solve all analogical problems. Thus we would expect that at this age, the
degree of surface similarity between the generalised ordering schema and the series
problem would have no effect. Point a. above discussed the hypothesis (motivated by
Gentner) that 4 to 5 year olds will only be able to solve spatial series problems, as they
will be unable to recognise relational similarities without there also being surface
similarities to act as a cue. Again drawing on Gentner's work concerning the
developmental shift from surface to deep similarities, we might also expect to see an
initial partial use of the generalised ordering schema to reason in the abstract domain. It
is hypothesised that this use will firstly occur after the children have successfully
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solved the spatial series problems. In other words, the proximity of presentation of the
two domains will make the structural similarity between them very salient. This salient
similarity between the two domains will then be used as a cue to using the generalised
ordering schema to reason about the abstract domain. This will, of course. result in an
ordering effect, with enhanced performance in the 'far' isomorph when it is preceded
by the spatial task. In order to investigate the existence of partial success (dependent on
the order of task presentation) in the abstract domain, 7 year old children will be tested,
as they are mid-way in age.
c. Older children, around the age of 9 years of age, will not need any cues which
highlight relational similarity in order to facilitate problem solving with the abstract
relationship. They will spontaneously recognise the structural similarity between the
'far' analogy and their internalised ordering schema. This is because earlier work by
Piaget and others has shown that children of this age are capable of analogical
reasoning, irrespective of the degree of surface similarity. We would thus expect to see
use of the generalised ordering schema to be firmly in place without the need of any
cues to prompt its use. This will of course result in there being no ordering effects due
to the domain of the series problem.
4.1.2 lVIethod
Design
A three factorial mixed design was used. There were two between subject variables:
- age (5 years, 7 years and 9 years).
_ order of task presentation (spatial followed by abstract i.e. the' distant'
isomorph, and vice versa).
This resulted in six experimental groups, with ten participants in each group.
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There was a within subject variable of task type ( spatial or abst t ing)
. rae reasomng . Each
participant received four problems of each task type.*
Participants
Sixty children took part in the experiment. They all attended state nursery (Group 1) or
primary schools (Groups 2 and 3) and were of mixed ability. They comprised three
age groups:
Group 1 - mean age 4 years 11 months, range 4.7 to 5.2 years
Group 2 - mean age 6 years 9 months, range 6.4 to 7.3 years
Group 3 - mean age 8 years 11 months, range 8.6 to 9.4 years
The children were randomly assigned to 'order of task' groups within their particular
age group.
Materials
The stimulus materials consisted of fifteen individual cards ( approximately 8.5ins x
4ins). These comprised three copies of five coloured drawings of different people
(grandfather, mother, father, girl and boy). The figures were all drawn in silhouette,
facing to the left. Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix A.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in their school environment. The experimenter first
explained the task, using an array of three different characters as a worked example.
The children then worked through the four examples without help from the
experimenter.
* An informal pilot study showed that more than this number resulted in a lack of interest from the -+
to 5 year olds.
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Throughout this thesis, the WISC-R digit span subtest was used as a measure of
working memory capacity. The test was administered to the participants before they
began the experimental trials. The results from this test enabled us to verify that the
working memory capacity of the subject groups was similar to that of their age group
norm. Later in the thesis, where comparable age groups were used in one experiment,
the test was used to ensure that all the experimental groups had similar scores for
working memory capacity. With the exception of Experiments 1,2 and 10, all the
studies were carried out with 7 and 9 year old children as participants. The WISC-R
test only supplies age norms for children aged 5 years 6 months and above. Following
a successful informal pilot study using the digit span subtest with children aged 4 years
6 months to 5 years 6 months, it was decided to use the test for all age groups, in order
to ensure consistency.
Introduction to the task.
The following instructions were read to the children:
"I want you to playa new sort of game with me. It's about doing
puzzles which put people in the right order. Here are some drawings of
different people ...Look, there's a girl, a daddy and a boy".
One copy of each of the appropriate drawings, as depicted in Appendix A, was shown
to the children (see below)
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"I'm going to give you some more drawings of the same people so that
you can use them as clues to put your drawings in the right order. Here
are the clues for this puzzle".
The drawings below were shown to the children.
"The daddy is first over here, then the little boy has followed him. In
the other clue, the little boy is first, and the little girl is following him.
So the first clue says that the daddy is in front of the little boy, and the
second says that the little boy is in front of the little girl. So we can join
together the pictures you have to make the right line, because we've got
the clues to tell us what to do. Look, like this, daddy (1) in front of the
little boy (2), and the little boy has to be in front of the little girl (3)"
Whilst the last sentence above was being read, the experimenter placed the original
cards in the correct order, at the time indicated by the numbers in parentheses (see
below)
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"Now you do this one by yourself".
A different three cards were given to the subject i.e. grandfather, girl, mummy.
"Here are your clues".
They were then shown their two paired character clues as below.
"Now use these clues to do the puzzle and put your cards in the right
order."
Note One 4 year old was unable to do this and so was excluded from the experiment.
All the other children were successful.
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ExperiInental task.
Four pairs of cards, i.e. four premises were used for each problem Thi h
' . IS means t at
the children had to correctly order five different characters for each task. The
participants were presented with the premises in non-serial order e.g. boy and
mummy, grandfather and girl, daddy and boy, mummy and grandfather. Appendix A
gives an example.
The following instructions were read to the children.
Spatial relation first
"You're doing really well. Now I've got four more puzzles for you to
do. I'll give you drawings of five different people. These people will
all be standing in a bus queue and your job is to put them in the right
order. I'll give you some clues, just like I did before, so that you can
work out what the right order is. Before you put your drawings in
order, I'll ask you some questions about where you're going to put
some of the different people."
Abstract relation first
"You're doing really well. Now I've got four more puzzles for you to
do. I'll give you drawings of five different people. All of these people
are happy, but none of them are exactly as happy anyone else. Another
way of saying this is that each person is a bit less or more happy than
anyone else. Think about your friends. One of them might very, very
happy, because it's their birthday perhaps. Another friend might nearly
as happy as the next one because they're going to play with their friend
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and to the party. The next friend is quite happy because they're going to
the party. And then another friend is not quite as happy because it will
be their birthday soon and the last friend might be the least happy
because it isn't their birthday for ages. Can you think of something that
might make you really, really happy? And then something that might
make your mummy nearly as happy? And something that might make
you daddy nearly as happy? O.K. This is what the five people are
like. They're all happy, but we can put them in order, starting with the
person who's the most happy, and finishing with the one who's the
least happy. Look at this line here."
The ordering above was shown to the subjects.
"Here the girl is the happiest, then the daddy, then the grandpa, then the
boy and then the mummy. Your puzzles will be about the same five
people, but the order they need to be in will change. Your job is to put
the drawings in the right order. I'll give you some clues, just like I did
before, so that you can work out what the right order is. Before you put
your drawings in order, I'll ask you about two of the people and which
of the two is happier than the other one."
One copy of each of the five character cards was then put in a pile in front of the
subject, followed by the appropriate four pairs of character cards used as premise
information. Before the children were allowed to place their cards in the correct order.
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they were asked a series of inferential questions. An example of this for the spatial task
would be '
"Who is furthest towards the front of the queue, the daddy or the grandpa?" The same
question for the abstract relation would be "Who is the happiest, the daddy or the
grandpa?" At the same time the experimenter selected the appropriate pair of cards (the
daddy and the grandpa) from the pile in front of the child, so that the child could
respond to the question by pointing, if they preferred. As in Pears and Bryant, all the
questions were about non-original pairs, for example, the girl and the grandpa, the
daddy and the boy and the grandpa and the mummy. Following Pears and Bryant, the
critical question was deemed to be the comparison between items Band D (in this
example the comparison between the daddy and the boy) This is because both of these
characters were as shown as both higher and lower than other characters in different
premises. The children were then asked to put the five character cards in the correct
order on the table in front of them.
Each child was given four problems for each task type (spatial or abstract). The relative
positions of each character and the order of premise presentation (though always
random), was varied within subjects. For example, consider the ordering
This requires four premises of character pairs as follows:
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The order of premise presentation given above is serial, because no actual reordering of
premises (and therefore of items) is required. Random orderings are those where some
reordering is required. For each 5 item ordering there are 23 possible random premise
orderings. Fig. 4.2 shows some examples of random premise orderings of the array
given above.
Fig. 4.2: Examples of random premise orderings of the array given above.
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The order of premise presentation, though always random, was also varied within
groups, such that all 23 possible orderings were used at least once within each
condition.
Note As the experiment progressed, it became apparent that the 5 year old children
were experiencing considerable difficulty in successfully completing the task.
Primarily as a means of improving self-esteem, it was decided to re-order the premises
such that they were presented serially. This was done for any trial in which a 5 year
old answered all the inferential questions incorrectly and was also unable to build the
array correctly.
4.1.3 Results
WIse scores
The results from the WISe digit recall test showed that, although the subjects were
performing at a level slightly above that of the norm for their age group, the scoring
intervals between the three experimental groups (approximately a score of 2) was in
accordance with the scoring intervals between the norm age group scores. The mean
scores for each experimental group were as follows:
Group 1 (5 year oIds)
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6.4
Group 2 (7 year olds)
Group 3 (9 year olds)
8.7
10.5
The relevant average performances on the digit span test are shown below:
Ages between 6 years 8 months and 7 years 8
Ages between 8 years 8 months and 9 years 10
(WISC-R Manual, 1974).
One of the reasons for carrying out this experiment was to enable a direct comparison
between with the results reported by Pears and Bryant (1990). In order to do this, the
data [rom the present study will be analysed in two ways. The first of these follows
Pears and Bryant's analysis, and is therefore concerned with total number of scores per
condition. The second method will consider the mean scores for each condition, and
analyses of variance will be carried out, where appropriate.
Answers to inferential questions
Analysis following Pears and Bryant's method
Table 4.1 shows the total number of questions which were answered correctly in each
of the six experimental groups. As there were ten participants in each group, and each
received four trials in each condition, the maximum number of correct answers in each
group is forty.
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Table 4.1: Total number of correct answers (critical and ..non-cntlcal) - scores out of 40
Task
Age Order Question Spatial Abstract
A?C 5 10
Spat. first B?D* 0 4
5 years C?E 6 5
A?C 5 3
Abst. first B?D* 4 8
C?E 4 9
A?C 23 19
Spat. first B?D* 20 20
7 years C?E 18 19
A?C 19 18
Abst. first B?D* 21 19
C?E 17 16
A?C 31/\ 31/\
Spat. first B?D* 24 24
9 years C?E 31/\ 26/\
A?C 35/\ 34/\
Abst. first B?D* 31- 23
C?E 28/\ 32/\
* = critical question (see page 91 for a definition)
- and /\ are explained below.
Since there was only one correct and one incorrect answer for each question, correct
answers could have been given by chance 50% of the time (i.e. 20 out of 40 [or each
summary data point given in Table 4.1). The table shows that only the oldest group (9
year olds) appears to be performing above chance. The 7 year old scores were around
chance, and the 5 year olds appear to be performing at well below chance rate.
A binomial test showed that with a probability level of less than 0.05, successful
performance at significantly above chance levels occurs when 25 out of the 40 scores
arc correct. Thus only the 9 year olds performed significantly above chance. They
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achieved this on all the non-critical questions across all conditions (marked" in Table
4.1), and on the critical questions only with the spatial task, and only when it was
presented second (marked - in Table 4.1).
Analysis of variance.
Due to the floor effects observed for the youngest age group (see Table 4.1) it was not
possible to include this group in the following analysis.
In order to investigate the remaining data, a four-way ANOVA was carried out [2
(order - spatial first and abstract first) x 2 (age - 7 years and 9 years) x2 (question -
critical and non-critical) x 2 (task - spatial and abstract)]. The first two factors were
between subjects, and the last two were repeated measures. It can be seen from Table
4.1 above that each problem involved one critical question and two non-critical
questions. Because of this, each data point was converted into a percentage of the
maximum score for each condition before being entered into the analysis. Table 4.2
below shows the mean percentage of questions which were answered correctly in
each of the sixteen experimental groups included in the design given immediately
above.
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Table 4.2: Mean percentage of correct answers
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Question
Critical Non-critical
Age Task order Task Task
Spatial Abstract .Spatial Abstract
7 years Sp. first 50 (28.86) 50 (33.33) 55.2 00.54) 47.8 (15.33)
Abs. first 50 (28.86) 45 (22.96) 44 (13.56) 41.4 (24.47)
9 years Sp. first 60 (24.15) 55 (19.69) 76.6 09.95) 71.5 (11.62)
Abs. first 77.5 (18.44) 57.5 (23.71) 79 (16.67) 82.8 (17.8)
A definition of critical and non-critical questions is given on page 91.
The analysis revealed the following significant effects:
- a main effect of age (F[1, 36] =37.896, p<0.01), such that the 9 year olds,
with an average percentage successful score of 70%, were more successful
overall than the 7 year olds (percentage successful score of 48%).
_a two-way interaction between age and type of question (F[1, 36] =4.503.
p<0.05) Fig. 4.3 below shows a graphical representation of this interaction.
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The interaction was analysed further, and revealed the following significant simple
main effects:
- an effect of age when answering the critical questions, such that the 9
year olds were more successful than the 7 year olds (F [1, 72] =6.707,
p<O.05).The 9 year olds were successful 62.5 % of the time, whereas the 7
year olds were successful 48.85% of the time.
- an effect of age when answering the non-critical questions, such that the 9
year olds were more successful than the 7 year olds (F[1,72]=32.730, p<O.Ol).
The 9 year olds were successful 77.5% of the time,whereas the 7 year olds
were successful 47.1 % of the time.
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- an effect of the type of question for the 9 year old children, such that
they were more successful with the non-critical questions (F [1, 36]=7.307,
p<0.05). They were successful with the non-critical questions for 77.5 % of
the time, and for the critical questions for 62.5% of the time.
Number of children able to order the array
As previously discussed, the question of whether the children could use the information
from the premise pairs for the purposes of ordering the concrete array (in this case the
tower of bricks) was not of crucial importance in the Pears and Bryant study, as they
were primarily interested in the ability to make transitive inferences per se. However, it
may well be that this will throw some light on the child's ability to determine the
structural dependencies which are inherent in the tasks.
Analysis following Pears and Bryant's method
Table 4.3 shows the total number of trials in each condition when the array was ordered
successfully using the copies of the premise characters which were provided. As there
were 10 subjects in each condition, and 4 trials per subject were counted, the maximum
number of successful trials per condition is 40.
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Table 4.3: Total number of trials (out of 40) when correct ordering of the array took
place
Task
Age Order Spatial Abstract
5 years Spatial first 3 4
Abstract first 4 2
7 years Spatial first 20 31
Abstract first 31 18
9 years Spatial first 32 34
Abstract first 35 26
If the arrays were ordered randomly, the chances of them being ordered correctly are 1
in 120 (0.33 out of 40). The number of orderings successfully completed by the 7 and
9 year old children were well above these levels. Even the 5 year olds were managing
to do this successfully some of the time. However, it could be that some orders of
premise presentation enable easier ordering than others.
Analysis of variance.
Table 4.4 shows the mean number of correctly ordered arrays, using the copies of the
premise characters which were provided. Again the 5 year olds have not been included
in the analysis, due to the low number of successful scores..
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Table 4.4: Mean number of correctly ordered arrays (max-4)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Task
Age Order Spatial Abstract
7 years Spatial first 2.0 (0.82) 3.1 (0.57)
Abstract first 3.1 (0.88) 1.8 (0.63)
9 years Spatial first 3.2 (0.63) 3.4 (0.70)
Abstract first 3.5 (0.71) 2.5 (0.94)
In order to investigate the above data, a 3 way ANOVA was performed. This was a
mixed design - 2 (order - spatial first and abstract first) x 2 (age - 7 years and 9 years) x
2 (task - spatial and abstract). The first two factors were between subjects and the final
factor was a repeated measure. The following significant results were obtained:
_ a main effect of age (F [1,36]=10.286, p<0.05). Overall, the 9 year old
children were more successful in completing a correct ordering (overall means
were 7 year olds - 2.5, 9 year olds - 3.17).
_ a 3 way interaction (F [1,36]=5.268, p<0.05). This is shown in the following
two graphs.
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Fig. 4.4: 7 year old children-interaction between task and t k d .as or enng.
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Fig. 4.5: 9 year old children-interaction between task and task ordering.
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This interaction was analysed further, and revealed the following significant simple
simple main effects:
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- an effect of task order when the 7 year olds were building the array
with the spatial task, such that the subj ects who completed this task
second were more successful than those subjects who completed it first
(F[1,36]=7.751, p<O.Ol). The mean score for those subjects who completed
the spatial task second was 3.1 whereas the mean score for those who
completed first was 2.0.
- an effect of task order when the 7 year olds were building the array
with the abstract task, such that the subjects who completed this task
second were more successful than those subjects who completed it first
(F[1,36]=10.826, p<O.Ol). The mean score for those subjects who completed
the spatial task second was 3.1 whereas the mean score for those who
completed first was 1.8.
- an effect of task order when the 9 year olds were building the array
with the abstract task, such that the subjects who completed this task
second were more successful than those subjects who completed it first
(F[1,36]=5.189, p<0.05). The mean score for those subjects who completed
the spatial task second was 3.4 whereas the mean score for those who
completed first was 2.5.
- an effect of age when the array was being built in the spatial task and
when it was presented first, such that the 9 year olds who completed this task
were more successful than the 7 year olds (F [1,36]=9.224, p<O.OI). The mean
score for the 9 year olds was 3.2 whereas the mean score for the 7 year olds
was 2.0.
_an effect of task type when the 7 year olds were building the array and the
spatial task was first, such the abstract task was completed more
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successfully than the spatial task (F [1 36]=17.707 p<O 01) The
' ". mean score
for the abstract task was 3.1 whereas the mean score for the spatial task
was 2.0.
- an effect of task type when the 7 year olds were building the array and the
abstract task was first, such the spatial task was completed more successfully
than the abstract task (F [1,36]=24.732, p<O.Ol). The mean score for the
spatial task was 3.1 whereas the mean score for the abstract task was 1.8.
- an effect of task type when the 9 year olds were building the array and the
abstract task was first, such the spatial task was completed more
successfully than the abstract task (F [1,36]=14.634, p<0.01). The mean
score for the spatial task was 3.5 whereas the mean score for the abstract task
was 2.5.
Serial re-ordering of premises
It must be remembered that the premises were only re-ordered serially for the 5 year
olds. It was done for any individual trial in which the child was unsuccessful in all the
inferential questions and also in building the queue. The results of this re-ordering are
reported here in order to enable a comparison with similar results reported in
Experiment 2.
Inferential questions
Table 4.5 shows the number of questions answered correctly in each trial.
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Table 4,5: Total number of questions answered correctly (serl'al re deri f
-or enng or the 5
year old children)
The numbers in parentheses give the total number of children in each trial for whom the
premises were re-ordered serially.
Task
Order Question Spatial Abstract
A?C 26(34)- 28(30)-
Spatial first B?D* 25(34)- 25(30)-
C?E 27(34)- 27(30)-
A?C 21(33) 22(31)-
Abstract first B?D* 23(33)- 19(31)
C?E 26(33)- 22(31)-
* = critical question
It can be seen that all the questions were answered correctly at a frequency above that of
chance (50% success rate).
At the 0.05 probability level, a binomial test showed that a score of 19 or more out of
30, 20 or more out of 31 and 22 or more out of 33 or 34 was significantly better than
chance. Thus, for 10 out of the 12 questions (marked - in Table 4.5), the children
were performing significantly above chance.
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Building of array
Table 4.6: Total number of successful queue comnletions ('al .~ _sen re-ordenng for the 5
year old children)
The numbers in parentheses give the total number of child' .
ren 10 each tnal for whom the
premises were re-ordered serially.
Task
Order Spatial Abstract
Spatial first 27 (34) 26 (30)
Abstract first 25 (33) 23 (31)
The equivalent percentage figures are given in Table 4.7 below.
Table 4.7: Percentage of successful queue com12letions- serial re-ordering
These are expressed as a percentage of the total number of serial re-orderings.
Task
Order Spatial Abstract
Spatial first 80 83
Abstract first 73 74
A 2-way analysis of variance was carried out on the above data and revealed no
significant differences (F [1, 18]=0.044, p>0.05). However, it has to be remembered
that the individual successful scores which were analysed are percentages of the total
number of trials for each child where the premises were re-ordered serially. Thus a
successful percentage score of 100% could signify that a child was unsuccessful with
random ordering for all his trials (a total of 4) and then successful with them all when
re-ordered serially. On the other hand, a less successful percentage score of 50% could
signify that a child was successful with random ordering for half his trials (a total of 2)
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and then successful with only one of those two whe d d .
n re-or ere senally. Thus the
child who presumably has a better grasp of the task (beca th
use ey are able to reason
using random ordering for at least some of the time) has I
a ower percentage successful
score [or this analysis, as we are considering only serial re-orderI·ng I d d h .
. n ee ,t e main
reason that this analysis was carried out was to enable a co . b .
mpanson to e made with
Experiment 2.
4.1.4 Discussion
Random premise ordering
Answers to inferential questions
It can be seen from the results that there is no support for the experimental hypotheses.
The precocious performance obtained by Pears and Bryant in their study was not
replicated with either the 5 or the 7 year old children, who did not perform significantly
above chance on either the critical or the non-critical questions. A binomial test
performed on the data showed that only the 9 year olds were performing significantly
above chance when answering some of the questions, whilst the 5 year olds were
significantly below chance. This can be easily explained by this group's great
reluctance to guess the answers. The cause of this reluctance was not totally clear,
however. It could be that the type of question they were being asked was unfamiliar.
The children were attending the local nursery school. To date, most of their experience
in answering questions has been concerned with those problems which can be solved
by observation. For example, they might be asked to look at a picture of children
playing and asked 'Who's holding the red ball?' It could therefore be that answering
questions which require active problem solving is very difficult. Also, some of the
children remained rather timid throughout testing, which could explain their inhibitions.
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The improved performance by the oldest age group was also show b th I'
n y e ana YSIS of
variance. They were more successful than the 7 year olds overall, and also when
considering both the critical and non-critical questions separately. If we look solely at
the 9 year olds performance, they showed a significant improvement when answering
the non-critical questions in comparison with the critical questions.
There was however no interaction of age with either the task ( i.e. whether spatial or
abstract reasoning was required) or task ordering. Thus the main effect of age can be
explained by its effects on the type of question. It had no effect on successful
performance in either the spatial or the abstract task, regardless of the order in which
these tasks were presented.
These results are interesting for several reasons. Firstly, the poor performance shown
by the 5 and 7 year old children needs investigating further, especially when comparing
I
it with the Pears and Bryant study. The discrepancy could be for several reasons, one
of which concerns the actual relational term used here (behind), which might have
given the children more problems than the 'on top of' relationship used by Pears and
Bryant. In a three dimensional space, there is a potential ambiguity in that 'behind'
might mean either 'to the right of' or 'on top of'. For example, in the situation below,
a request to the child to place a red car behind the blue car might result in a placement at
either position A or B. If the children were answering the inferential questions by
constructing an internal integrated array, then this potential ambiguity may have affected
performance.
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'Birds eye' view
8
BLUE CAR A
CHILD SITTING HERE
It is considered unlikely this type of confusion is happening in the current study, as the
subjects were working only in a horizontal dimension, with figures which had obvious
fronts and backs, so they only had a placement choice of right or left. Also, nothing
was observed during the experiment which suggested any confusion. Nonetheless,
Pears and Bryant showed that similar aged children were apparently more at ease when
working with a tower of bricks and using a vertical spatial relation ('higher than ') than
the children in this study who used a horizontal relation ('behind'), together with
drawings of people (nonetheless, they were still not successful in completing the critical
inferencing questions). Other likely reasons for the lack of replication of Pears and
Bryant's results are methodological (though the detailed Method section was very
closely followed) or cultural, as the Pears and Bryant study was carried out in France.
This could have resulted in differing educational methods, or length of time in formal
education. In order to address these possible reasons, it was decided to replicate the
study reported by Pears and Bryant (1990). The report of this begins on page 121.
As previously discussed, it seems likely that children will solve series problems by
constructing an integrated internal array. This is because it imposes a lighter working
memory load than that of encoding individual premises (Breslow, 1981). The children
in the current study did not need to commit the premise information to memory,
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however, as the premise towers remained in view throughout the .
expenment.
Nonetheless, the 5 and 7 year olds were unable to correctly answer any of the
inferential questions at a rate significantly above that of chance. It seems therefore, that
these children were still experiencing some difficulty in actually integrating premises
internally (that is, constructing a structural task representation). They were not allowed
to actually construct the full tower using real bricks until after they had answered the
inferential questions, thus some internal manipulation of premise information was still
required.
Notwithstanding the differences between the current study and that of Pears and
Bryant, as discussed above, it seems from this experiment that the evidence concerning
children's ability to build an integrated internal spatial array is not as robust as
expected. The results from the two studies suggest that some of the difficulties which 5
year olds experience in building an integrated internal array might depend on the actual
spatial relationship used. However, the older (7 and 9 year old) children in the current
study were also not performing at ceiling level when answering the inferential
questions, suggesting that they also hadn't fully mastered the task of internally
integrating premises into an ordered array.
Using the evidence from the construction of real arrays
For the reasons given above, the analysis of variance of the 'concrete array' data was
carried out. If we accept that children, at least initially, answer these types of problems
by constructing an internal integrated ordering, then it seems reasonable to look at their
performance in constructing a similar external problem representation. This should
highlight some of the difficulties involved, and it will enable us to consider whether the
source of the child's difficulty lies in the inability to identify and use the appropriate
structural relationships. Riley (1976) working in the domain of series problems, has
. hild h b n working with externalshown that data patterns obtained when c ren ave ee
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orderings correlate with their performance when required to perform all operations
mentally. She used drawings of six children's faces, with the first name written
underneath. She told her subjects that they were going to learn about six imaginary
children, who differed on one dimension (for example, weight). During the training
phase, the children learned the comparative weights of the adjacent pairs of children.
They were then tested about the comparative weights of non-adjacent pairs. Half of the
subjects had access to duplicate drawings of the six faces during the training phase.
They were told that they could use these to help them remember the premise relations.
All of these children which were tested in the weight condition organised the pictures
into a linear order. They spent much less time in training, and made fewer errors than
those children who could not use duplicate drawings. However, both groups were
fastest with those comparisons involving end-anchors. Of the internal pairs, both
groups of subjects showed an inverse relation between decision time and number of
intervening items between the required comparison (see Chapter 3 for a further
explanation of these). Bearing this in mind, it is likely .that the problems which arise
during external integration of items will reflect similar issues concerning internal
integration.
Constructing the external array
It can be seen from the results that even the 5 year old children were able to build the
array correctly for some of the time. However, the numbers of successful attempts
were quite low for these children, and probably represent tasks when a relatively easy
order of presentation of premises was given. This suggestion is explained more fully
below.
- . . formati An example of this isThere were four character pairs used as premise ill orma IOn.
given in Fig. 4.6 below.
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Fig. 4.6: Example of paired-character premise information
The ordering shown above is serial, because no manipulation of the premise positions
is required to correctly order the array. None of the subjects in this experiment were
presented with the premises ordered serially. Any order other than that represented
above has been termed 'random ordering'. This means that at least one of the premise
positions needs to be altered before the array can be ordered. Any 4-premise problem
has 24 possible orderings, 1 of which is serial and the other 23 are random. Some
examples of random orderings for the equivalent serial ordering above are given in
Figs. 4.7, 4.8 and 4.10 below.
Fig. 4.7: Example of a random premise ordering
Gl
~ .
......
Gl
~ ~
......
Each condition in this study had 10 subjects, who completed 4 trials in each condition.
Each subject always used a different random ordering for each trial they completed.
However, these orderings were not varied systematically within subjects, or
between groups. Nonetheless, records were kept of the different types of random
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premise ordering that each child received. It appears from these that the requirement to
place an item in front of, rather than behind, a partially ordered array inhibited
successful performance, and therefore that the number of these requirements in any
particular trial determined that trials level of difficulty. It seemed to the experimenter
that the subjects considered the premises strictly in the order that they were presented
(however, no formal records were kept concerning this). This would explain why the
need to place an item at the front of a partially ordered array sometimes arose. Fig. 4.8
shows an example of a suggested complex random premise presentation of the ordering
given in Fig. 4.6 above, and also illustrates the suggestion made above.
Fig. 4.8: Example of a suggested complex random premise presentation.
(j)
i (j)
l; ~ ~~
"""{
If, as is suggested, the child considers each premise in the order it is presented, he or
she will begin to order the items by first placing the 'Mummy' and 'Daddy' cards,
followed by the 'Boy' card. The next novel item encountered by scanning the array
from left to right is the 'Girl' card. The partially built array will therefore be as in Fig.
4.9 below.
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Fig. 4.9: Partially built array
Gl
~ .
.......
In order for the premise information to be followed correctly, the 'Girl' card needs to
be placed at the front of the current array. It appears that in the current experiment,
this posed considerable difficulty. In contrast, Fig. 4.10 shows a simple random
premise presentation for the same array.
Fig. 4.10: Example of a suggested simple random premise presentation.
In this example, provided that the premises are considered in the same order that they
are presented, the array can be successfully constructed without the need to place any
items at the front of a partially ordered array.
Because of the lack of systematic variation of types of premise orderings in the current
experiment, further consideration of the data concerning the above is not possible.
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Also, it is conceivable that the children had difficulty in realising that the mid-items
were represented in two different premise-pairs, in that they were two copies of the
same drawing. In order for the premise information to be successfully integrated, the
child needs to amalgamate these two representations into one character. In the example
above, the children are looking at two copies of the girl, mummy and daddy. They
need to be aware that they only need one of each of these characters to construct a linear
ordering. If the children were trying to construct an array still using two drawings of
the mid-items then their performance will be greatly inhibited, as only one drawing of
each character was made available to them. This will be investigated in Chapter 5,
together with a systematic consideration of the effects of premise ordering.
Due to the large number of nil scores in the 5 year olds data only the 7 and 9 year old's
results were used in the analysis of variance. The results of this showed that, overall,
the 9 year olds were more successful than the 7 year olds, and also showed that the
different age groups were performing differently from each other, according to task and
order of presentation. This difference is explained more fully below.
The 7 year olds showed a simple practice effect. This is because their performance
always demonstrated a significant improvement when reasoning with the task type
(either abstract or spatial relationship) which was presented second. Thus there was
no effect of the actual task types, and the children appeared merely to be learning how
to manipulate the items so as to construct the correct array.
The 9 year old children needed no practice when the spatial relationship was presented
first. Their performance was virtually at ceiling with this spatial relation in this
condition and therefore showed no significant improvement with the second
relationship (abstract).
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However, when the abstract relation was presented first, the 9 year old children were
not performing at ceiling (even though they were given a simple introduction). The
children in this condition showed a significant improvement when they completed the
second set of trials (the spatial relationship task). Also, the 9 year olds performance on
the abstract task was significantly better when it was presented second than when it was
presented first. However, performance when the spatial task was presented second
was not significantly better than when it was presented first (presumably because
performance was already at ceiling).
These results suggest that 9 year old children are able to map task structure from a
generalised ordering schema in order to solve series problems. However, there appears
to be a distinction between mappings made on the basis of surface similarities and those
made on the basis of deep similarities (Gentner, 1989). For the purposes of this
experiment, surface features are defined as the actual relationship used. Thus the
spatial task and the generalised schema share surface features, as they both use the
relation 'behind'. Deep features are defined as the relational structure. Thus the
abstract and spatial tasks share deep features as, whilst different actual relationships are
used, they share the same structure.
Those trials which did not share surface features with the schema were not successfully
solved by analogical mapping, unless deep similarities in the relational structure of the
task and schema were made salient by the prior presentation of a similar task. This
task, as well as being structurally isomorphic to both the task in question and the
generalised schema, also shared the surface features of the schema. The salient surface
similarity between the spatial relationship task and the generalised schema, and the
salient deep similarity between the two task types (spatial and abstract) enabled
analogical mapping to occur between the schema and the abstract relationship task.
Without the benefit of this 'bridge', which provided a link between the two task types
and the generalised schema, the 9 year olds were unable to map relational structures
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from their generalised schema to the abstract series problem This re It 'd
. su provi es some
support for Gentner's argument that children are at first reliant on surface features when
reasoning analogically. It seems that this reliance stems from a need to make structural
similarities salient. Once surface similarity has been recognised and used, the close
proximity of another problem which shares a deep structure cues mapping based on the
deep relational similarity between series problem domains.
However, the results of most interest appear to be those shown by the 7 year old
subjects. These children did not immediately recognise how to relate items together
into an integrated representation, irrespective of the relation in which they were
working. Thus, although there were salient surface similarities between the spatial task
and their hypothesised generalised schema, analogical mapping did not occur until the
children had experienced several trials. This practice effect occurred irrespective of the
type of task. It seems therefore that there are constraints other that of surface similarity
which affect successful analogical mapping in order to solve series problems. Due to
repeated exposure to very similar problems, the 7 year old subjects in this study were
able to eventually overcome these constraints. However, children are not often in this
position and need to be able to map between relational similarities in novel tasks.
Focusing on the actual construction of an external ordered array should give some
insights as to the constraints children face in constructing and using structural
relationships. If we can identify some of these, we could present problems in a way
which will support a systematic and structural problem representation. It is hoped that
this might facilitate analogical reasoning by providing a bridge across which appropriate
mappings will more readily be made. It may be that this will result in more immediate
mapping, without the need to focus on initial surface similarities.
4.1.5 Summary
Experiment 1 had two aims, which are summarised below.
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1. To provide further evidence that the ability to construct an ordered array is a pre-
requisite for the ability to solve series problems.
2. To test the hypothesis that 5 year old children would only be able reason
successfully using the spatial task, whilst 9 year old children would be successful
irrespective of task type. It was also suggested that there would be an interim situation
(probably around 7 years) where the children would be able to transfer successful
analogical mapping from the spatial domain to the abstract one.
It has been shown that the ability to integrate individual premises into a integrated array
is very difficult for the 5 year olds, and initially difficult for the 7 year olds, though
they do get better with practice. These children also had difficulties in answering
inferential questions. Thus this study adds support to arguments made by Trabasso
and others that series problems are solved by the construction of an integrated array. In
respect of hypothesis 2, successful performance was not shown at all by the 5 year old
children. Nonetheless, the oldest group (9 year olds) did provide some evidence that
spatial series problems are, at least initially, easier than abstract ones. However, it
seems from the 7 year olds performance that there are constraints affecting the
integration of premises into an ordered array which occur irrespective of the task
domain (spatial or abstract).
For this reason, it was decided to conduct further studies to concentrate on how
children construct an external ordered array when given a common series problem. The
following set of experiments has been designed to investigate the existence of two
possible constraints.
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1. The effects of the order of premise presentation.
Although the order of presentation in the current study was random, there appeared to
be certain orderings which the children were more successful with. It was noticed that
the children seemed to consider the premises strictly in order of presentation. This
means that, [or certain premise orderings, items will have to be placed in front of a
partially ordered array. It is proposed that those orderings which require this will give
particular problems.
2. An inability to deal with redundant mid-items.
It is conceivable that the children did not realise that in order to successfully integrate
the premise information, only one drawing of each character was required, even though
all the mid-array characters were represented twice in the premise information. This is
illustrated in Fig. 4.11 below.
Fig. 4.11: Example of random premise information.
In the example above, the 'Daddy, the 'Girl' and the 'Mummy' are represented twice in
separate premises, as they are all 'mid-items' characters. In order to integrate the
separate premises into one array, the children need to be aware that two similar
drawings are actually different representations of the same character. A lack of this
knowledge would have prevented them from successfully ordering the array, as this is
dependent on integration of premise information.
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It was decided, based on work by DeLoache in 1991, to use photographs as stimulus
materials, rather than drawings. This is because DeLoache showed that photographs
were the easiest graphic representation for young children to understand. This is also
consistent with work reported by O'Connor, Beilin and Kose (1981) who argued that 6
year olds believe in the fidelity of photographs, as they are more likely to accept
illogical outcomes as true when they were represented in photographs rather than in
drawings. These two studies suggest that children might find it easier to accept that
two identical photographs in separate premises were of one character and therefore
realise the necessity to use only one photograph of a character when building the
integrated array.
Further chapters in this thesis will therefore describe the group of studies which
addressed the two factors listed above.
Before we begin to consider issues concerning the construction of an ordered external
array, it is necessary to address the poor performance shown by the 5 year old children
in this study, when compared with the results obtained by Pears and Bryant (1990).
As previously discussed, the difference in results could be due to the actual relational
term used. The current study used the relation 'behind', thus ordering in a horizontal
dimension, whilst the Pears and Bryant study used the' on top of' relation, thus
working in a vertical dimension.
In order to investigate this, it was decided to replicate Pears and Bryant's experiment.
If their results are also replicated, we will have some evidence that the relational term
'behind" poses more problems for 5 year old children when solving series problems
than the relational term 'on top of'.
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4.2 EXPERIMENT 2 - REASONING ABOUT SERIES PROBLEMS IN
A VERTICAL SPATIAL DOMAIN (A REPLICATION OF PEARS AND
BRYANT, 1990)
4.2.1Method
Design
A one-factorial repeated measures design was used. Each subject was presented with
twelve trials. Four of these trials involved working with a tower of four bricks, four
with a tower of five bricks and the final four trials used a tower of six bricks. Thus the
independent variable was the number of bricks in the tower. The measures of
performance were the number of questions answered correctly and the number of
correctly ordered towers. See page 80 for a diagrammatic representation of the task.
Participants
The fifteen children who participated in the study were all attending a state nursery
school in a mixed catchment area. Their mean age was 4 years 9 months (range 4 years
6 months to 4 years 11 months). Five children did not succeed in building a tower in
the practice trial and were therefore excluded from the experiment.
Materials
The task materials were different coloured bricks measuring approximately 1cm cubed.
Thess fitted together in a similar manner to 'LEGO' bricks. Photographs of the task
materials "are given in Appendix B.
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Procedure (this has been taken-from Pears & Bryant 1990)
Introduction to task
The children were introduced to the task materials, and were told that they would be
playing a game with them. The children were already familiar with the task materials,
as they are used regularly for number work. Each child was then shown two (premise
towers' each consisting of two bricks of different colours. For example, there might be
a tower with a red brick above a green brick, together with a tower with a green brick
above a black one. The child was then given three bricks, in this case black, red and
green and asked to build one three-brick tower so that they kept the relationships
already shown to them in the two smaller towers. The experimenter then pointed to the
two-item towers, explained the relations to the child, and told them to use these to help
them to build their tower.
Expertrnental task
See page 80 for a diagrammatic representation of the task.
The children were presented with twelve trials in all, divided into three blocks of four,
in the following order:
Block 1 - they were given three two brick towers to work with. This meant
that the tower which they eventually had to build and about which they were
asked inferential questions consisted of four bricks.
Block 2 _ as above but with four two brick premises and a five brick eventual
tower.
122
Block 3 - as above but with five two brick towers and a six brick eventual
tower.
The relative position of the different colours was changed on every trial and varied
between trials.
Each trial (12 for each subject) followed the following procedure:
The premise information (in the form of two-brick towers) was presented to the
subject. It was presented in random order, so that the children could not solve the
problem by reading off the order of the colours as they were presented to them.
The children were then given duplicates of the different coloured bricks used in the
premise towers i.e. four bricks for the 'tower of four' etc.
They were then asked inferential questions concerning the order of colours in the tower
which they would build if they preserved the relationships displayed in the premise
towers. The questions were always about non-original pairings-see Fig. 4.12 below.
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Fig. 4.12: Examples or completed towers and associated inferential questions
For the tower of four
Example completed tower
Red
Green.
Blue
Yellow
Inferential questions
Which will be the highest-the red brick or the blue brick?
Which will be the highest-the yellow brick or the green brick?
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For the tower of five
Example completed tower
Red.
Green.
B l l
Yellow
Bh.ck
Inferential questions
Which will be the highest-the red brick or the blue brick?
Which will be the highest-the yellow brick or the green brick?
Which will be the highest-the blue brick or the black brick?
For the tower of six
Example completed tower
Red
GreeD.
B l l
Yellow
BlAck
Orange
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Inferential questions
Which will he the highest-the red brick or the blue brick?
Which will be the highest-the yellow brick or the green brick?
Which will be the highest-the blue brick or the black brick?
Which will be the highest-the green brick or the orange brick?
The questions 'Which will be the highest-the yellow brick or the green brick?'
(towers of five and six) and also 'Which will be the highest-the blue brick or the black
brick?' (tower of six only) were deemed to be critical questions as they involved two
items which were not end points and which had been shown as both higher and lower
items in the premise towers.
When the children had answered the questions, they were asked to build a tower using
the bricks they had been given, and again preserving the relationships displayed in the
original premise towers.
Children who answered all the inferential questions incorrectly and were also unable to
build the tower correctly in anyone trial were then presented with the premises ordered
serially for those trials.
WISC-R digit recall scores were also taken from each subject.
4.2.2 Results
The results from the WISC-R showed that the mean score for the subjects used in this
study was 6.3. This is similar to the group of comparably aged children used in
Experiment 1.
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Note As in Experiment 1 the analysis of data has replicated that carried out bv Pears
J
and Bryant (1990). This was to enable a direct comparison between their results and
those of the current study.
Random presentation
. Inferential questions
Table 4.8 shows the total numbers of subjects (out of a possible 15) who answered the
inferential questions correctly in each condition.
Table 4.8: Total numbers of subjects who answered the inferential questions correctlv
(max. =15)
Trials -> 1 2 3 4
4 TOWER
A'?C 8 10 8 12-
B?D 10 8 11- 13-
5 TO"VER
A?C 8 8 II" 10
B?D* 9 9 9 8
D?E 10 II" 8 8
6 TOWER
A?C 9 8 10 9
B?D* 9 10 9 7
C?E* 8 9 8 8
12' 6 7 7D?F
* =critical question (see page 20 for a definition)
" d " See below for explanation.,- an .
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As in Experiment 1, the children could have been correct by chance 50% of the time.
Table 4.8 shows that more than half the children produced correct answers on 33 out of
the 36 total questions asked.
At the 0.05 probability level, a binomial test showed that a score of 11 or more out of
15 was significantly better than chance. This occurred in none of the critical questions.
Furthermore, a significantly better than chance performance was only obtained for the
non-critical questions in 3 out of the 8 instances for the 'tower of four' (marked - in
Table 4.8), 2 out of 8 for the 'tower of five' (marked 1\ in Table 4.8) and in 1 out of 8
for the' tower of 6' (marked" in Table 4.8).
Comparison with Pears and Bryant (1990)
Pears and Bryant report that all the noncritical inferential questions were being correctly
answered significantly marc times than would have been expected by chance. The
number of correct answers obtained for the critical questions was also significantly
above chance in 8 out of the 12 possible questions. The table below shows a direct
comparison of significantly above chance answers, between this study and Pears and
Bryant (1990).
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Table 4.<): Comparison of significantly above ch 'ance answers (current study with Pears
and Bryant)
Trials -> 1 2 3 4
This P.&B This P.&B This P.&B This P.&B
expo . expo . expo . expo
4 TOWER
.
A?C srg srg sig sig sig
B?D sig sig »s sig sig »s
5 TOWER
A?C srg sig sig sig sig
B?D* sig sig
D?E sig sig srg sig sig
6 TOWER
A?C sig srg sig sig
B?D* sig sig sig srg
C?E* SIg sig
D?F sig sig sig SIg sig
* = critical question (see page 20 for a definition)
Comparison with ExperiInent 1
It is appropriate here to reconsider the results obtained in Experiment 1, where the
children were asked to build a queue consisting of 5 people. Only the data from the
spatial task has been used for comparison purposes, and only when it was presented
first. This was to enable as close a match as possible between task types. In the
current study, using only the 'tower of 5' data, no critical questions and only 2 out of 8
noncritical questions received significantly more correct answers than the chance rate.
However, scores which represented a 50% success rate were always obtained for both
types of questions. This is to be contrasted with the corresponding conditions in
Experiment 1 (the queue task). None of the questions (critical or non-critical) were
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answered at a rate significantly above that expected by chance (with a probability level
of 0.05).
Building the towers
Pears and Bryant argued that the successful building of the actual towers was of less
importance than the results obtained from inferential questioning. Nonetheless, they
reasoned that those children who could make transitive inferences about spatial position
have at least one appropriate strategy to help them construct the large tower and should
therefore be reasonably successful. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the
construction of the tower is crucial, as it gives us an insight into the subjects ability to
build a structural task representation by integrating separate premises. Table 4.10
shows the number of children who were able to successfully build the tower in each
problem type.
Table 4.10: Number of successful completions of tower (scores out of 15)
Problem Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Totals
4 TO\VER 10 7 8 12 37
5 TOWER 10 7 8 10 35
6 TOWER 3 5 5 4 17
Because of the importance of this data for the research question addressed in this thesis,
it was decided to deviate from Pears and Bryant's analysis methods and carry out an
analysis of variance. A one-way analysis of variance was carried out on the total
number of correct answers for each of the three problem types. This showed a
significant effect of the number of bricks in each tower (F [2, 28]=20.303, p<O.Ol).
The means for this analysis are given in Table 4.11 below.
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Table 4.11: Mean number of successful lowe I'
. wer camp etions (collapsed over trials)
Max= 4
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Problem Successful tower completions
4 TOWER 2.47 (0.99)
5 TOWER 2.33 (0.72)
6 TOWER 1.13 (0.92)
Tukey comparisons showed a significant difference between 'tower of 4' and 'tower of
6' (q=8.18, p<O.Ol) and also between 'tower of 5' and 'tower of 6' (q=7.36, p<O.Ol).
Comparison with Pears & Bryant
This study reported percentages of correctly built towers. These are reproduced,
together with the data from this study, converted into percentages, in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12: Percentages of correctly built towers
Problem This study Pears & Bryant
4 TOWER 62 83
5 TOWER 58 70
6 TOWER 28 64
Comparison with Experiment 1
Again, it is appropriate to compare this experiment with the results obtained in
Experiment 1. Thus, the 'tower of 5' data has been used. Considering the data from
Experiment 1, only 5 year old children working with the spatial task has been used for
comparison purposes, and only when it was presented first. This was to enable as
close a match as possible between task types. 58% of the children were able to build
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this tower successfully, compared with 8% of the same age children who were able to
build the queue successfully.
Serial re-ordering of premises
It must be remembered that the premises were only ordered serially in those individual
trials in which the child was unsuccessful in all the inferential questions and also in
building the tower (or the queue in Experiment 1).
Inferential questions
Table 4.13 shows the number of questions answered correctly in each trial.
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Table 4.13: Number of questions answered correctly (serial presentation)
The numbers in parentheses give the total number of ch ildren i .1 ren In each tnal for whom the
premises were reordered serially. The last column of the table ci he gives t e total number of
serial re-orderings when questions were answered correctly dexpresse as a
percentage of the total number of serial re-orderings i e the first n b . h
. . urn er In t e totals
column expressed as a percentage of the number in parentheses.
Trials 1 2 3 4 Totals 0/0 totals
4
TOWER
A?C 1(3) 0(3) 2(4) 2(2) 5(12) 42%
B?D 2(3) 3(3) 1(4) 1(2) 7(12) 58%
5
TOWER
A?C 2(3) 1(4) 2(4) 1(3) 6(14) 43%
B?D* 0(3) 2(4) 3(4) 2(3) 7(14) 50%
D?E 2(3) 0(4) 3(4) 3(3) 8(14) 57%
6
TOWER
A?C 3(3) 2(5) 2(5) 2(6) 9(19) 47%
B?D* 1(3) 1(5) 3(5) 1(6) 6(19) 32%
C?E* 2(3) 0(5) 1(5) 0(6) 3(19) 16%
D?F 2(3) 1(5) 0(5) 3(6) 6(19) 32%
Only 17 out of a total of 36 data entries are at chance or above. Due to the sample sizes
the data was collapsed across trials (see' totals' column above) and a binomial test was
carried out. This showed that none of the questions (critical or non-critical) in any of
the three problem types were answered correctly significantly more frequently than
would have been expected by chance (0.05 level). Significantly above chance
performance (0.05 level of probability) would have occurred if 9 or questions had been
answered correctly for the 'tower of four' (where a total of 12 were reordered serially),
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10 or questions had been answered correctly for the 'tower of five' (where a total of 14
were reordered serially) and 13 or questions had been answered correctly for the 'tower
of six' (where a total of 19 were reordered serially).
Comparison with Pears & Bryant
In the equivalent trials in the Pears and Bryant study, all the questions were answered
correctly at a rate above chance. Only one score, that of the critical question in the first
trial for the' tower of 4' fell below the 0.05 level of significance.
N.B. Because Pears and Bryant used serial presentation with a different subject group,
the sample sizes were larger (34) and they were also broken down across trials. On
carrying out an analysis of variance - 2 (random or serial ordering) x 2 (tower size-5 or
6) x 2 (critical or noncritical question), Pears and Bryant found no significant effect of
ordering. A similar analysis was not carried out to compare the effects of ordering in
this study, due to the small sample sizes.
Compariso n with Experiment 1
As with this study, serial presentation was given only to those children in Experiment 1
who were totally unsuccessful (in anyone particular trial). However, due to the greater
lack of success in Experiment 1, the sample sizes were much bigger. Table 4.14
reproduces the number of questions answered correctly by the 5 year old children in
each of the conditions in Experiment 1.
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Table 4.14: Number of questions answered correctly in Experiment 1 (serial
presentation)
The numbers in brackets give the total number of children in each trial for whom the
premises were reordered serially.
Order Question Spatial Abstract
A?C 26(34)- 28(30)-
Spatial first B?D* 25(34)- 25(30)-
C?E 27(34)- 27(30)-
A?C 21(33) 22(31)-
Abstract first B?D* 23(33)- 19(31)
C?E 26(33)- 22(31)-
* =critical question
It can be seen that all the questions were answered correctly at a frequency above that of
chance (50% success rate).
At the 0.05 probability level, a binomial test showed that a score of 19 or more out of
30, 20 or more out of 31 and 22 or more out of 33 or 34 was significantly better than
chance. Thus, for 10 out of the 12 questions (marked - in Table 4.14), the children
were performing significantly above chance. This can be compared with the data from
the current study, where a success rate significantly above that of chance was not
detected for any of the towers (though this data had been collapsed across trials).
Building of Tower
Again, the sample sizes for this are low. However, 39% (9 out of 23) of the children
who attempted to build the 'tower of 4' after serial presentation were successful, 28%
(7 out of 25) were successful for the' tower of 5', and 63% (27 out of 43) for the
'tower of 6'.
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Because the data has been collapsed across trials to obtain these figures, and different
subjects attempted this task in different trials, it is not possible to perform an analysis of
variance in order to ascertain whether or not the effect is significant.
Comparison with Pears & Bryant
Table 4.15 shows the percentage of successful scores for both studies.
Table 4.15: Percentage of successful scores for the current study and Experiment 1
This study Pears and Bryant
4 TOWER 39 87
5 TOWER 28 75
6 TOWER 63 71
Comparison with Experiment 1
Table 4.16: No. of successful queue completions- serial re-ordering ( Experiment 1)
The numbers in parentheses give the number of successful queue completions which
occurred after serial re-ordering expressed as a percentage of the total serial re-
orderings.
Order Spatial Abstract
Spatial first 27 (80) 26 (83)
Abstract first 25 (73) 23 (74)
The average successful percentage rate of queue completions from the above data is
78%. The equivalent percentage from the current study for the 'tower of 5' task is
28%.
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4.2.3 Discussion
The results obtained show some improvement in the performance reported in
Experiment 1 (the queue task), although comparable results to those observed by Pears
and Bryant were not obtained.
The discussion is therefore split into two sections. The first section discusses the
results of the current study and compares them with those obtained using the queue task
(Experiment 1), whilst the second compares the current results with those reported in
Pears and Bryant (1990).
Comparison with the queue task (Experiment 1 )
Further details of this study can be obtained by reading the full report. However, the
main differences in the method are as follows:-
_ the mean age of the comparable group of children in Experiment 1 was two months
older than in the current study.
_ the subjects in Experiment 1 completed 8 trials altogether. All of these were 5 item
tasks, four involved a spatial relation and four involved a more abstract relation. In the
current study the children completed twelve trials in all, four each of four, five and six
item tasks. All the trials involved the same spatial relation.
_ the spatial relation used Experiment 1 was 'in front of' / 'behind', whereas in the
current study it was' above' / 'below'.
137
- real objects i.e. bricks, were used in this study. Representations of objects, i.e.
drawings of people, were used in Experiment 1.
It is not considered likely that the difference in age groups between experiments is
having an effect on the results obtained. On the whole, the slightly younger age group
show an improvement in performance over the older children. Also, considering the
data from 5 year old age group in Experiment 1, there was no significant effect of the
relationship used, or of the order in which this was presented (i.e. no practice effects)
Indeed, this age group children seemed almost to disregard the explanation of the actual
relationship. It therefore seems unlikely that either age or the spatial/abstract
relationship change is having an effect, so we need to look elsewhere for an explanation
of the observed differences between studies. In view of the points listed above, it is
probable that this will be found in any or all of the following:
1. Differing number of trials per subject (8 or 12), resulting in a possible practice
effect.
2. Whether or not the number of items in trials was increased for individual subjects (5
items throughout or four, then five, then six). This may have resulted in a 'easy to
hard' phenomenon, or a 'learning to learn' effect.
3. The dimensionality of the spatial relation (horizontal or vertical).
4. The type of stimulus used (representations or real objects).
di . 1. h follows will attempt to address the differing results obtained inThe ISCUSSlon w 1iC
the light of the above.
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Inferential questions with random premise presentation.
In Experiment 1, the subjects were performing at a rate significantly below that of
chance. In the current study, a 50% success rate i.e. at chance, was obtained for all the
questions. It appears that the most likely explanation for this is familiarity with the task
materials. The experimenter noted that the children were very happy to guess at an
answer when they were working with the bricks. Nursery age children are used to
working with colour names, and also using very similar bricksin their counting games,
when they actually build them into towers. This has to be contrasted with the actual
task which the children undertook in Experiment 1. They are used to dealing with
drawings of people, and the concept of bus or supermarket queues is not unfamiliar to
them. However, the experimental task context itself was unfamiliar to the children.
The experimenter noted that the children were quite reluctant to interact with the
drawings, whereas it was difficult to control the play sufficiently in the current study.
This unfamiliarity has presumably resulted in much less task involvement, so that the
children are unwilling to guess at an answer.
However, although the more familiar task environment resulted in greater involvement,
there is still very little evidence of success in the current study when answering the
inferential questions. None of the critical questions were answered above chance, and
only two out of eight of the noncritical were. It would seem that the children are
beginning to occasionally order the items appropriately. Both of the successful
occasions were when the children could use an 'end-anchor' to support their problem-
solving (i.e. for a non-critical question), but there were other occasions when
inferencing using 'end-anchors' was not successful. These limitations could either be
due to:
_capacity limitations when processing the premises in order to construct the array.
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- metacognitive considerations in that the children are not aware that the construction of
a fully ordered array would be an efficient strategy.
- not knowing how to interpret all the premise information so as to correctly construct
the array.
Building the array with random premise presentation.
These results address two of the three possible areas of difficulty which have been
detailed immediately above. The children were explicitly asked to build an external
array using the actual premise items. Thus there should be no problems relating to
internal processing limitations, or to metacognitive considerations concerning
appropriate strategies. However, only 58% of the children in this study were able to
build the tower, so it would seem that the subjects are still experiencing difficulties in
correctly interpreting the information which they have been given. Also, there was a
significant decrease in performance between actual construction of the 'tower of 5'
and that of the 'tower of 6'. Thus, even when processing limitation problems have
been eliminated by the presence of a real array which can be externally manipulated,
performance is still inhibited by a greater number of premises. It therefore appears that
the children were making errors when they actually interpreted the premise information,
which resulted in incorrect brick orderings. If this was the case, then it is not
surprising that the larger towers produced worse performance, as more items give more
opportunity for error.
The percentage of successful tower completions in this study is considerably higher
than that obtained in Experiment 1 (58% as compared with 18%). There are several
possible reasons for this:-
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- familiarity with the task environment, as previously discussed. It is felt, however,
that this cannot be the sale reason for the observed difference, otherwise we would
expect to see performance approaching ceiling in the current study.
- a possible practice or 'learning to learn' effect. It seems unlikely that this is occurring
here. The data from Experiment 1 was averaged over eight trials, and there was no
evidence of any improvement towards the latter part of a subject's performance. The
comparable results from the current study was averaged over trials 5 to 8 (i.e. the
'tower of 5' data). There was no evidence of any practice effect here, as the
percentages dropped as the number of trials increase, presumably due to an increased
number of items.
- an interaction between the dimensionality of the relationship used and the dimension
in which the premises were presented. In both experiments, the premises were actually
placed in front of the child in a left to right order (see Fig. 4.13 below).
Fig. 4.13: Actual premise placements (random)
Experiment 1
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This study
BlJ.ck
Red
Red. Bl1J.e
Yellow
Yellow
Green.
It could be that the type of placing used in Experiment 1 is interfering more with the
construction of the array in Experiment 1. Here, the dimension in which premise
information is presented is also the dimension in which the items need to be ordered
(horizontal in both cases). This could be causing some interference, and will be
investigated in more detail in Chapter 8.
- actual objects were used, rather than drawings. It does not appear probable that this
will be having an effect. Children of this age are used to looking at picture books etc.,
and none of the subjects expressed any surprise or seemed ill at ease when they were
initially introduced to the drawings. However, it is intended that future studies in this
thesis will investigate differing effects between using drawings or real objects as task
items.
The bricks that were used in this study were similar to 'LEGO' bricks, in that they had
to be pushed onto each other. When two bricks had been joined together, it was
necessary to exert some force before these bricks could be separated. In contrast to
this, the drawings were simply mounted onto pieces of card, so that 'joining' two items
meant just placing them next to each other. Thus, provided that the two bricks
presented together in a premise were correctly joined when the child began to construct
the array, it was more difficult for them to subsequently split the two bricks in error,
than it was when dealing with the drawings. It seemed to be the case in Experiment 1
that the children were mistakenly inserting new characters into the middle of a partially
ordered queue. In the current experiment, subjects were discouraged from disjoining
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partially ordered towers by experiencing some physical difficulty. Providing that the
pairs of bricks which replicate premise information have been correctly joined, this will
result in less splitting of bricks which have been placed into appropriate pairs. This
also has some drawbacks, of course, in that bricks which have been incorrectly added
to partially ordered arrays are equally difficult to remove!
Inferential questions with serial premise presentation.
For both this study and Experiment 1, only the subjects who answered all the questions
incorrectly and were unable to build the external array received the premises reordered
serially. In this study, an improvement in performance was not obtained by the
reordering. In Experiment 1, however, performance was improved as 11 out of 12
questions were answered correctly. It seems likely that the reason [or this is again the
interaction between the relationship used and the dimension in which the premises were
presented. With serial presentation, the mode of premise placement used will facilitate
performance in Experiment 1. Now, the children only have to eliminate adjacent mid-
items in order to be successful. In Experiment 1, this is trivial, due to the already
horizontal view of the premises. In the current study, however, further manipulation
needs to be carried out, in that the resultant array has still to be ordered vertically. An
example of this is given in Fig. 4.14 below.
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Fig. 4.14: i\clual premise placements (serial).
Experiment 1.
This study
BlAck Red Blue Yellow
Red Blue Yellow G ~ e l l l
Building the array with serial premise presentation.
The relevant data in the current study shows a large improvement from the 'tower of 5'
to the 'tower of 6' (18% to 63%). This would seem to be demonstrating a large
practice effect. Serial ordering of the premises does improve performance, but only
when the children have become familiar with the actual mechanics of building the
tower. This pattern of results was not seen with random presentation, where a large
decrease in performance was seen in the 'tower of 6' data. Thus it seems that serial
presentation removes some of the cognitive load, but the actual mechanics of the
construction also need to be perfected. The relevant results from Experiment 1 showed
that 58% were able to build the 5 person queue, when presented with the data ordered
serially. This has been averaged out over conditions, as no differential or practice
effects were observed. Thus it seems that, for the queue task, the children needed no
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practice in building the array. In the current study, comparable performance was 18%,
but, after practice (even with more items), success rate became equivalent to
Experiment 1.
So, in summary:-
With random presentation, children are generally more successful with this task (bricks
task) than with Experiment 1 (queue task). However, the children do not show a
significant success rate in answering the inferential questions in either experiment.
When they constructed an external array, they were more successful with the current
study, though their performance was still not at ceiling and was inhibited when the
number of items in the array was increased.
The situation is more complex with serial presentation. In the current study, no
facilitation of performance was achieved in answering the inferential questions. In
Experiment 1, more of the questions were answered correctly at a rate significantly
above that of chance, when the premises were reordered serially. If we consider the
construction of the external array, the position changes again. Serial presentation of
premises in the current study resulted in a large facilitatory practice effect (trials 4 to 8
compared with trials 9 to 12), even though the number of items was also increased with
practice (the opposite effect was observed with random presentation, where
performance with the 'tower of 6' was significantly worse than the other two). In
Experiment 1, serial presentation resulted in an immediate and overall improvement,
which was comparable with the eventual performance after practice in the current study.
If we consider the possible explanations for these differences, which were introduced at
the beginning of this section, it would seem that we are left with two probable effects :-
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1. The interaction of the dimension in which the premise information is presented, and
that of the actual relationship used. This is investigated further in Chapter 8.
2. The actual dimension in which the task was situated-vertical relations are easier than
horizontal ones. It is difficult to think of a reason why this might be so, however.
Comparison with Pears and Bryant (1990)
The only currently observable difference is the subject group. Pears and Bryant used
French children with a mean age of 4 years 6 months. This study used English
children, with a mean age of 4 years 9 months.
The results obtained in this study have failed to replicate the performance obtained by
Pears and Bryant. In the random presentation of premises, performance was worse in
this study when looking both at inferential questions and at external array completion.
It also showed no signs of improving through practice (though this could have been
cancelled out by the use of more items in the later trials). Serial presentation appeared
to have an effect on answering inferential questions in both studies, though Pears and
Bryant's subjects were presumably at ceiling, and the children in this study were still
not performing significantly above chance on any questions. Building of the external
array using serial presentation was showing an improvement due to practice in this
study (even with an increased number of items). Pears and Bryant report a slight
decrease in performance due to an increase in items. It could well be that, with more
practice, the subjects in this experiment would show equivalent performance to that
obtained by Pears and Bryant. It seems likely that their performance would then begin
to deteriorate due to an increased number of items, though it is unclear when this would
happen.
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Other than cultural differences, there appears to be no explanation for these results.
The better performance was produced by the slightly younger age group. Both groups
of subjects were attending the equivalent of state nursery schools, though of course
there may well be significant differences in the type of education received.
4.3 GENERAL SUMMARY
In conclusion, the research reported in this chapter has resulted in three main outcomes.
Firstly, it has been shownthat series problems are a suitable domain in which to
investigate the development of structural representations.
Secondly, we have evidence that 5 to 9 year old children have difficulty in integrating
premises into a single array, and that this affects the solving of series problems using
analogical reasoning.
Finally, there is some support for the proposition that there are constraints inherent in
the task which inhibit the integration of separate relations into a structured
representation.
This final point will be investigated further in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5 : TASK CONSTRAINTS IN THE BUILDING OF
STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATIONS (PART 1)
CONCERNING INFORMATION ORDERING AND 7 YEAR OLD
CHILDREN
The findings from Experiment 1 indicated that the 5 and 7 year old children were
unsuccessful in answering inferential questions in series problems, and also, for the
most part, in building the external ordered array i.e. the queue of people correctly
ordered. This could be completed by considering each pair of items presented as a
premise and integrating the information contained in them. Furthermore, the findings
were consistent with the evidence already reviewed which shows that:
1. Child and adult novices solve series problems by forming an internal, integrated
representation (Trabasso, Riley and Wilson, 1975; Wood, 1969).
2. Children who use concrete item representations to form an external integrated array
produce patterns of results which are very similar to results when they solve similar
problems without any external representations (Riley, 1976).
Because of the above, it is now accepted that the lack of success in solving series
problems demonstrated in Experiment 1 was due to difficulties in constructing a single,
integrated representation of the relational information contained in separate premises.
This failure to correctly represent the task at the structural level meant that the children
were unable to make appropriate mappings between the task and their generalised
ordering schema (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; Halford, 1992). It seemed that the
difficulties the children experienced was demonstrated by their comparable difficulty in
building the external array. In other words, constraints in the construction of an
integrated internal representation were demonstrated in the 'real-world' by
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corresponding constraints in the construction of a single, integrated external
representation.
Internal and external constraints
There is a tradition of research which has investigated the internal constraints on the
development of problem solving abilities. Following on from Piaget's structural
theory, neo-Piagetians such as Case (1972) and Pascual-Leone and Goodman (1979)
have drawn attention to the role of working memory capacity in children's general
cognitive development. They maintain that a growth in this capacity accounts for
children's increasing ability to successfully process and act upon information, both in
everyday situations and in educational environments. In a similar vein, Halford has
drawn attention to the function of working memory in the mapping of analogical
relations.
Researchers such as Donaldson (1978) have questioned Piaget's structural theory by
investigating the effects of external factors which impinge on children's cognitive
performance. They have shown that children's perceptions of the task requirements
and their beliefs about the experimenter's expectations can mask competence in some
Piagetian tasks. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond characteristics internal to the
child in order to fully investigate the underlying reasons for children's performance in
any given domain.
There is little reported research concerning the effects of external task constraints" in the
domain of relational representation. There is, however, an emerging theoretical
perspective in the cognitive domain in which the situated nature of cognition is a central
* Researchers such as Crisafi and Brown (1986) and Holyoak, Junn and Billman (1984) have shown
how varying the amount of surface similarity in problem analogies affects performance. In these
studies the items which required mapping were varied in order to vary the similarity. In the context of
this thesis, external task constraints refer to those factors which are inherent in the way in which the
task is structured.
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ISSUC. Here, the interaction of the individual with other individuals, with artefacts and
with the environment is recognised as crucial. The idea is that cognition is distributed,
embodied in the environment and in artefacts and in tasks as much as in the heads of
individuals. This has been demonstrated by researchers such as Carraher, Carraher and
Schliemann (1985) working with Brazilian street children. Although they were unable
to deal with formal arithmetic problems, they were very skilled in dealing with the
calculations required to sell candy. The message received from this type of research is
that 'cognitive context' has a fundamental part to play in problem solving. It is the
interaction of task, environment and the individual which results in performance. It
would therefore appear both useful and productive to think about factors which
originate from outside the original cogniser in relation to the construction of structural
representations. These factors, whilst not discounting the theories of workers such as
Halford, will add a further dimension to current knowledge concerning the formation
and mapping of systematic relational representations.
The aim of the following set of studies, therefore, is to begin to investigate the task
constraints which are operating on the building of structural task representations.
Experiment 1 showed that the 7 year old children were able in certain circumstances to
correctly construct an external ordered array, although their performance was still error
prone. For this reason, a decision was made to use similar aged children in the
following experiment.
5.1 EXPERIMENT 3 - ORDERING AND STIMULUS CONSTRAINTS
ON THE INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION
Rationale
Experiment 1 identified two initial task constraints which might have been inhibiting
successful performance. These were:
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1. Elimination of redundant items.
It is conceivable that the children had difficulty in realising that the mid-items were
represented in two premises and that in order to successfully construct the array, the
two tokens of the same person have to be amalgamated into one character. If the
children were trying to construct an array still using two drawings of a mid-item then
their performance will be greatly inhibited. Research has shown that photographs are
perhaps the easiest graphic representation for young children to understand (DeLoache,
1991; O'Connor, Beilin and Kose, 1981). For this reason it was decided to compare
the use of drawings and photographs as types of stimulus, to ascertain whether the use
of photographs will facilitate the elimination of redundant mid-items.
2. Order of Premise Presentation.
Although the order of presentation in Experiment 1 was random, there were some types
of ordering which the children seemed to find easier than others. This was also borne
out by the youngest children in this study, who only appeared able to construct an array
with certain types of ordering. It was noticed first of all that the children seemed to
consider the premises strictly in order of presentation. It seems that those orderings
which required a premise to be placed in front of a partially constructed array (i.e. a left
to right violation) gave particular problems. Because of this it was decided to
systematically vary the order of premise presentation between conditions. A 5 item
array has 24 possible orderings. In view of this, it was decided to reduce the number
of items to 4, so that all possible orderings could be covered in one study. The
possible premise orderings for such an array are as follows:
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1. AB BC CD
2. AB CD BC
3. BC CD AB
4. BC AB CD
5. CD BC AB
6. CD AB BC
1. is a serial presentation, where the relational information does not require
restructuring, and can therefore be used as a demonstration.
2. involves only the insertion of the third premise between the first two.
3. and 4. require only one premise to be placed using a left to right violation (L-R) r.e.
A in front of BCD or A in front of BC and then join D.
5. and 6. require either two straightforward L-R's or the joining of the second and
third premise to form a 3 term array and then an L-R. This would appear to be a
complex set of actions which can be carried out in a variety of ways and it will be
interesting to see whether a common strategy will emerge.
Taking the above factors into account, the following hypotheses were formulated:
1. There will be an improvement in performance if photographs, rather than drawings
are used.
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2. The following three types of premise presentation will result in decreasing levels of
performance:
Level 'Insert' - Order 2
Level'L-R' - Orders 3 & 4
Level 'Mixed' - Orders 5 & 6
5.1.1 Method
Design
A two factorial between subject design was used. The two factors were as follows:
1. Method of stimulus presentation. 2 levels:
Photographs
Drawings
2. Ordering of premises. 3 levels:
Level I (Insert) AB CD BC
Level L-R (Left to Right violation) BC AB CD
BC CD AB
Level Ivt (Mixed) CD BC AB
CD AB BC
Note Serial ordering was used as a worked example.
Thus there were 6 experimental groups.
153
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task. The 'order of placement' details
were also recorded, for both correct and incorrect orderings.
Partici pants
The participants in this study were 60 mixed ability 7 year olds from state first and
primary schools, with predominantly middle class catchment areas (mean age 7 years 1
month, range 6 years 8·months to 7 years 4 months). They were randomly assigned to
one of the six experimental groups.
Task description
The relation used was 'behind'. This was based on work done in Experiment 1. 4
item arrays were used, so as to constrain the numbers of possible premise orderings.
All the items were side views of women, distinguishable from each other by wearing
different coloured jumpers. Thus a completed array would be 4 women in a queue,
facing forwards and viewed from the side, with the front of the queue being to the left
of the observer's visual field. The orders of colours used were randomly varied, so as
to give 6 different orderings of four colours (yellow, green, red, purple). Appendices
C and D show examples of completed linear orderings.
Each subject completed six tasks. The two groups who completed level I had six
different colour ordering examples of the one type of premise ordering, and the other
four groups received three examples of the two orderings covered in their groups.
Thus each subject received one example of each of the different colour orderings. The
fit of colour order to example was randomly varied between subjects so that each
premise ordering was associated with 5 out of the 6 colour orderings.
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All of the subjects in groups L-R and M were presented with alternate task type
orderings and this was counter-balanced between subjects. Thus, for each group,
half of the subjects received order a b a b a b and the other half received b a b a b a.
Materials
Photographs
Six different colour photographs were taken, each showing the 4 colours in a different
order. The women used were all between the ages of 22 and 28 years, dressed in black
trousers and the appropriately coloured jumper and with a neutral facial expression.
They stood in front of a plain background approximately 20 ins apart and facing
forwards, to the photographer's left. Colour prints (6ins x 4ins) were made, and a
further 3 copies of each print were obtained. Two of these prints were cut so that the
three different pairings of adjacent characters were shown (see Fig. 5.1 below). These
three pairings formed the premise information.
Fig. 5.1: Example of 3 character pairings used as premise information
Red. G ~ e D D Ydlow Pun>le
From 1st copy of complete photograph
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Red GreeD.. Yellow
Discarded From 2nd copy of complete photograph Discarded
The third was cut so that the four separate characters were displayed, each as a 'part
photo' (see Fig. 5.2 below). These were given to the subjects to use when
constructing the linear ordering.
Fig. 5.2: Example of individual characters used by subjects when ordering the array
Red GreeD.. Yellow
Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix D.
Drawings
The same colours, orderings and sizes were used as for the photographs. The figures
were drawn by hand, photocopied and then coloured. They were then cut as described
above. Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix C.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a quiet room. The experimenter first explained the
task, using a complete photograph and serial ordering of premises as a worked
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example. The children then worked through the six examples, using copies of the
individual 4 items to build a concrete array. Final ordering, time taken and order of
item placement were recorded by the experimenter.
Wording of instructions
"I've taken photos/done drawings of four people standing in a
queue ...Look, like this one ... Can you see that they're all wearing
different coloured jumpers? You see that the person wearing the
<yellow> jumper is first, then the <red> and then the <green> and last
of all the <purple> one. I also made some copies.... they were exactly
the same. I cut one of the copies down the middle, so that the first two
people in the queue were in the first half and the last two people were in
the second half. ..... .1ook...like this .... .I then got another copy ,and cut
off the first and last people in the queue and threw them away, so that I
only had the middle two people left in this part...look. ..like this ..... The
other photos/drawings have got the same people in, but they're in a
different order in each one. In the puzzles that I want you to do for me,
you'll have to work out which order the people are in, because I'm not
going to show you the big photo/drawing until the end. You can use
these part photos/drawings as clues to help you do the puzzle .... .look,
I'll show you how........<Use serial ordering> Here are four separate
photos/drawings of the four people. We can use these to build up our
own queue from the clues. Look at these two people here. The photo/
picture shows us that the person wearing the green jumper is standing
behind the person wearing the red jumper. ..OK? So you use your
little photos/drawings to start to build the queue.....now look at this
next one.. Who's standing behind the person with the green
jumper? ...OK, so now you use your photos/pictures again .....Now
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usc them again when you've worked out what this last photo/picture is
showing you...... Right, now you've put all of the people in the order
which these three part photos/pictures told you about and so you've
finished this puzzle. Well done.....There are six more for you to do.
They all use the same people but the order of the people will be different
and the order of the photos /pictures which I give you might make the
puzzles a little bit harder."
WISC-R digit recall scores were also taken from each subject.
5.1.2 Results
Note Each subject completed six experimental trials. However, a large number of the
subjects erroneously tried to complete the first trial by recalling the demonstration
,
ordering. For this reason data from the first trial of each subject has been discounted in
the following analyses.
WIse scores
The results from the WISC digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (Insert ordering-photographs)
Group 2 (Left-to-right violation ordering-photographs)
Group 3 (ML"Xed ordering-photographs)
Group 4 (Insert ordering-drawings)
Group 5 (Left-to-right violation ordering-drawings)
Group 6 (Mixed ordering-drawings)
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8.5
8.7
8.5
8.9
8.4
8.8
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 7 years and 7 years 3
months is a score of 8 (WISC-R Manual, 1974).
Number of correct answers
Table 5.1 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
Table 5.1: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Stim ul us Ordering
Insert L-R violation Mixed
Photographs 4.8 (0.42) 3.9 (0.88) 2.3 (1.34)
Drawings 4.9 (0.32) 3.8 (1.23) 2.4 (1.17)
An ANOVA [2 (stimulus) x 3 (ordering), both between subjects factors] was carried
out on the above data and showed a main effect of ordering (F [2, 54]=33.204, p<O.Ol).
Fig. 5.2 shows a graphical representation of the above data.
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Fig. 5.2: Effects of stimulus and ordering (number of correct answers)
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In view of the lack of a significant effect of the type of stimulus presented, the stimulus
data was collapsed. The means for the resultant three groups were 4.85, 3.85 and 2.35
respectively. A one-way analysis of variance was carried out on this data, which
showed a significant effect of ordering (F[2, 57]=34.947, p<O.Ol). Tukey comparisons
were carried out to investigate this. They revealed the following significant effects:
- the subjects were more successful with Insert ordering than they were with L-R
violation (q=4.70, p<O.Ol).
- the subjects were more successful with L-R violation than they were with
Mixed ordering (q=7.05, p<O.Ol).
Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 5.2 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) for each experimental group.
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Table 5.2: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Stimulus Ordering
Insert L-R violation Mixed
Photographs 12.56 (4.26) 20.80 (3.30) 31.19 (4.61)
Drawings 10.24 (1.77) 18.92 (3.94) 29.89 (3.91)
An ANOVA [2 (stimulus) x 3 (ordering), both between subjects factors] was carried
out on the above data and showed a main effect of ordering (F[2, 54]=131.135,
p<O.Ol). Fig. 5.3 shows a graphical representation of the above data.
Fig. 5.3: Effects of stimulus and ordering (time taken to correctly solve tasks)
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In view of the lack of a significant effect of the type of stimulus presented, the stimulus
data was collapsed. The means for the resultant three groups were 3.39, 3.66 and 4.21
respectively. A one-way analysis of variance was carried out on this data, which
showed a significant effect of ordering (F[2, 57]=129.370, p<O.OI). Tukey
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comparisons were carried out to investigate this. They revealed the following
significant effects:
- the subjects were quicker with Insert ordering than they were with L-R
violation (q=10.04, p<O.Ol)
- the subjects were quicker with L-R violation than they were with Mixed
ordering (q=12.66, p<O.Ol).
Order of placement data
Whilst the subjects were completing each task (as before, five were counted in total)
the experimenter took details of the order in which they constructed the external array.
One record sheet was used for each child, and separate lines were used to record each
separate action which the child made. An example of this is given below.
162
Fig. 5.4: Example recorel sheet
1. R P
2. R P Y
3. Y R P
4. Y R P G
Note The letters Y, R, P and G refer to the different coloured jumpers worn by the
characters. Line 1 signifies that the first action was that of placing the 'red' and
'purple' characters together in one action. Line 2 signifies that the subj ect left the
placing made in line 1 and added the 'yellow' character to the end of the partially built
array. Line 3 signifies that the child then removed the 'yellow' character and re-ordered
it at the front of the partially built array Line 4 signifies that the subject left the placing
made in line 3 and added the 'green' character to the end of the partially built array.
The record sheets were then scored and collated in respect of the following items.
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1. It has previously been suggested that the children employ a left to right strategy,
with respect to the consideration of premise information, when they construct the array.
For example, if they were given BC AB CD they would begin the array by
placing items Band C, followed by items A and B (or just by joining on A) and then
by C and D, rather scanning the array to select out the items in the correct order i.e. A B
CD. The table below gives the mean number of trials in which the left to right
construction strategy was employed.
Table 5.3: Mean number of trials where a left to right take-up of information was used
(max=5)
Stimulus Ordering
Insert L-R violation Mixed
Photographs 4.7 4.1 4.4
Drawings 4.8 4.5 4.6
The overall mean number of trials when a left to right take-up of information was used
was 4.5 (out of a maximum of 5).
2. The left to right strategy has also been investigated with respect to the position in
which the children place the items. Hypothesis 1 suggested that children have difficulty
in placing items in front of a partially constructed array. In view of this, and also the
partial support obtained in the analysis of variance previously described, it was decided
to look more closely at the error patterns, and also any spontaneous correction of
orderings, to see whether further support could be obtained for this. In order to do
this a distinction has been made between successful trials due to self-correction and,
those which were successful from the outset. An answer which is correct from the
outset is one in which no incorrect 2, 3 or 4 item orderings have been made during the
problem solving process, whereas a self-correction involves the spontaneous correction
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of incorrect 2, 3 or 4 item orderings. An example of this distinction is given in Fig. 5.5
below.
Fig. 5.5: Examples of 'correct from outset' and 'spontaneous self-correction' solutions
Premise presentation
Green. Yellow Red Green. Yellow
Correct from outset solution i.e. with an observable break in the array
Green. Yellow
Green.
Red.
Yellow
Green. Yellow
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P"1JJ1lle
Red
Self-correction solution i.e. with no observable break in the array
G ~ e n n Yellow
G ~ e D D
Red
Yellow Red
Yellow
Because of the very small amount of errors and self corrections in the 'Insertion'
groups, consideration has been restricted to the L-R violation and Mixed groups.
Table 5.4: Total number of left to right violation errors
The figures in parentheses show the total number of all errors in that group. The two
figures in each cell are then converted to a percentage.
Ordering
Stimulus
Photographs
Drawings
L-R violation
8 11) 73%
10 12 83%
70%
85%
-
The overall mean percentage of left to right violation errors is 78%.
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Table 5.5: Total number of successful left to right violation self-corrections
The figures in parentheses show the total number of all errors in that group. The two
figures in each cell are then converted to a percentage.
Ordering
Stimulus L-R violation Mixed
Photographs 13 (16) 81% 12 (17) 71%
Drawings 14 (16) 88% 15 (20) 75%
The overall mean percentage of successful left to right violation self-corrections is 79%.
3. The order of placement data was also scrutinised for instances of 'premise pair'
splits. Consider the premise ordering below.
PUfllle Yellow G ~ e : n n Red Red , P1.lrJ! I.e
As subjects invariably use a left to right take-up of information, a typical ordering
would be as follows
Purple Yellow
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(from 1st premise)
Yellow Green. Red
(from 2nd premise)
At this stage, typically the subject would indicate that they had finished ordering the
queue (this would of course be an incorrect ordering), or they would look at the 3rd
premise and so reconsider their answer. It seemed that many of the children re-ordered
the array by moving only the last character (red jumper) in order to comply with the 3rd
premise. The children would then indicate that they had completed the task, with the
queue being ordered as follows (still incorrect).
Red. P u r p p Yellow Green.
However, in re-ordering as above, the child has failed to take account of the
information given in the 2nd premise, in that the red jumper is now no longer behind
the green jumper. This type of error has been termed a 'premise pair split' because the
subject has erroneously split characters which were given as immediately next to each
other in the premise information.
In contrast to this, a child who re-ordered by taking note of the information given in all
three of the original premises would carry out the following placements.
168
Premise presentation
Purple Yellow G ~ e I l l Red Red P"Urple
1st placement of items
Purple Yellow
2nd placement of items
Yellow Red
Re-ordering following consideration of third premise - note that red and green jumpers
have been re-ordered in one action due to the information given in the second premise.
Red P"Urple
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Yellow
In view of this, the CD AB BC task type was examined for evidence of splitting of
a previously ordered premise pair.
Table 5.6 : Total number of 'previously ordered premise pair' splits - (CD AB BC)
tasks
The figure in parentheses shows the total number of all initially correct, self-corrections
and errors in that group. The two figures in each cell are then converted to a
percentage.
Stimulus Ini t. correct Corrections Errors
Photographs 0(1) 0% 5 (5) 100% 14 (14) 100%
Drawings 0(2) 0% 8 (9) 89% 19 (19) 100%
5.1.3 Discussion
EliInination of redundant items
The first experimental manipulation, that of comparing photographs with drawings as
stimulus material, was designed as a means of testing whether or not the participants
had problems in accepting that the two middle character items were each represented
twice in the original premise information. In order for a correct solution to be reached,
it was necessary to eliminate the redundant character tokens. However, there was no
significant difference between the two conditions. Also, there were no comments from
the subjects which indicated that they were confused by there being only one drawing
of each character available to them when ordering the array. This is illustrated in Fig.
5.6 below.
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Fig. 5.6: Example of a potential situation where subjects might have been confused
Premise presentation
Green.
1st placement
Yellow Yellow Red Purple Green.
Green. Yellow
2nd placement (note that only the character (the red jumper) is added, although the
second premise has two characters, (the yellow jumper and the red jumper).
Green. Yellow Red
We must now consider whether the experimental manipulation was an adequate test of
the hypothesis concerning the redundancy of mid-item information. It could be that the
current lack of evidence in support of this proposition is due to the experimental
procedure, as the subjects were only given one token of each character to work with.
Thus the providing of a single token might have been causing confusion when the array
was being ordered, if the subjects were not aware that one token for each mid-character
had to be eliminated. This could have contributed to a lack of understanding of the task
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and therefore also to the children' s lack of success. Although we have evidence from
the current experiment that the order of premise presentation significantly affects
performance, inhibition might also be occurring as a result of an erroneous belief that
duplicate tokens of the mid-characters (the red and yellow jumpers in the example given
above) were needed. An obvious way to test this would be to compare the performance
of children who had only one token of each character available, with the performance of
those who had more than one. A further experiment was therefore designed in order to
carry this out, and is reported in Chapter 7.
Order of premise presentation
It can be seen from the results section that there is empirical support for hypothesis 2.
This showed that different premise orderings had a differential effect on performance.
Both types of data i.e. number of correct solutions and time taken to reach a correct
solution, provided a similar pattern of results. Task difficulty was primarily affected by
the number of left to right violation of premise orderings which were required.
It seems that there are at least three levels of 'order of premise presentation' difficulty
for a four item array. Thus the representation of structural systemacity in series
problems is not an obvious initial process for 7 year old children. Even when the
similarity between the task domain and the type of spatial reasoning required is made
very explicit, children still need practice in recognising and using item relationships.
The problems with L-R violation are interesting. Obviously, these children are literate,
and so this could well be a cultural phenomenon produced by interaction with text. The
study used a left to right presentation of premises, which might have encouraged the
children to build as they would construct written text. Therefore, it may prove
enlightening to present premises vertically. This will be addressed in a further study.
Also the data from the Mixed group is inconclusive. Performance is significantly,
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worse than the L-R group, but it is not clear why. There are several types of ordering
patterns which could be used in these problems. In view of the results obtained in the
other two conditions, it seems likely that the subjects were experiencing difficulty due
to the number of left to right violation of premise orderings which were required. On
the other hand, the mixed condition actually contains two subtypes of task - CD AB
BC and also CD BC AB. These are presented alternately. The necessity to change
strategies in order to deal with the two subtypes may be contributing to the difficulty. It
would be interesting therefore, to run a further two level, between subject experiment,
which compares CD AB BC with CD BC AB. Also, it could be that the former sub-
type is more difficult than the latter, due to the absence of a common item in the first
two premises (sub-type CD BC AB has the C item common to the first two
premises). This design would allow a direct comparison to be made. Several of the
children in the Insert ordering (AB CD BC) commented that there was no need for the
last premise and were happy to join AB to CD without the confirmatory premise BC.
However, although ordering CD AB BC produced many errors, examination of the
placement details revealed a partial reordering, often to BCDA, which showed some
consideration of the last premise. This could be due to an added conceptual
understanding provided by the alternative task in the Mixed group.
It is also possible that one of the reasons for the 7 year olds tendency to employ
inappropriate left to right strategies concerns the nature of the task. This was unfamiliar
to the children, and some of them appeared to be having difficulty in grasping what was
required of them. This could be due to the to the lack of context contained in the task.
It was explained to the subjects that they were solving puzzles about working out the
right order for people in a queue, but it could be that this explanation did not provide
the children with a good reason for trying to understand what was required of them.
There is evidence (Donaldson, 1978) that children's performance can be facilitated by
the use of contextualised 'real-world' tasks which are meaningful and motivating. In
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view of this, it was decided to carry out a study to compare performance on two series
problems. One of these will be the same problem as that encountered by the children in
the current study. The other will use same horizontal spatial relationship, but will
require the child to work with everyday well-known toys, and will provide a
supporting narrative. This study is reported as Experiment 4.
Order of premise placement data
This data has shown that an average of 79% of the subjects errors and self corrections
were due to them erroneously placing a character token at the end (i.e. to the right) of a
partially built array when they should have been placing them at the front. This of
course provides further support for the hypothesis that children's performance in
integrating premise information into one array is inhibited when they are required to
violate a left to right ordering pattern.
We can also see that for an average of 4.5 out of 5 trials, the subjects always used a left
to right takeup of information. This means that they scanned and acted on the premise
information in the order in which it was presented to them, that is in a left to right
order. This provides us with a reason as to why the children need, for certain types of
orderings, to violate their left to right rule. Fig. 5.7 below gives an illustration of this.
Fig. 5.7: Example of left to right violation
Premise presentation
G ~ e n n Y ~ l l o o Yellow
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Red. Purple G ~ e n n
1st placement
G ~ e n n Ydlow
2nd placement
3rd placement
Yellow
G ~ e n n
Red
Yellow Red.
Because the premise have been dealt with strictly in the order in which they were
presented, the 3rd placement required that the new character be placed at the front (i.e.
to the left) of the partially ordered array. This therefore required violation of the left to
right ordering rule. If however the children had searched the premises in order to find
the first 'end-anchor', i.e. the first character in the array, and had continued by
searching for the 2nd, 3rd and then 4th characters, then no left to right violations would
have been necessary.
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The order of premise placement data also appears to be showing that a further difficulty
is in realising that an item pairing given in an original premise should not be separated.
Inita1ly, the children appear to only consider one premise at a time. Consider the
premise ordering below.
Pwple Yellow Red G ~ e n n Green. Purple
An common initial (incorrect) ordering is:
Yellow Red
Subjects would usually reorder this as:
G ~ e n n P"Ul1 1e Yellow Red
This is because they then view the third premise. This of course has only involved the
re-ordering of one item (green jumper) rather than both the characters which were
linked in the second premise (the red jumper and the green jumper), which would result
in a correct solution. This is of relevance to the situation observed in Experiment 2
(Pears and Bryant replication). The bricks used were ones which were moulded to
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form ajoin (similar to 'LEGG' bricks) so it was much easier to move items as pairs
rather than individual bricks. It is interesting to speculate on why the 'split pairing' is
occurring. It could be that the children do not fully understand all the information
inherent in the initial premise, or just that they forget to utilise this information when re-
ordering, as they are no longer directing their attention towards it.
Conclusion
To summarise, therefore, it appears that the inhibition in performance in the
construction of a structural task representation de onstrated by the 7 year old children
in Experiment 1 was probably not due to problems concerning the elimination of
redundant mid-items. A further experiment is however necessary to investigate this
factor (see Chapter 7).
The current experiment has provided evidence that the 7 year olds experience difficulty
in constructing an ordered array and this is dependent on the order of premise
presentation. However, it could be that this effect is due, at least in part, to the child
working with an unfamiliar task. Experiment 4 will therefore investigate whether this
effect is also found when children are working with familiar toys and provided with a
supporting context.
We have collected some evidence that the 7 year olds difficulty in this study stems from
an inappropriate application of a left to right ordering strategy. This occurs because
they act on premise information strictly in the order in which it is presented to them.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that 9 year old children were more successful that 7 year
olds in constructing an ordered array. A further study (Experiment 5 in Chapter 6)
needs to be carried out to ascertain whether this improvement in the older children's
performance was due to the surrender of the inappropriate left to right ordering strategy
used by the 7 year olds in the current study.
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5.2 EXPERIMENT 4 - THE EFFECT OF A FAMILIAR TASK ON THE
INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION
There is evidence (Donaldson, 1978) that children's performance can be facilitated by
the use of contcxtualised 'real-world' tasks which are meaningful and motivating. In
view of this, it was decided to conduct the following study, which compares
performance on series problems. Both use the same horizontal spatial relationship, but
one uses equivalent stimulus materials to Experiment 3, whilst the other uses everyday
well-known toys, together with a supporting narrative.
5.2.1 Method
Design
A one factorial between subject design was used.
The two levels of 'type of stimulus material' were 'toy train' (Condition 1) and
'drawings of queue' (Condition 2).
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task. The 'order of placement' details
were also recorded, for both correct and incorrect orderings.
Participants
The participants in this study were 10 mixed ability 7 year olds (mean age 7 years 1
month, range 6 years 7 months to 7 years 6 months) from state first and primary
schools, with predominantly middle class catchment areas. The subjects were from the
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same schools as those in Experiment 3, and were assigned to Condition 1. The data
for Condition 2 (drawings of queue) was taken from Experiment 3 (Condition Left to
Right violation and Drawings).
Task description
Condition 1
As in Experiment 3, except that the task items were four different coloured carriages
from a toy train. The carriages could be coupled together and decoupled. The premise
information was presented by using drawings of two carriages coupled together (3
drawings for each 4 item task). The drawings were approximately 6 ins x 2.5 ins, and
the carriages were coloured appropriately. Each carriage had a character seated in it,
facing towards the front, so that the carriages had obvious backs and fronts. An
example of premise information is at Appendix E.
All the subjects worked with the following task orderings:
BC AB CD
Be CD AB
This corresponds to level L-R (Left to right violation) used in Experiment 3.
Condition 2
As in Experiment 3, except that all the subjects worked with the following task
orderings:-
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BC AB CD
BC CD AB
This corresponds to level L-R (Left to right violation) used in Experiment 3.
,
Materials
Condition 1
A toy 'LEGG' train, with an engine and four different coloured carriages, with a
character facing towards the front of each carriage, was used as the 'ordered array. The
children were handed the carriages and asked to put them in the right order. Premise
information was presented using 3 drawings of pairs of carriages, coloured
appropriately, for each ordering. Appendix E shows an example of premise
information and the appropriately ordered array.
Condition 2
As in Experiment 3, but using the drawings only. Appendix C shows an example of
premise information and the appropriately ordered array.
Procedure
Condition 1
As in Experiment 3, except the children were handed the four carriages to work with.
The wording of the instructions was as follows:
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"I'm going to tell you a story about something that happened in a
nursery school, just like the one you've got here. The teacher wanted
the young children to learn their colours. She decided to make it more
fun by using a toy train, just like this one (show engine and four
coupled carriages) Look. first there's a <red> carriage, then a <blue>
one, then <green> and last it's a <yellow one> She asked the children
to choose any two carriages, and make a drawing of them. They could
choose any two, but they had to colour them in the right colours and put
them in the right order. So you see that some children choose the first
two <red then blue>, some chose the next two <blue then green> and
some chose the last two <green then yellow>. Whilst the children were
busy working, the teacher went out of the room. Some of the children
started to play with the train, and they took the carriages apart, like this
<separate the engine and all the carriages>. They then realised that they
needed to join all the carriages together in the right order before the
teacher came back, otherwise she would know that they hadn't been
working. They couldn't remember the right order, so they had to use
the drawings which they'd made as clues. Look, you can do it like this
<use serial ordering and work through example as in Experiment 3>. I
want you to imagine that you're in this class, and you have to use the
drawings to work out the right order for the carriages, There are six to
do. They all use the same carriages, but the order that they should be in
will be different and the order that I give you the drawings in might
make it a little bit harder."
Condition 2
As in Experiment 3.
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WISC-R digit recall scores were" also taken from each subject.
5.2.3 Results
Note. Each subject completed six experimental trials. However, a large number of the
subjects in the first study erroneously tried to complete the first trial by recalling the
demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable with earlier studies
the first trial from each subject has been discounted.
WIse scores
The results from the WISC digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (toy train)
Group 2 (drawings of queue)
8.2
8.4
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 7 years and 7 years 3
months is a score of 8 (WISC-R Manual, 1974).
Number of correct answers
Table 1 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
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Table 5.7: Mean number of correct trials (max-S)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Type of stimulus material
Toy train Drawings of queue
3.6 (1.17) 3.8 (1.23)
A one way ANOVA was carried out on the above data and showed no significant effect
of the type of stimulus material (F[1, 18]=0.138, p>0.05).
Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
It was felt that the children may take longer to join carriages together (Condition 1) than
they would to place drawings in order (Condition 2). In view of this, 10 children were
asked to complete three trials each of the Insert ordering (Experiment 3), which has
previously been established as producing performance approaching ceiling, but whilst
working with the toy train. However, there were no significant differences between the
mean scores obtained and those of the children in Experiment 3 who completed the
Insert condition using the drawings (mean scores of 11.3 seconds and 10.24 seconds
respectively, F[1, 18]=3.163, p>0.05).
Table 5.8 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) for each experimental group.
Table 5.8: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Type of stimulus material
Toy train Drawings of queue
20.83 (2.39) 18.92 (3.94)
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A one way ANOVA was carried out on the above data and showed no significant effect
of the type of stimulus material (F[1, 18]=1.711, p>0.05).
Order of placement data
Whilst the subjects were completing each task (as before, five were counted in total)
the experimenter took details of the order in which they constructed the external array.
These were then examined with a view to identifying any differences in the use of left
to right strategies, as reported in Experiment 3.
Table 5.9: Mean no. of trials where a left to right take-up of information was used
(max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Type of stimulus material
Toy train Drawings of queue
3.8 (1.23) 4.5 (0.97)
A one way ANOVA was carried out on the above data and showed no significant effect
of the type of stimulus material (F[1, 18]=1.995, p>0.05).
Table 5.10: Total no. of Left to Right violation errors
N.B. the second figure in each cell shows the total number of errors in that group
Type of stlmulus material
Toy train Drawings of queue
12 (15) 10 (12)
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Table 5.11: Total no. of successful Left to Right violation self-corrections
N.B. the second figure in each cell shows the total number of self-corrections in that
group
Type of stimulus material
Toy train Drawings of queue
13 (14) 14 (16)
5.2.4 Discussion
The lack of any significant differences between conditions for both the number of
correct answers and the time taken to complete the trials means that there is no evidence
to support the experimental hypothesis i.e. that working with a situated, concrete task
facilitates performance.
It would seem, therefore, that the provision of a 'real task' does not affect performance
on series problems for the 7 year old children. This is further borne out if we consider
the order of premise placement data. The toy train condition appears to be producing
just as many left to right violation errors and self-corrections as the queue task, and
there is no significant difference in the left to right take-up of information.
There are three possible reasons for this:
1. Inappropriate choice of 'real task'
It could be that, if a different real task had been selected, facilitation of performance
would have occurred. This appears unlikely, however. The children who used the toy
train certainly seemed more 'at home' with the task, and there were no puzzled
expressions or inappropriate questions, as there were with the children who used the
queue task. Also, there were no indications from the order of premise placement data
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of any lessening of the left to right strategies which have been observed in the earlier
experiments. IL could be that the presentation of premise information using real objects,
rather than drawings, would have an effect, although it is not obvious exactly how this
would facilitate performance. On the contrary, asking the children to order using
duplicates of the objects used in the premises might cause some confusion, and it is
difficult to think of a cover story which would be convincing and motivating.
2. Time taken to couple the carriages
It was considered possible that the children would take longer to join the carriages
together than they would to place the drawings in order. However, there was no
difference in times between the performance on the train and queue tasks when the
children were using the Insert condition (where performance approaches ceiling).
Nonetheless, it could still be that the decoupling of incorrectly ordered carriages, when
the subjects self correct errors, takes longer than the re-ordering of the queue task.
This might explain the lack of difference in times between conditions, whereby any
facilitation in performance gained by the real task is being offset by the longer time
needed to re-order potential errors.
If this is the case, the train task ought to be producing significantly more correct
solutions. As this did not occur, it seems unlikely that the potentially more difficult
manipulation of the task materials is having any effect.
3. Constraints on performance are not due to familiarity or motivational factors.
This would appear to be the most likely explanation, if we consider the current data and
the results from previous studies. It seems that 7 year old children are experiencing
difficulties with these types of tasks due to the inappropriate use of a left to right
strategy, which is still used when they work with familiar task materials within a
186
motivational context. The evidence from the current study, together with that from
Experiment 3, suggests that this rule is very robust for a large proportion of 7 year
olds.
Experiment 1 compared the performance of 5, 7 and 9 year old children in the domain
of series problems and showed that only the 9 year old children were able to answer the
inferential questions and correctly order an external array for a significant proportion of
the tasks. The two studies reported in this chapter have shown that the degree to 7 year
old children were required to violate a left to right ordering strategy significantly
affected successful performance when constructing the external array. Details were'
also taken of the order in which the children placed the individual items. Collation of
this data showed that the children relied almost exclusively on a left to right ordering
strategy in the following ways:
- they employed a left to right take up of information.
- spontaneous self corrections and errors involved erroneously placing an item
at the end of a partially ordered array, rather than in front.
The following chapter will discuss similar experiments, but carried out with 9 year old
children. We know that there is a difference in overall performance between 7 and 9
year old children (Experiment 1), and that the 7 year old's difficulty stems from an
inappropriate L-R ordering strategy (Experiment 3). We will therefore be able to find
out whether the age difference in performance observed in Experiment 1 is due to
differences in the application of this strategy.
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CHAPTER 6 : TASK CONSTRAINTS IN THE BUILDING OF
STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATIONS (PART 2)
CONCERNING INFORMATION ORDERING AND 9 YEAR OLD
CHILDREN
Experiment 1 compared the performance of 5, 7 and 9 year old children in the domain
of series problems and showed that only the 9 year old ·chiidren were able to answer the
inferential questions and correctly order an external array for a significant proportion of
the tasks. The 7 year olds could order the array but only after practice and were unable
to answer the inferential questions (see Chapter 4).
A further study (Experiment 3, discussed in Chapter 5) investigated the performance of
the 7 year old children in order to get some purchase on their initial inability to carry out
this ordering. It was found that the degree to which they were required to violate a left
to right ordering strategy significantly affected successful performance when
constructing the external array.
Details were also taken of the order in which the children placed the individual items.
Collation of this data showed that the children relied almost exclusively on a left to right
ordering strategy in the following ways:
- they employed a left to right take up of information.
_spontaneous self corrections and errors involved erroneously placing an item
at the end of a partially ordered array, rather than in front.
The experiments reported in this chapter investigate the existence of an inappropriate
left to right ordering strategy in the performance of 9 year old children.
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6.1 EXPERIMENT 5 • THE EFFECT OF ORDERING ON THE
INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION FOR 9 YEAR OLD CHILDREN
Rational
The current experiment replicates Experiment 3, but using 9 year old children. We
know that there is a difference in overall performance between 7 and 9 year old children
(Experiment 1), and that the 7 year olds difficulty stems from an inappropriate L-R
ordering strategy (Experiment 3). This study will enable us to find out whether the age
difference in performance is due to differences in the application of this strategy. If the
reason for the older children's improvement in overall performance was due to the
realisation that left to right ordering is inappropriate in the L-R Violation and Mixed
orderings, then we would expect that these specific conditions will both lead to
improved performance for the 9 year old when compared with the 7 year olds.
6.1.1 Method
Design
A one factorial between subject design was used.
The three levels of premise ordering were as follows:
Level I (insert)
Level L-R (left to right violation)
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AB CD BC
BC AB CD
Be CD AB
Level M (mixed)
NB Serial ordering was used as a worked example.
CD BC AB
CD AB BC
Experiment 3 also looked at the effect of a further factor (type of stimulus material).
However, no significant effects were found, and so this is not being investigated in the
current study.
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task. The 'order of placement' details
were also recorded, for both correct and incorrect orderings.
Partici pants
The participants in this study were 30 mixed ability 9 year olds (mean age 9 years 1
month, range 8 years 8 months to 9 years 5 months) from state first and primary
schools, with predominantly middle class catchment areas. The subjects were from the
same schools as those in Experiment 3. They were randomly assigned to one of the
three experimental groups.
Task description
As in Experiment 3
Materials
As in Experiment 3, but using the photographs only. An example of the task materials
is given at Appendix D.
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Procedure
As in Experiment 3.
6.1.2 Results
N.B. Each subject completed six experimental trials. However, a large number of the
subjects in the previous studies erroneously tried to complete the first trial by recalling
the demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable with earlier ones
the first trial from each subject has been discounted.
WIse scores
The results from the WISC digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (Insert ordering)
Group 2 (Left-to-right violation ordering)
Group 3 (Mixed ordering-)
11.9
11.6
11.8
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 9 years and 9 years 3
months is a score of 11 (WISC-R Manual, 1974).
Number of correct answers
Table 6.1 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
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Table 6.1: Mean number of correct trials (max-S)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
Insert L-R violation Mixed
4.7 (0.48) 4.7 (0.48) 3.8 (0.63)
A one way ANOYA was carried out on the above data and showed a significant effect
of ordering (F[2, 27]=9.346, p<O.Ol). Tukey comparisons showed that there was a
significant increase in number of correct trials when comparing Insert ordering with
Mixed (q=5.30, p<O.Ol), and also when comparing L-R violation with Mixed
(q=S.30, p<O.Ol).
Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 6.2 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) for each experimental group.
Table 6.2: !Vlean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
Insert L-R violation Mixed
14.58 (2.44) 13.44 (2.39) 18.22 (3.70)
A one way ANOYA was carried out on the above data and showed a significant effect
of ordering (F[2, 27]=7.372, p<O.Ol). Tukey comparisons showed that there was a
significant decrease in the time taken to correctly complete the orderings when
comparing Insert ordering with Mixed (q=3.9S, p<O.OS), and also when comparing L-
R violation with Mixed (q=5.20, p<O.Ol).
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Order of placement data
Whilst the subjects were completing each task (as before, five were counted in total)
the experimenter took details of the order in which they constructed the external array.
These were then collated in respect of the following items:
1. Use of a left to right strategy, with respect to premise information consideration.
It was found that this was the predominant strategy in Experiment 3. For example, if
the children were presented with BC AB CD, they would begin the array by
placing items Band C, followed by items A and B (or just by joining on A) and then
by C and D, rather scanning the array to select out the items in the correct order i.e. A B
CD. The table below gives the mean number of trials in which this type of
construction strategy was employed by subjects in the current study.
Table 6.3: Mean number of trials where a left to right take-up of information was used
(max=5)
Ordering
Insert L-R violation Mixed
4.9 2.8 4.1
2. Use of a left to right strategy, with respect to the position in which the children place
the items.
Again, it was found that this was the predominant strategy for the 7 year old children in
Experiment 3. In view of this, it was decided to look more closely at the error patterns
and spontaneous correction of orderings in the current study. In order to do this, a
distinction was made between successful trials due to self-correction and those which
were successful from the outset. An answer which is correct from the outset is one in
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which no incorrect 2, 3 or 4 item orderings have been made during the problem solving
process, whereas a self-correction involves the spontaneous correction of incorrect 2, 3
or 4 item orderings. An example of this distinction is given in the Results section of
Experiment 3 (see Chapter 5).
Because of the very small amount of errors and self corrections in the Insert groups,
consideration has been restricted to the L-R violation and Mixed groups.
Table 6.4: Total number of Left to Right violation errors
The figure in parentheses shows the total number of errors in that group. The two
figures in each cell are then converted to a percentage.
Ordering
L-R violation Mixed
2 (3) 66% 7 (12) 58%
Table 6.5: Total number of successful Left to Right violation self-corrections
The figure in parentheses shows the total number of self-corrections in that group. The
two figures in each cell are then converted to a percentage.
Ordering
L-R violation Mixed
7 (9) 78% 9 (10) 90%
3. Splitting of pre-ordered premise pairs
The data from Experiment 3 showed that a very high proportion of the tasks involved
the splitting of a pair of items which had been ordered for the subjects in the original
premises, particularly in the CD AB Be task. In view of this, the current data was
scrutinised for similar evidence.
194
Table 6.6: Total number of 'previously ordered premise pair' splits - (CD AD BC)
tasks
The figure in parentheses shows the total number of all initially correct, self-corrections
and errors in that group. The two figures in each cell are then converted to a
percentage.
Init. correct Corrections Errors
0(10) 0% 5 (7) 71% 5 (8) 63%
Comparison with data from the 7 year old children (Experiment 3)
Because the subjects in Experiment 3 and this study were taken from the same schools,
and the same materials and procedure were used throughout, it was decided to combine
the relevant data from the two studies in a direct statistical comparison. Experiment 3
was a two factor experiment, where one of the factors involved a comparison between
using photographs and drawings as stimulus material. No significant differences were
found, so this was not investigated with the 9 year old children. Only the data from the
7 year old children who used the photographs has been used in this comparison, so as
to equate with the stimulus material used in the current study.
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Number of correct answers
Table 6.7: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
Insert L-R violation Mixed
7 year olds 4.8 (0.42) 3.9 (0.88) 2.3 (1.34)
9 year olds 4.7 (0.48) 4.7 (0.48) 3.8 (0.63)
A two way ANOVA [2 (age) x 3 (ordering), both between subjects factors], was
carried out on the above data and showed main effects of both age (F[l, 54]=13.444,
p<O.Ol) and ordering (F[2, 54]=26.861, p<O.Ol) and also an interaction
(F[2,54]=5.361, p<O.Ol). Fig. 6.1 shows a graph of the interaction.
Fig. 6.1: Age x ordering (correct answers)
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Further analysis showed the following significant simple main effects:
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- the 9 year old children produced more correct solutions than the 7 year old
children when solving the Left to Right violation problems (F=5.33, p<0.05).
- the 9 year old children produced more correct solutions than the 7 year old
children when solving the Mixed problems (F[l, 54]=18.750, p<0.01).
- an effect of task ordering for the 7 year old children (F[2, 54]=26.722,
p<0.01).
- an effect of task ordering for the 9 year old children (F[2, 54]=4.500, p<0.05).
Tukey comparisons were made between the different levels of ordering for both age
groups. They revealed the following significant effects:
- the 7 year old children produced more correct solutions using the Insert
ordering than they did using the Left to Right violation ordering (q=3.67,
p<0.05).
- the 7 year old children produced more correct solutions using the Left to Right
violation ordering than they did using the Mixed ordering (q=6.53, p<0.01).
- the 7 year old children produced more correct solutions using the Insert
ordering than they did using the Mixed ordering (q=10.21, p<0.01).
- the 9 year old children produced more correct solutions using the Left to Right
violation ordering than they did using the Mixed ordering (q=3.67, p<0.05).
- the 9 year old children produced more correct solutions using the Insert
ordering than they did using the Mixed ordering (q=3.67, p<0.05).
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Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 6.8: Mean time taken to complete trials (in seconds)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
Insert L-R violation Mixed
7 year olds 12.56 (4.26) 20.86 (3.33) 31.19 (4.61)
9 year olds 14.58 (2.44) 13.43 (2.40) 18.22 (3.70)
A two way ANOVA [2 (age) x 3 (ordering), both between subjects factors, was carried
out on the above data and showed main effects of both age (F[l, 54]=44.359, p<O.Ol)
and ordering (F[2, 54]=51.333, p<O.Ol) and also an interaction effect (F[2, 54]=22.787,
p<O.Ol). Fig. 6.2 shows a graph of the interaction.
Fig. 6.2: Age x ordering (problem solving time)
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Further analysis showed the following significant simple main effects:
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- the 9 year old children produced correct solutions more quickly than the 7 year
old children when solving the Left to Right violation problems (F[1,54]=21.529,
p<O.Ol).
- the 9 year old children produced correct solutions more quickly than the 7 year
old children when solving the Mixed problems (F[1, 54]=66.777, p<O.Ol).
- an effect of task ordering for the 7 year old children (F[2, 54]=69.180,
p<O.Ol).
- an effect of task ordering for the 9 year old children (F[2, 54]=4.941, p<0.05).
Tukey comparisons were made between the different levels of ordering for both age
groups. They revealed the following significant effects:
- the 7 year old children produced correct solutions more quickly using the
Insert ordering than they did using the Left to Right violation ordering
(q=7.35, p<O.Ol).
- the 7 year old children produced correct solutions more quickly using the Left
to Right violation ordering than they did using the Mixed ordering (q=9.25,
p<O.Ol).
- the 7 year old children produced correct solutions more quickly using the
Insert ordering than they did using the Mixed ordering (q=16.60, p<O.Ol).
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- the 9 year old children produced correct solutions more quickly using the Left
to Right violation ordering than they did using the Mixed ordering (q=4.26,
p<O.Ol).
Order of placement data
No statistical comparison has been made between the two studies in this respect.
However, so that the two experiments can be compared discursively, the following
tables combine the relevant data from this experiment and Experiment 3.
Table 6.9: Mean number of trials where a left to right take-up of information was used
(max=5)
Ordering
Insert L-R viol. Mixed
Age 7 years 4.8 4.1 4.4
9 years 4.9 2.8 4.1
Table 6.10: Total number of Left to Right violation errors
The figure in parentheses shows the total number of errors in that group. The two
figures in each cell are then converted to a percentage.
Ordering
L-R viol. Mixed
Age 7 years 10 (12) 83% 40 (53) 85%
9 years 2 (3) 66% 7 (12) 58%
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Table 6.11: Total number of successful Left to Right violation self-corrections /
/
The figure in parentheses shows the total number of self-corrections in that group. The
two figures in each cell are then converted to a percentage.
Ordering
L-R viol. Mixed
Age 7 years 14 (16) 88% 12 (20) 75%
9 years 7 (9) 78% 9 (10) 90%
Table 6.12: Total number of paired item splits - (CD AB BC) tasks
The figure in parentheses shows the total number of initially correct, self-corrections
and errors in that group. The two figures in each cell are then converted to a
percentage.
Init correct Corrections Errors
Age 7 years 0(2) 0% 8 (9) 89% 19 (19) 100%
9 years 0(10) 0% 5 (7) 71% 5 (8) 63%
6.1.3 Discussion
It can be seen from the Results section that the 7 and 9 year olds are behaving
differently in the different levels of premise ordering. In view of this, the discussion to
follow compares the two age groups' performance with each of the different types of
ordering. Both types of measurements (number of correct trials and time taken to
correctly order the array) show very similar patterns of results and so the following
refers to both types of scores.
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Insert condition - AB CD Be.
It would appear that the scores are approaching ceiling for both age groups in this
condition. The mean times taken were 12.56 seconds (7 year olds) and 14.58 seconds
(9 year olds). There is no significant difference between these two times. Observation
of the 7 year old children showed that completion of the task was a continuous
sequence of motor actions, with very few self-corrections and no time given over to
reflection. An informal timing of 7 year old children who were asked to place similar 4
item arrays, but by merely copying a given ordering, gave a mean of 12.26 seconds,
with a range of 10.82 to 12.98 seconds. Means of 4.7 and 4.8 correct answers out of a
possible 5 are likely to be reflecting 'performance slips' rather than conceptual
misunderstandings.
However, it must be remembered that the children who completed this ordering could
be successful simply by applying a Left to Right strategy. Indeed the 7 year old
children were remarking that the last premise (Be) was not needed. This was not the
case for the 9 year old children, several of whom actually 'marked' the last presented
premise with a finger, or obviously glanced at it, in order to check the already
completed array. Some of these children began to ignore this premise towards the end
of their block of tasks, but they usually remarked that all the tasks were the same and so
they knew what the required ordering was.
It would seem, therefore, that the similar performance levels obtained by the two
different age groups do not reflect similar levels of understanding. The 7 year olds
success is due to the use of a low-level strategy which replicates the Left to Right
ordering of the items as presented in the premise ordering. They make no attempt to
verify the ordering by reference to the mid premise.
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Left to Right violation condition - BC AB CD, BC CD AB
Again, the 9 year old children are approaching ceiling in this condition. The 7 year old
children in Experiment 3 were significantly less successful when using this ordering,
however.
This can be explained by considering the order of premise placement data, which looks
in more detail at the use of the Left to Right ordering strategy. The 7 year old children
in this condition were using a left to right take-up of premise information virtually all of
the time (4.5 out of 5), whereas the 9 year olds left to right take-up drops to 2.8 out of
5. Thus it would seem that the older children have begun to scan the array in order to
isolate an 'end-anchor', showing that they are well aware of the significance of the mid-
items in the array.
However, although this ordering showed fewer errors and self-corrections for the older
children, the proportion of these which were attributed to an incorrect left to right
strategy application was still very high.
Thus it would seem that there is still some tendency for the 9 year old children to
initally apply this strategy but they can easily identify and correct the resultant errors.
This could be due to metacognitive strategies i.e. the checking of each premise item
with the partially ordered array so that all the pertinent premise information is extracted
and used. In order to be able to do this, it is necessary to be aware of what information
is needed for the task, in other words, to possess some structural task understanding.
If the 7 year olds think that the task consists of introducing the new items in the order in
which they are presented in the premises, then that is the only information they will
extract from the premise and rechecking will not be deemed necessary or appropriate.
203
Mixed condition.
Although the 9 year olds were more successful than the 7 year olds in this condition,
their performance was not approaching ceiling, but was similar to the scores obtained
for the 7 year olds in the L-R violation condition. It would seem therefore, that even
though the older children are aware of the need to check premise information and
correct for Left to Right violation errors, they still have some other constraint which is
operating on performance.
It seemed to the experimenter that the 9 year old children were behaving differently with
the two sub-groups of tasks included in this condition. Ordering CD BC AB
appeared to present very little difficulty. There was some self-corrections, again due to
left to right strategies, but far fewer actual errors. Ordering CD AB BC still seemed
to be presenting problems. More of the tasks were actually correct than for the 7 year
olds (10 as opposed to 1), but there were still more errors in this subgroup. However,
data directly comparing the two sub-groups has not been analysed due to the possible
confounding factor of presenting examples of the two subgroups alternately to each
subject within the same condition. It could be that these two subgroups are sufficiently
different so as to cause some initial confusion (though of course, if the children had a
complete initial structural understanding this should present no problems). In view of
this, a further study will directly compare the performance of 9 year old children using
ordering CD AB BC with those using CD BC AB, in a between subject design.
If we look at the order of premise placement data, it can be seen that both age groups
have a high proportion of paired item splits for ordering CD AB BC. Thus, although
the 9 year aIds are more successful than the 7 year aIds in this condition, they still
experience the same type of persistent error. It is only with this ordering that a left to
right take-up of information (an initial strategy when task specific actions are being
constructed) will lead to the formation of an array in which a pair of items needs to be
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re-ordered i.e. CDAB to ABCD. It seems therefore, that there is still not complete
structural understanding of the task for the 9 year olds, probably due to the inability to
appreciate the significance of 'given' premise information.
If an understanding of the significance of 'given' premise information is still a problem,
we would expect ordering CD AB BC to be difficult, whereas ordering CD BC AB
will result in performance similar to that of Left to Right violation for the 9 year old
children. This is because the construction of the array with premise ordering CD AB
BC usually proceeds by joining AB to CD, i.e. CDAB. An understanding of the
significance of 'given' premise information, together with the viewing of the third
premise (BC), would result in a correct reordering to ABCD, as the subject would
realise that they needed to keep items A and B adjacent. This is because of the
information contained in the first premise. The most efficient way to do this, whilst at
the same time incorporating the information given in the third premise, would be to
move items A and B, as a pair, to the front of item C. Of course, a split premise pair
which has resulted in the incorrect reordering of CDAB to BCDA can still be
corrected, but only by reference to the second premise. Thus it is still possible that
children who split premise pairs will be able to raise their number of correct solutions to
ceiling by using spontaneous self-corrections. However, because of the greater
number of separate actions required, there may well still be some time costs.
6.2 EXPERIMENT 6 - THE EFFECT OF ORDERING ON THE
INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION FOR 9 YEAR OLD CHILDREN
(PART 2)
Rationale
Experiment 5 (reported above) looked at the performance of 9 year old children when
ordering an array. It was found that the order in which the premises were presented
205
significantly affected the number of correct solutions and the time taken to correctly
order the arrays, such that 'Insert' and 'Left to right violation' orderings were both
more successful than 'Mixed' orderings.
When the same study was ran with 7 year old children (Experiment 3), a different result
was obtained. Insert ordering was the most successful. There was a significant
difference between the results obtained in this condition and the L-R violation condition
and also between the L-R violation and Mixed (the most difficult condition). Evidence
was also obtained in support of the view that the main problem for the 7 year olds was
the incorrect application of a left to right ordering strategy when trying to order the
array. This left to right rule was also invariably used when the children were
considering the premise information i.e. they used the information from the leftmost
premise first. The strategy therefore produced errors in the L-R violation and Mixed
conditions. This was not the case for the 9 year olds, however. Their performance
was approaching ceiling in L-R violation, but was significantly inhibited in the Mixed
condition. It would seem therefore, that there are other constraints which are having an
effect here.
The Mixed condition contains two ordering types:
1. CD BC AB
2. CD AB BC
These were initially grouped together, as it was hypothesised that they both require
complex, multiple ordering strategies (see Experiment 3).
However, the data collected in Experiment 5 suggested that the subjects were acting
differently in the two different task types. It seemed that CD Be AB was easier
than CD AB BC. However, this could not be tested statistically as the children in the
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study did three of each task alternately. It could be that this task ordering inhibited
performance in the more' difficult' condition, as the children were getting confused in
the early stages, when trying to build a conceptual understanding of the task structure.
For this reason, it has been decided to directly compare performance in the two types of
ordering in a between subjects design. There are four likely groups of results»
1. No significant difference between the groups in this study, and also no significant
difference between these groups and the Mixed condition in Experiment 5. This would
suggest that the difficulty experienced by the 9 year old children in Experiment 5 is due
to a factor which is common to both of the sub-groups of tasks in the Mixed condition.
2. No significant difference between the groups in this study, and also no significant
difference between these groups and the L-R violation condition in Experiment 5. This
would suggest that the tasks themselves are inherently no more problematic than any
others for the 9 year old children, as performance will be close to ceiling. Thus the
former inhibition of performance will have been due to the presentation of the two tasks
simultaneously.
3. A significant difference between the groups, where CD BC AB is the most
difficult. In this condition the subjects will need to violate the 'left to right' heuristic
twice. This type of result will throw doubt on the suggestion that the incorrect
application of a left to right ordering strategy is peculiar to the 7 year olds.
4. A significant difference between the groups, where CD AB BC is the most
difficult. If this is the case then there are still constraints on performance for the 9 year
old children, but these are not merely due to a left to right heuristic. Inspection of the
order of placement data will provide details of the precise nature of the difficulty. 1£ the
subjects in this study have a full understanding of the task structure, there should only
be a small difference (due to the action of moving items A and B to the front of the
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·queue) between orderings AB CD BC and CD AB. BC. Both orderings require
inspection of the third premise in order to link the information contained in the first two
premises, as they contain no common item. The children in Experiment 5 (9 year olds)
appeared to recognise the necessity of checking the third premise, at least in the first
few tasks, before they realised that all the tasks shared the same ordering. The 7 year
olds did not share this understanding, indeed several of them remarked that the third
premise was not needed.
6.2.1 Method
Design
A one factorial between subject design was used.
The two levels of premise ordering were as follows:
Condition 1
Condition 2
CD BC AB
CD AB BC
Note Serial ordering was used as a worked example.
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task. The 'order of placement' details
were also recorded, for both correct and incorrect orderings.
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Participants
The participants in this study were 20 mixed ability 9 year olds (mean age 9 years 3
months, range 8 years 10 months to 9 years 9 months) from a state first school, with a
predominantly middle class catchment area. The subjects were from the same school as
those in Experiments 3 and 4, and were randomly assigned to one of the two
experimental groups.
Task description
As in Experiment 3, except that the subjects in Condition 1 all worked only with task
ordering CD AB BC, and those in Condition 2 all worked only with task ordering
CD BC AB.
Materials
As in Experiment 3, but using the photographs only. An example of the task materials
is given at Appendix D.
Procedure
As in Experiment 3.
6.2.2 Results
Note Each subject completed six experimental trials. However, a large number of the
subjects in the previous studies erroneously tried to complete the first trial by recalling
the demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable with earlier ones
the first trial from each subject has been discounted.
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WISC scores
The results from the WISC digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (CD AB BC ordering)
Group 2 (CD BC AB ordering)
11.7
11.6
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 9 years and 9 years 3
months is a score of 11 (WISC-R Manual, 1974).
Number of correct answers
Table 6.13 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
Table 6.13: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
CD AB BC CD BC AB
2.6 (0.52) . 4.6 (0.52)
A one way ANOYA was carried out on the above data and showed a significant effect
of ordering (F[1, 18]=75.00, p<O.OI). There was a significant increase in the number
of correct trials for Condition 2 (CD BC AB).
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Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 6.14 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) for each experimental group.
Table 6:14: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
CD AB BC CD BC AB
23.10 (2.27) 12.03 (1.38)
A one way ANOYA was carried out on the above data and showed a significant effect
of ordering (F[1, 18]=173.49, p<0.01). Again, there was a significant improvement for
Condition 2 (CD BC AB).
Order of placement data
Whilst the subjects were completing each task (as before, five were counted in total)
the experimenter took details of the order in which they constructed the external array.
This revealed that those subjects in Condition 2 (CD BC AB) made very few errors or
self corrections. This is also supported by the error and time data reported above. The
subjects in Condition 1 (CD AB BC) however, were making errors by placing A after
CD. This was then followed by B, forming an incorrect ordering of CDAB. They
were attempting to correct these errors after having looked at the third premise (BC). A
partial reordering to BCDA occurred in most instances, but then the subjects became
confused and began to select anyone premise at random, trying to ensure that the two
items relevant to that premise were correctly ordered, but not linking the two premises
together. It seems that the lack of a common item in the first two premises confused the
subjects and so they were seldom successful in combining all the relationships.
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Comparison with data from the 9 year old children in Experiment 5
Because the subjects in Experiment 5 (see Chapter 5) and this study were taken from
the same school, and the same materials and procedure were used throughout, it was
decided to combine relevant data from the two studies in a direct statistical comparison.
Experiment 5 compared the effects of three different types of task ordering, where the
most difficult level consisted of three of each of the two tasks which are currently being
compared between subjects. The children were performing at ceiling in the other two
types of ordering, one of which, together with the Mixed data, will be included in the
following analysis for comparison purposes. The data from the L-R violation and
Mixed conditions from Experiment 5 have therefore been treated as the third and fourth
conditions.
Number of correct answers
Table 6.15: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
CD AB BC CD BC AB L-R viol Mixed
2.6 (0.52) 4.6 (0.52) 4.7 (0.48) 3.8 (0.63)
A one-way ANOVA was carried out on the above data and revealed a significant
ordering effect (F[3, 36]=32.314, p<O.OI). Tukey comparisons showed the following
significant results:
- an increase in number of correct trials from CD AB BC ordering to L-R
violation ordering (q=12.30, p<O.OI).
212
- an increase in number of correct trials from CD AB BC ordering to Mixed
ordering (q=7.03, p<O.OI).
- an increase in number of correct trials from Mixed ordering to CD BC AB
ordering (q=4.68, p<0.05).
- in agreement with previous analyses, an increase in number of correct trials
from Mixed ordering to L-R violation ordering (q=5.27, p<O.Ol).
- in agreement with previous analyses, an increase in number of correct trials
from CD AB BC ordering to CD BC AB ordering (q=II.71, p<O.OI).
Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 6.16: Mean time taken to complete trials (in seconds)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
CD AB BC CD BC AB L-R viol Mixed
23.10 (2.27) 12.03 (1.34) 13.44 (2.39) 18.22 (3.69)
A one-way ANOVA was carried out on the above data and revealed a significant
ordering effect (F[3, 36]=38.189, p<O.OI). Tukey comparisons showed the following
significant results:
- a decrease in time taken to correctly complete trials from CD AB BC
ordering to L-R violation ordering (q=11.88, p<O.OI).
- a decrease in time taken to correctly complete trials from CD AB BC
ordering to Mixed ordering (q=6.01, p<O.Ol).
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- a decrease in time taken to correctly complete trials from Mixed ordering to CD
BC AB ordering(q=7.61, p<O.Ol).
- in agreement with previous analyses, a decrease in time taken to correctly
complete trials from Mixed ordering to L-R violation ordering (q=5.88,
p<O.Ol).
- in agreement with previous analyses, a decrease in time taken to correctly
complete trials from CD AB BC ordering to CD BC AB ordering
(q=13.62, p<O.Ol).
6.2.3 Discussion
It can be seen from the results that the ordering CD AB BC was significantly more
difficult than ordering CD BC AB. The data from this experiment was also compared
with the relevant data from Experiment 5 as the subjects used in both studies were of
equivalent ages and from the same schools. This comparison showed that the children
in Condition 2 of this study (ordering CD BC AB) were performing at the same
success rates (approaching ceiling) as those in the Left to right violation condition of
Experiment 4, and the same children were also performing better than those in the
Mixed condition of Experiment 5. Additionally, the subjects in Condition 1 ordering
CD AB BC) of this study experienced more difficulty than those in the Mixed
condition of Experiment 5. Thus the four different types of ordering which were
directly compared fell into three levels of difficulty as follows:
214
CONDITION
CD AB BC
DIFFICULTY
(most difficult)
Mixed condition i.e
CD BC AB
CD AB BC and
CD BC AB (intermediate)
L-R violation condition i.e. BC CD AB and
BC AB BC (least difficult)
It seems therefore, that the result obtained in Experiment 5 was not due solely to the
presentation of two types of task in the same condition. If this was the case, we would
have expected to see the 9 year olds performance to be at or approaching ceiling when
the two types of ordering were presented in different conditions. However, when these
two types of tasks were presented separately (i.e.. in the current study), there was
inhibition of performance for the CD AB BC task only. Also, this task was the more
difficult when compared to the condition in which the children used both types of
premise presentation. Furthermore, 9 year olds working with the ordering CB BC
AB were performing at or approaching ceiling. These results show that there are still
constraints on performance for the 9 year old children, but only when they are ordering
using the CD AB BC presentation.
We must therefore consider what is special to this type of ordering which is still
inhibiting performance for the 9 year olds. It seems that, like the 7 year olds in
Experiment 3, their problems are due to a combination of the inappropriate use of a left
to right ordering strategy, and working with the premises strictly in the order in which
they were presented (see Chapter 5 for a full discussion of this) The data from ordering
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they were presented (see Chapter 5 for a full discussion of this) The data from ordering
CD BC AB showed that the 9 year olds had begun to scrutinise the premises for' end-
anchor items', as they only used a left to right take-up of premise information for an
average of 2.1 out of 5 trials. This is similar to the performance of the 9 year olds
working with the easier orderings in Experiment 5. Thus in the premise ordering
below, the subjects would scan the array to look for the first item (red jumper) and so
on, therefore building the array in a left to right manner from the outset.
Yellow Green. Yellow Red Green.
This strategy of scanning the array for the correct item means that subjects no longer
have to place any items at the front of a partially ordered array, thus removing the
requirement to violate the left to right ordering rule. This has therefore resulted in
performance which is approaching ceiling for the children working with CD BC AB
ordering. The situation is very different for those children working with ordering CD
AB BC. They are still using a left to right take-up of information for an average of 4.6
out of 5 trials. This means that they are required to violate the left to right rule in the
3rd placement. This is demonstrated in Fig. 6.3 below.
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Fig. 6.3: Example or CD AB BC ordering
Premise ordering
Yellow
1st placement
Y ~ l l o o
2nd placement
Yellow
3rd placement
G r e ~ D D Red.
GrHD.
G ~ e l l l
Yellow
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Red.
R ~ ~
Red Yellow
Because the premises have been acted on in the order in which they were presented, the
3rd placement required a violation of the left to right ordering rule as the red jumper has
to be placed at the front of the partially ordered array. This ordering also requires that
the 2nd premise is then reconsidered, so that the green jumper is placed at the front of
the array. The only way the violation can be avoided is by moving the green and red
jumpers together as a premise pair.
It seems therefore that presentation of two initial unlinked premises (as in a CD AB
BC as illustrated above) prevents full understanding of the task structure. Subjects
begin by using a left to right take-up of information. This means that the first and
second premises become erroneously linked. The subjects then realise that this
situation is incorrect as they consider the third premise. However, they then only move
the red jumper as they do not keep the red and green jumpers together, even though
they were given as an original premise pair. The children then either believe that they
have correctly completed the task, or they rescrutinise the premises and become very
confused and make more errors. This has resulted in inhibition of performance for the
9 year olds working with the CD AB BC ordering.
It is interesting to note that this confusion did not occur in Experiment 5 when 9 year
old children were working with ordering AB CD BC. In this case they appeared to
realise that they needed to inspect the third premise in order to check the linkage of the
first two premises. They did this by marking the last presented premise (BC) with a
finger, or obviously glancing at it, in order to check the already completed array. The 7
year oids did not share this understanding, indeed several of them remarked that the
third premise was not needed.
However, when the 9 year oids had to alter an ordering to account for this rechecking,
as in ordering CD AB BC, they ran into difficulties because they did not realise the
significance of information which was given to them in the premises. They did not,
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therefore, manipulate the premise items as a pair when reordering and so become
confused.
It seems therefore that 9 year olds have a fragile conceptual understanding of the
structural representation of series problems, as they appear to realise the need to check
all three premises. However this understanding is not robust as it results in errors
when the premise ordering requires that characters are re-ordered in pairs, dependent on
information contained in the original premises.
6.3 GENERAL SUMMARY - CHAPTERS 5 AND 6
The four experiments reported in these two chapters investigated the role of premise
ordering in the building of structural representations. It has been demonstrated in
Experiment 3 that 7 year old children apply an inappropriate left to right ordering
strategy when solving series problems. Evidence for this was provided by analysis of
the error and time data and also by the order in which the subjects used the premise
information and placed new items. Experiment 4 showed that this strategy was not
restricted to working with unfamiliar task materials. Experiment 5 demonstrated that
the inappropriate left to right ordering strategy did not occur in the 9 year old children's
performance, as they were successful in ordering the tasks with required one left to
right ordering violation. The 7 year olds performance on the same tasks however, did
show evidence of inappropriate strategy use. The most complex ordering (CD AB
BC), which was separately investigated in Experiment 6, resulted initially in attempts
by the 9 year olds to order in a left to right manner, but the subjects noticed these and
attempts were made to correct the resultant errors. However, successful performance
was still not forthcoming as the subjects could not reorder the incorrect arrays so as to
ensure that all the relational information was correctly integrated. It was suggested that
this is due to a failure to appreciate and use the status of the' given' information, i.e.
that provided in the premises as part of the task. This could be due to:
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1. A total lack of understanding of the relational information given in each premise.
2. A failure to remember this information at a critical decision point, probably due to
limited cognitive resources.
Point 1 above is not considered likely, as the 9 year olds in Experiment 6 were trying
to re-order based on individual premises. This demonstrates that they did understand
the significance of the relational information contained in each premise. The second
suggestion is much more probable, but further studies are necessary to address this.
It is also interesting to speculate whether a failure to appreciate and use the status of the
'given' information is affecting the 7 year old's performance. The third condition in
Experiment 3 (mixed) was more difficult for these children than the L-R condition. If
the only factor affecting the 7 year olds in these tasks is the inappropriate application of
a left to right ordering strategy, we would expect these conditions to be equally
difficult, as they both involve the insertion of an item into a partially ordered array at a
position other than immediately to the right. However, if these children are also
experiencing difficulty in dealing with the lack of a common item in the first two
premises when ordering CD AB BC, then it is not surprising that the Mixed condition
is posing more difficulties. A further experiment, which replicates Experiment 6 but
with younger subjects, could be carried out to investigate whether 7 year old children
also experience difficulty when needing to reorder a premise pair i.e. the incorrect
ordering CDAB requires that the premise pair AB is moved to the front of the array.
Nonetheless, we now have strong evidence that the construction of integrated relational
representation is adversely affected by the order in which premise information is
presented. This encourages the application of inappropriate strategies which result in
an incorrect structural representation. Chapter 8 will go to investigate the reasons why
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7 year olds performance is inhibited by premise orderingin these types of tasks.
Before this, it is necessary to investigate any possible inhibition of performance due to
the erroneous belief that duplicate tokens of the same character must be used in the
integrated array (see Chapter 5 for a full discussion of this). Chapter 7 deals with this
Issue.
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CHAPTER 7 : TASK CONSTRAINTS IN THE BUILDING OF
STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATIONS (PART 3)
CONCERNING THE REDUNDANCY OF ITEM INFORMATION
Experiment 1, reported in Chapter 4, identified two possible factors which might have
been contributing to the difficulty which 7 year old children experience when
integrating separate premises into a single, ordered array. It is the second of these
factors, that of the elimination of redundant items, which is addressed in this chapter.
An experimental manipulation (reported as part of Experiment 3 in Chapter 5), has
already been carried out to investigate whether or not 7 year old children were aware
that duplicate characters in the original premise information needed to be amalgamated
into one single character when the premises were integrated and the array was ordered.
This is illustrated in Fig. 6.1 below.
Fig. 6.1: Example of random premise information.
Yellow Purple Green Red Yellow
In the example above, the yellow and purple jumpers are represented twice in separate
premises, as they are the 'mid-items' of the integrated array.
It was hypothesised that the children might have been misled by the use of drawings as
stimulus material. It could be that they were not aware that two similar drawings (for
example the yellow and purple jumpers in Fig. 6.1 above) were actually different
representations of the same character. This lack of knowledge would have prevented
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them from successfully ordering the array, as it is dependent on integration of premise
information.
It was decided, based on work by DeLoache in 1991, to use photographs as stimulus
materials, rather than drawings. This is because DeLoache showed that photographs
were the easiest graphic representation for young children to understand. This is also
consistent with work reported by O'Connor, Beilin and Kose (1981) who argued that 6
year olds believe in the fidelity of photographs, as they are more likely to accept
illogical outcomes as true when they were represented in photographs rather than in
drawings. These two studies suggest that children might find it easier to accept that
two identical photographs (rather than drawings) in separate premises were of one
character. This might therefore have lead them to realise the necessity to use only one
photograph of a character when building the integrated array.
However, the results from Experiment 3 showed that there was no significant
improvement in performance when using photographs rather than drawings as stimulus
materials, therefore providing no evidence in support of the experimental hypothesis.
We must now question whether this hypothesis was an adequate test of the underlying
theoretical question, that is, whether or not 7 year old children understand that an
integrated array necessarily entails using only one token of each character. Experiment
7, reported below, was designed to test this question using an alternative hypothesis.
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7.1 EXPERIMENT 7 - THE EFFECT OF PROVIDING DUPLICATE
CHARACTER TOI{ENS
Rationale
The question we wish to address is whether or not young children understand that the
integration of separate premises into one ordered array entails that each task item (in this
case individual characters) has to be represented only once.
Experiment 3 investigated this issue by comparing the use of photographs as stimulus
material with that of drawings. This manipulation resulted in no significant differences
in performance, thus providing no evidence in support of the experimental hypothesis.
However, for both Experiments 1 and 3, the subjects were given only one token of
each character with which to construct the integrated array. If the children were
expecting to have duplicate character tokens to work with, then this could have had one
of two possible effects:
1. The children could have become very confused and believed that completion of the
task was not possible, thus resulting in inhibition of performance.
2. Due to the lack of duplicate tokens, the subjects could have been prevented from
making some errors. This is because, had duplicate tokens been available, the children
might have used them, thus resulting in an incorrect array. In this case the restriction of
items might have lead to a facilitation of performance.
In order to distinguish between these two effects, and to reconsider the original
question, the current study was designed. It compares the performance of subjects
given only one token of each of the characters in the array with those given several
character tokens and allowed to select the ones they need.
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7.1.1 Method
Design
A one factorial between subject design was used.
The two levels of 'number of character tokens available' were one token (Condition 1)
and six tokens (Condition 2).
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task. The 'order of placement' details
were also recorded, for both correct and incorrect orderings.
Participants
The participants in this study were 20 mixed ability 7 year olds (mean age 7 years 2
months, range 6 years 7 months to 7 years 7 months) from a state primary school, with
a predominantly middle class catchment areas. They were randomly assigned to one of
the two experimental groups.
Task description
As in Experiment 3, except that all the subjects worked with the following task
orderings:-
BC AB CD
BC CD AB
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This corresponds to level L-R (Left to right violation) used in Experiments 3 to 5.
Materials
As in Experiment 3 but using the drawings only. Copies of these are given in
Appendix C. Five more copies of the complete array were made, and then cut into
individual character tokens.
Procedure
As in Experiment 3, except that the children in Condition 1 were provided with one
token of each character to work with, whereas the children in Condition 2 were
provided with six tokens of each character and told to use as many as they needed.
WISC-R digit recall scores were also taken from each subject.
7.1.2 Results
Note Each subject completed six experimental trials. However, a large number of the
subjects in the first study erroneously tried to complete the first trial by recalling the
demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable with earlier studies
the first trial from each subject has been discounted.
WISC scores
The results from the WISC digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 8.4
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Group 2 8.6
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 7 years and 7 years 3
months is a score of 8 (WISe-R Manual, 1974).
Number of correct answers
Table 6.1 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
Table 6.1: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Number of tokens for each character
1 token 6 tokens
3.9 (0.74) 3.7 (0.95)
A one way ANOYA was carried out on the above data and showed no significant effect
of number of character tokens provided (F[l, 18]=0.277, p>0.05). Thus the availability
of more than one token does not affect the number of successful trials.
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Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 6.2 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) for each experimental group.
Table 6.2: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Number of tokens for each character
1 token 6 tokens
21.44 (2.50) 22.93 (4.82)
A one way ANOVA was carried out on the above data and showed no significant effect
of number of character tokens provided (F[1, 18]=0.746, p>0.05). Thus the availability
of more than one token does not affect the time taken to successfully order the array.
Order of placement data
Whilst the subjects were completing each task (as before, five were counted in total),
the experimenter took details of the order in which they constructed the external array.
These were then examined with a view to identifying any differences in the use of left
to right strategies, as reported in Experiment 3.
No differences in left to right strategies were apparent, both between the two conditions
investigated in this experiment and also between the current study and the equivalent
results reported in Experiment 3. Nonetheless, one other difference in the behaviour of
the two experimental groups taking part in the current study was noted. The children in
Condition 2 of this current experiment were initially using the extra tokens to replicate
at least the first incidence of a mid-item character in the premises. This initial action did
not effect the overall performance of the subjects in Condition 2, however, as the
redundant token was quickly identified and discarded. An example of a typical
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construction sequence for the task BC AB CD, by a subject who had six available
tokens for each character, would be as follows:
Premise presentation
Red Yellow Purph Red Yellow Green.
First placement
Red Yellow
Second placement
Yellow
Third placement
Purple
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Red
Red. Yellow P u r p p
Fourth placement
Red. Yellow PUl'}lle Green.
7.1.3 Discussion
The lack of any significant difference between conditions means that we have no
evidence in support of the experimental hypothesis, i.e. that children's performance
when integrating information into a single structural representation will be affected by
the number of available items from which the representation can be constructed.
Experiment 3 also found no significant improvement when photographs (a more easily
understood graphical representation for young children), rather than drawings, were
used as the task materials. These two results mean that the theoretical claim concerning
the redundancy of information remains unsubstantiated. Thus it seems unlikely that the
initial difficulty for the 7 year old children reported in Experiment 1 was due to an
inability to eliminate the redundant mid-items contained in the original premises. As
seen in the example above, those children who had the opportunity to work with
duplicate representations of the same character did make use of this initially, but it did
not affect their performance, both in terms of number of errors or time taken to solve
the problems.
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Similar results to those from Experiment 3 were also obtained concerning the incorrect
application of a left to right ordering strategy. Although the children who managed to
place the identical representations of one character next to each other had no problems
in eliminating one of the representations (see above), they were unable to use their
knowledge concerning redundant items to aid them in forming the correct ordering.
Those children who erroneously applied this strategy did so in spite of the fact that their
own construction, for example
Green. PUlJIle Red Green.
was highlighting the fact that the array needed to be ordered so that one of the identical
representations representing the green jumper could be discarded. Such children knew
that one of the two representations should be removed, but were very uncertain as to
which one it should be, and appeared to have no means of resolving this problem. It
appears that these children, although often seeming to realise that their array is
somehow 'wrong', are still unable to monitor their problem solving and to correct the
error. It may well be, therefore, that the left to right rule is very robust for a large
proportion of 7 year old children.
Thus the work reported in this chapter has added more weight to the argument
expressed in Chapters 5 and 6, i.e. that the ordering of presentation of information is a
significant factor in the construction of relational representations. Chapter 8 will go on
to investigate a possible cause for the 'premise ordering' effect.
However, we have obtained no evidence to support the claim that the children's
difficulties were in part due to an inability to appreciate the redundancy of item
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information contained in the information they were given. It seems that this
redundancy does not affect the integration of separate relations into a single systematic
representation.
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CHAPTER 8 : TASI( CONSTRAINTS IN THE BUILDING OF
STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATIONS (PART 4)
CONCERNING DIMENSIONAL CONGRUENCE BETWEEN TASK
AND INFORMATION PRESENTATION RELATIONSHIPS
Chapter 4 described a study (Experiment 1) which compared the performance of 5, 7
and 9 year old children when ordering an external array for the purposes of solving
series problems. Only the 9 year old children were successful, however. The 7 year
olds could order the array for some problems, but only after practice.
The ordered arrays are an external systematic representation of the relational structure
inherent in series problems. It has been argued that the ability to correctly integrate
relations into a single systematic representation is a necessary prerequisite for success
in analogical reasoning tasks and could therefore explain the lack of consensus in the
literature concerning the age at when children are able to perform analogical reasoning.
Goswami (1989) provides evidence of early competence in these types of tasks,
whereas there are many studies which report persistent difficulties into adulthood (Gick
and Holyoak, 1980). Subsequent chapters in this thesis have therefore investigated
some of the task constraints which could have been influencing the 7 year old's
performance in Experiment 1.
A series of studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6 investigated the role of information
ordering in the construction of an integrated array. It was found that the degree to
which 7 year old children were required to violate a left to right ordering strategy
significantly affected successful performance, both in terms of problem solving time
and error data.
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Details were also taken of the order in which the children placed the individual items.
Collation of this data showed that the children relied almost exclusively on a left to right
ordering strategy in the following ways:
- they employed a left to right take up of information.
- spontaneous self corrections and errors involved erroneously placing an item
at the end of a partially ordered array, rather than in front.
There was also evidence of 'premise splitting', particularly in CD AB BC tasks. This
means that information initially given to the children in the premises was disregarded
during the task solution. An example of this is given in Fig. 8.1 below.
Fig.6.1: Example of premise pair splitting (CD AB BC task).
Premise information.
Puryle Yellow Green. Red Red Puryle
As subjects invariably use a left to right take-up of information, typical placements
would be as follows:
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Purple Yellow
(from 1st premise)
Purple Yellow GruIl. Red
(from 2nd premise)
At this stage, typically the subject would indicate that they had finished ordering the
queue (this would of course be an incorrect ordering), or they would look at the 3rd
premise and so reconsider their answer. It seemed that many of the children re-ordered
the array by moving only the last character (red jumper) in order to comply with the 3rd
premise. The children would then indicate that they had completed the task, with the
queue being ordered as follows (still incorrect):
Red Yellow G ~ e I l l
However, in re-ordering as above, the child has failed to take account of the
information given in the 2nd premise, in that the red jumper is now no longer behind
the green jumper. This type of error has been termed a 'premise pair split' because the
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subject has erroneously split characters which were given as immediately next to each
other in the premise information.
Data from the CD AB BC task (Experiment 3) showed that 98% of the errors and self
corrections involved the splitting of a 'given pair'. See Fig. 8.1 above for an example
of this type of premise ordering.
A further study in this series (Experiment 5) showed that the inappropriate left to right
ordering strategy used by the 7 year olds was not affecting the performance of 9 year
old children on the same tasks. These children did still have some difficulty with task
ordering CD AB BC, however (see Experiment 6 for the relevant data and
discussion). It has been suggested that this difficulty is due to 'premise pair splitting'
(as discussed above).
There are at least two reasons for the 7 year olds use of an inappropriate left to right
strategy when ordering the array. One concerns a lack of conceptual understanding of
the relations between the premises. This would mean that the children have no
procedural rules to guide them when linking a third item onto a premise pair. Because
of this, they resort to a simple and commonplace left to right rule. Children are used to
reading and writing from left to right, and so this ordering is imposed onto the current
problem. This would explain the ceiling performance achieved in the Insert condition
(AB CD BC) in Experiment 3, in that the subjects using this type of ordering to
construct the array simply place their four character tokens in the same order as they
occur in the premises (i.e. ABC D). This is done without appreciating the need to
check the third premise (BC) as a verification that their ordering is correct.
However, a second possible reason concerns the interaction between the dimension of
the relation with which the children were required to reason and the dimension in which
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the premises were presented. This has been mentioned briefly when discussing the
resulls from Experiment 2 in Chapter 4.
All of the studies to date (with the exception of Experiment 2) have required ordering in
a horizontal dimension, and have typically used the context of people standing in a
queue. Thus a typical integrated array would be as in Fig. 8.2 below.
Fig. 8.2: Example of a typical integrated array (taken from Experiment 3)
Yellow Green.
The subjects were presented with relational information from which they could
construct the structural representation above. This was given in the form of paired
characters. The information has always been presented to the children in a horizontal
dimension, by being placed on a table in front of them. Fig. 8.3 shows a premise
presentation, as seen by the subject, for the array shown in Fig. 8.2 above.
Fig. 8.3: Example of presented premise information for the array in Fig. 8.2 above.
Yellow Green. Red
237
Yellow Green.
Therefore, for all of the studies except Experiment 2, premise information has been
presented horizontally and the children have been required to reason about a horizontal
relationship.
Experiment 2 was different in that the children were reasoning about the position of
bricks in a tower (i.e. a vertical relationship). An example of a completed array is
shown in Fig. 8.4 below.
Fig. 8.4: Example of a typical integrated array (taken from Experiment 2)
B l l
Red
Green.
Yellow
However, the premise information ( in the form of paired bricks) was still presented to
the children in a horizontal dimension. Fig. 8.5 shows a premise presentation for the
array shown in Fig. 8.4 above.
Fig. 8.5: Example of presented premise information for the array in Fig. 8.4 above
Red
Green.
Blue
Red
Green.
Ydlow
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Experiment 2 was primarily carried out in order to replicate a previously reported study
by Pears and Bryant (1990), so it investigated the performance of 5 year old children.
Although Experiment 2 did not result in equivalent performance to that reported by
Pears and Bryant, it did seem that better performance was achieved by the same age
children working the tower of bricks (vertical dimension) than with the characters in a
queue (horizontal dimension used in Experiment 1). It could be that the difference in
dimensions between the task relationship and the premise information presentation
which existed in Experiment 2 might account for this.
Because of the very poor performance shown by the 5 year old children in Experiment
1, the rest of this thesis has concentrated mainly on the abilities of 7 year old children.
This is because my interests lie primarily with identifying inappropriate structuring
strategies, rather than with developmental progression per se. In order for such
strategies to be investigated, it was necessary to work with children who were
displaying some degree of initial competence. However, it could well be that the
hypothesised effects in 5 year olds of using the same task and premise presentation
relationships might also result in inhibition of performance in 7 year old children. This
is because the presence of congruent (i.e. the same) task and premise presentation
relationships might adversely affect structural reasoning by cueing inappropriate left to
right ordering strategies.
It is suggested that the reasons underlying this hypothesised effect are concerned with
the psychological significance of the gap between the premise pairs. Consider the
premise ordering below:
Red. Yellow Yellow
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Grun. Purple Red.
Red Yellow
1st placement
Red Yellow Green.
2nd placement. This involves adding the green jumper (the novel item) onto the end of
the partially ordered array. The next placement involves a decision about where to put
the last item (the purple jumper). It appeared at the end of the premise ordering
sequence, so is often placed at the end of the array. See below.
Red Yellow Green.
This incorrect placement of the purple jumper could be because the children did not
realise that the gap between the 2nd and 3rd premises was salient, in that it signified
two distinct and disjoined pieces of information, rather than one sequenced array.
The current chapter will begin therefore to consider the claim that it is the congruence of
task and premise presentation relationships which causes inappropriate left to right
ordering strategies. This occurs because the gap between premise pairs is not made
salient when congruent relationships are used. In order to investigate the above, the
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following study has been designed to investigate the effects of making the gaps
between premise pairs more salient. This will be carried out by making the spatial
ordering of information incongruent with (different from) the actual dimension of the
task relationship.
8.1 EXPERIMENT 8 - THE EFFECT OF VARYING THE SPATIAL
DIMENSIONS OF TASK RELATIONSHIPS AND THE
PRESENTATION OF PREMISE INFORMATION.
Rationale
The purpose of this study is to discover whether 7 year old children become more
successful in constructing a systematic relational representation when they are forced to
realise the significance of the gap between premises. This will be done by varying two
dimensional factors (task relationship and premise presentation) in order to construct
two congruent and two incongruent series problems. It is hypothesised that the
incongruent conditions will result in facilitation of performance, as the requirement to
order in a different spatial plane from that of the premise presentation will necessarily
mean that the premises will be viewed as separate sections of 'paired-item' information,
rather than a continuous and incremental piece of knowledge. Thus the inappropriate
left to right ordering strategy observed in previous experiments will not be employed.
8.1.1 Method
Design
A two factorial between subject design was used. The two factors were as follows:
1. Type of spatial relationship used (horizontal or vertical).
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2. Ordering of premise information (horizontal or vertical).
Thus there were four experimental groups.
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task.
Participants
The participants in this study were 30 mixed ability 7 year olds (mean age 7 years 2
months, range 6 years 7 months to 7 years 7 months) from state first and primary
schools, with predominantly middle class catchment areas. The subjects were from the
same schools as those in Experiment 3, and were randomly assigned to one of three
experimental groups (relation horizontal, presentation vertical; relation vertical,
presentation vertical; relation vertical, presentation horizontal).
The data for the fourth group (relation horizontal, presentation horizontal) was taken
from Experiment 3 (Level L-R, Drawings). This is because the two experiments
shared common methodologies, experimenters and subject pools.
Thus there were ten subjects in each experimental group.
Task description
Horizontal spatial relationship
As in Experiment 3, except that all the subjects worked with Level L-R task ordering.
Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix C.
242
The subjects in the horizontal presentation group were presented with the premises laid
out as follows :- BC CD AB. An example of this is given in Fig. 8.6 below.
Fig. 8.6: Example of horizontal spatial relationship and horizontal presentation
Red Yellow Yellow Green. Red
The subjects in the vertical presentation group were presented with the premises laid
out as follows :- BC
CD
AB
An example of this is given in Fig. 8.7 below.
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Fig. 8.7: Example of horizontal spatial relationship and vertical presentation
Red
Yellow
Purple
Y ~ l l o o
Red
Vertical spatial relationship
The relation used was' on top of'. This was based on work done by Pears and Bryant
(discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). As in the horizontal spatial relationship, 4 item
orderings were used. All the items were front views of girls, distinguishable from each
other by wearing different coloured T-shirts. Thus a complete vertical ordering would
be 4 girls standing on each others shoulders, all facing forwards (the subjects were told
that the orderings were of children learning to be acrobats). As in the horizontal
relationship, the orders of colours used were randomly varied, so as to give 6 different
orderings of four colours (yellow, green, red, purple). Copies of the task materials are
given in Appendix F.
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Each subject completed six tasks. The tasks were ordered in the same way as those in
the horizontal relationship condition.
The subjects in the horizontal presentation group were presented with the premises laid
out as follows :- B C A
C D B
An example of this is given in Fig. 8.8 below.
Fig. 8.8: Example of vertical spatial relationship and horizontal presentation
Red.
Yellow
Yellow Purple
Red.
The subjects in the vertical presentation group were presented with the premises laid
out as follows :- B
C
C
D
A
B
An example of this is given in Fig. 8.9 below.
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Fig. 8.9: Example or vertical spatial relationship and vertical presentation
Red
Yellow
Yellow
G ~ e D D
Red.
Materials
As in Experiment 3, but only drawings were used (either of women viewed 'side-on' in
a queue, or acrobats standing on each others shoulders). Copies of the task materials
are given in Appendices C and F.
Procedure
As in Experiment 3 except that reference was made to acrobats standing on each others
shoulders, rather than people in a queue, where appropriate. As previously described,
the premises were presented in a horizontal array for half of the subjects working with
each of the spatial relationships, and in a vertical array for the other half.
The WISC-R digit span subtest was administered to the participants.
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8.1.2 Results
Note Each subject completed six experimental trials. However, a large number of the
subjects in the previous studies erroneously tried to complete the first trial by recalling
the demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable with earlier ones
the first trial from each subject has been discounted.
WIse scores
The results from the WISC digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (relation horizontal, presentation vertical) 8.9
Group 2 (relation vertical, presentation vertical) 8.6
Group 3 (relation vertical, presentation horizontal) 8.8
Group 4 (relation horizontal, presentation horizontal) 9.2
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 7 years and 7 years 3
months is a score of 8 (WISC-R Manual, 1974).
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Number of correct answers
Table 8.1 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
Table 8.1: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Presentation
Horizontal Vertical
Relationship Horizontal 3.8 (1.23) 4.5 (0.53)
Vertical 4.6 (0.52) 3.5 (0.97)
An ANOVA [2 (relationship) x 2 (presentation), both between subjects factors] was
carried out on the above data. This revealed a significant interaction between the two
factors (F[1, 36]=10.80, p<O.Ol - see Fig. 8.10), with no main effects.
Fig. 8.10: Relationship x presentation interaction (number of correct answers)
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Further analysis of the above data revealed the following significant simple main
effects:
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- the subjects working with the vertical relation and horizontal premise
presentation scored more correct answers than those working with the vertical
relation and vertical premise presentation (F[1, 36]=8.067, p<O.Ol).
- the subjects working with the vertical premise presentation and the horizontal
relationship scored more correct answers than those working with the vertical
premise presentation and the vertical relationship (F[l, 36]=6.667, p<0.05).
- the subjects working with the horizontal premise presentation and the vertical
relationship scored more correct answers than those working with the horizontal
premise presentation and the horizontal relationship (F[l, 36]=4.267, p<0.05).
Note The difference between the number of correct answers from those subjects
working with the horizontal relation and vertical premise presentation and those
working with the horizontal relation and horizontal premise presentation approached
significance (F[1, 36]=3.267, p=0.0791).
Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 8.2 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) for each experimental group.
Table 8.2: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Presentation
Horizontal Vertical
Relationship Horizontal 18.92 (3.94) 12.59 (1.50)
Vertical 11.97 (1.41) 20.16 (1.70)
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An ANOVA [2 (relationship) x 2 (presentation), both between subjects factors] was
carried out on the above data. Again, this revealed a significant interaction between the
two factors ( F[1, 36]=93.322, p<O.Ol - see Fig. 8.11, with no main effects.
Fig. 8.11: Relationship x presentation interaction (time taken to correctly solve tasks)
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Further analysis of the above data revealed the following significant simple main
effects:
- the subjects working with the horizontal relation and vertical premise
presentation produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
the horizontal relation and horizontal premise presentation (F[l, 36]=35.518,
p<O.Ol).
_ the subjects working with the vertical relation and horizontal premise
presentation produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
the vertical relation and vertical premise presentation (F[1, 36]=59.321, p<O.Ol).
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- the subjects working with the horizontal premise presentation and the vertical
relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with the
horizontal premise presentation and the horizontal relationship (F[1, 36]=42.749,
p<O.Ol).
- the subjects working with the vertical premise presentation and the horizontal
relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with the
vertical premise presentation and the vertical relationship (F[I, 36]=50.744,
p<O.Ol).
Comparison with data from the Insert condition (Experiment 3)
Because the subjects in Experiment 3 and this study were taken from the same schools,
and the same type of materials and procedure were used throughout, it was decided to
combine the relevant data from the two studies in a direct statistical comparison. Due to
results obtained in Experiments 3 and 5, the scores obtained for both measurements in
the Insert condition have been deemed to be at or approaching ceiling, and so a direct
comparison of these 'base-line' scores with the current study will provide evidence as
to whether the experimental manipulation has facilitated performance to 'ceiling' levels.
Experiment 3 was a two factor experiment, where one of the factors involved a
comparison between using photographs and drawings as 'stimulus material. No
significant differences were found, and so this has not been investigated further. Only
the data from the children who used the drawings in the Insert condition has been used
in this comparison, so as to equate with the stimulus material used in the current study.
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Number of correct answers
Table 8.3: Mean number of correct trials (max-5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
reI. horiz./pres. vert. reI. vert./pres. horiz Insert (Exp. 3)
4.5 (0.53) 4.6 (0.52) 4.9 (0.32)
A one way ANOVA was carried out on the above data and showed no significant effect
of ordering (F[1, 36]=2.017, p>0.05).
Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 8.4: Mean time taken to complete trials (in seconds)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Ordering
reI. horiz./pres. vert. reI. vert./pres. horiz Insert (Exp. 3)
12.59 (1.50) 12.06 (1.44) 10.23 (1.77)
A one way ANOVA was carried out on the above data and showed a significant effect
of ordering (F[2, 27]=6.137, p<0.05). Tukey comparisons showed that the Insert
ordering (Experiment 3) resulted in correct trials being completed more quickly than
both the relation horizontal/presentation vertical condition (q=4.72, p<O.Ol) and the
relation vertical/presentation horizontal condition (q=3.67, p<0.05).
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8.1.3 Discussion
The results obtained from this experiment have shown that the poor performance
demonstrated by the 7 year old children in Experiments 1 and 3 can be facilitated by
manipulating the dimension of the task and presentation relations. When these two
factors are incongruent, that is one is in a vertical and one in a horizontal dimension,
performance is significantly better than when the factors are congruent, that is both are
in either a vertical or a horizontal dimension. This is portrayed diagrammatically in Fig.
8.12 below.
Fig. 8.12: Diagrammatic representation of findings (current experiment)
Task relationship
Vertical Horizontal
.
Premise Vertical B
presentation C BC
C CD
D
AB
A
B
Horizontal
B C A BC CD AB
C D B
Note The double border denotes incongruent dimensional relations and successful
performance.
When the task was presented using the two incongruent conditions the error rate was
not significantly different from that of the Insert condition in Experiment 3. The time
which subjects took to correctly solve incongruent problems was higher than that of the
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Insert condition, however. This is not surprising if we consider the difference
between the two types of orderings. Insert ordering consists of AB CD BC. Thus
the child can straightaway order using the first two premises and needs to use the third
premise only as confirmation. L-R ordering (that used in the current experiment) is
either BC CD AI3 or BC AB CD. These both require an item to be placed at the
front of the array. This still results in a slight tendency for the children to follow an
inappropriate left to right heuristic. This is easily realised and corrected, as can be seen
by the equivalent error rates, but it takes a few seconds longer, hence the difference in
problem solving time.
It seems therefore that when children are not confused by task features, they are able to
integrate premises successfully. This shows that they must have knowledge that
separate relations can be linked together to form a systematic representation. They are
misled, however by task information which does not make the critical features of a
problem salient. Thus performance was inhibited by a lack of appreciation of the
significance between premises. As soon as these gaps were made salient by altering the
dimension of the premise information, the children were successful.
This result is interesting, especially if we consider it in terms of the literature describing
the use of 'scaffolding' in both formal and informal education (Wood, Bruner and
Ross, 1976). This has been reviewed more fully in Chapter 2. To summarise, Wood
(1988) defines the term 'scaffolding' as "the breaking down of a task into a sequence of
smaller tasks which children can manage to perform" and "highlighting things they
need to take account of' (p. 80). An initial consideration of this literature might suggest
that the placement of premise information in the 'correct' spatial dimension for task
reasoning would help the subject, as this means that some of the work towards
achieving the task goal will have been carried out. However, the results from the
current study demonstrate that the 'smaller tasks' must be carefully selected so as not to
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cue the children into using inappropriate strategies. This is an important issue, and will
be discussed more fully in Chapter 10.
We must also consider the generalisability of these results. The goal in this study was
to achieve the correct ordering of either women or children in a queue or a tower. It
could be said that these type of tasks are very unfamiliar to young children, and that
perhaps the cause of their difficulties stems from this unfamiliarity.
When presented with a novel or unfamiliar task, an often sensible action is to import a
well-used strategy from a similar domain. Children of this age spend a lot of their time
in school focusing on the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic, where 'add to
end' orderings are extremely common. For example, in the domain of addition,
children solve problems of the form 3 + 2 =?, where the action they are required to
perform comes at the end of a string of symbols. Also, when writing a story, young
children usually approach the task in a sequential manner, and the story is constructed
by more text being added to the end of what has already been written. The domains of
reading, writing and arithmetic have some features in common with the series problems
used in the current study. All are concerned with the ordering of symbols, and they
were all carried out in a formal educational setting (the experiments were carried out in
a school classroom, in close proximity to the child's usual work-area). Due to the
unfamiliarity of the experimental task, the children may have imported the familiar 'add
to end' ordering which is usually appropriate for the task requirements which they
encounter during formal education.
There is ample evidence (Donaldson, 1978) that children's performance in unfamiliar
laboratory tasks can often be significantly improved by the use of equivalent
contextualised 'real-world' tasks which are meaningful and motivating. A previous
experiment (Experiment 4) found that performance was not improved by the use of a
familiar task when both task relationship and premise presentation used a horizontal
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dimension. Thus we have already shown that there is no 'familiarity effect' when both
task and premise presentation relationships are congruent (both in a horizontal
dimension). However, because the results obtained from the current study are both
interesting and important, it was considered necessary to investigate the effects of
reasoning with a familiar task when both task and premise presentation relationships
use a vertical relationship and also when the two relationships differ from each other
(i.e. one is in a vertical dimension and the other horizontal).
8.2 EXPERIMENT 9 - THE EFFECT OF REASONING WITH
CONGRUENT AND INCONGRUENT CONDITIONS USING A
FAlVIILIAR TASK.
Rationale
This study has been designed to ascertain whether the difference obtained between
congruent and incongruent task relationships and premise presentations are also present
when children reason with a familiar 'real-world' task. If the comments above,
concerning the effects of unfamiliar tasks on children's tendencies to import an
inappropriate strategy are valid, then we might expect to see no significant differences
between congruent and incongruent conditions when reasoning with a familiar task.
This is because incongruence will then only be of consequence for unfamiliar tasks.
On the other hand, if the use of an inappropriate ordering strategy occurs also when the
task is familiar, then we will obtain a similar pattern of results as that obtained in
Experiment 8.
After discussion with the class teachers, it was decided to use the 'LEGO' train (see
Experiment 4) for the horizontal task and a toy crane with which the children were
familiar [or the vertical condition. Both toys were well used by the children, and they
256
were happy to insert carriages or crates into an ordering for various reasons, whilst
playing with the toys.
8.2.1 lVlethod
Design
A two factorial between subject design was used. The two factors were as follows:
1. Type of spatial relationship used (horizontal or vertical).
2. Ordering of premise information (horizontal or vertical).
Thus there were four experimental groups.
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task.
Participants
The participants in this study were 40 mixed ability 7 year olds (mean age 6 years 11
months, range 6 years 6 months to 7 years 5 months) from a state and primary school,
with a predominantly middle class catchment area. The subjects were from one of the
schools used in Experiment 2, and were randomly assigned to one of four experimental
groups (relation horizontal, presentation horizontal; relation horizontal, presentation
vertical; relation vertical, presentation vertical; relation vertical, presentation horizontal).
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Task description
Horizontal spatial relationship
As in Experiment 8, except that the task was to order different coloured carriages from
a toy train, using appropriately coloured drawings of the carriages as premise
information. Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix E. The order of the
four colours used (red, yellow, blue and green) was randomly varied, so as to give six
different orderings. Examples of the two different premise orderings (horizontal and
vertical) are given below.
Fig. 8.13: Example of horizontal spatial relationship and horizontal presentation.
Fig. 8.14: Example of horizontal spatial relationship and vertical presentation.
Vertical spatial relationship
As in Experiment 8, except that the task was to order different coloured crates from a
toy crane, using appropriately coloured drawings of the crates as premise information.
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Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix G. Again, the order of the four
colours used (red, yellow, blue and green) was randomly varied, so as to give six
different orderings. Examples of the two different premise presentations are given
below.
Fig. 8.15: Example of vertical spatial relationship and horizontal presentation.
Blue Green.
Blue
Red.
Yellow
Fig. 8.16: Example of vertical spatial relationship and vertical presentation.
Blue
Red
Green.
Blue
Red
Yellow
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Materials
Horizontal task relationship
A toy 'LEGG' train, with an engine and four different coloured carriages, with a
character facing towards the front of each carriage, was used as the 'ordered array'.
The children were handed the carriages and asked to put them in the right order.
Premise information was presented using 3 drawings of pairs of carriages, coloured
appropriately. Appendix E shows an example of premise information andthe
apropriately ordered array.
Vertical task relationship
A toy crane with four different coloured crates which could be suspended in any order
from the main hook was used as the 'ordered array'. The children were handed the
crates and asked to hang them in the right order. Premise information was presented
using 3 drawings of pairs of crates, coloured appropriately. Appendix G shows an
example of premise information and the apropriately ordered array.
Procedure
As in Experiment 8, except that reference was made to carriages being placed in order
behind the engine for the horizontal task relationship conditions and crates being hung
from the crane in the correct order for the vertical task relationship conditions. As
previously described, the premises were presented in a horizontal array for half of the
subjects working with each of the spatial relationships, and in a vertical array for the
other half.
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8.2.2 Results
Note Each subject completed six experimental trials. However, a large number of the
subjects in the previous studies erroneously tried to complete the first trial by recalling
the demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable with earlier ones
the first trial from each subject has been discounted.
WIse scores
The results [rom the WISe digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (relation horizontal, presentation vertical) 8.3
Group 2 (relation vertical, presentation vertical) 8.8
Group 3 (relation vertical, presentation horizontal) 8.2
Group 4 (relation horizontal, presentation horizontal) 8.4
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 6 years 8 months and
7 years is a score of 8 (WISC-R Manual, 1974).
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Number of correct answers
Table 8.5 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
Table 8.5: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Presentation
Horizontal Vertical
Relationship Horizontal 3.3 (0.82) 4.4 (0.7)
Vertical 4.7 (0.48) 3.1 (0.88)
An ANOYA [2 (relationship) x 2 (presentation), both between subjects factors] was
carried out on the above data. This revealed a significant interaction between the two
factors (F[l, 36]=33.646, p-cfl.O'l - see Fig. 8.17), with no main effects.
Fig. 8.17: Relationship x presentation interaction (number of correct answers)
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vertical
Further analysis of the data revealed the following significant simple main effects:
- the subjects working with the horizontal relation and vertical premise
presentation produced more correct solutions than those working with the
horizontal relation and horizontal premise presentation (F[1, 36]=11.169,
p<O.Ol).
- the subj ects working with the vertical relation and horizontal premise
presentation produced more correct solutions than those working with the
vertical relation and vertical premise presentation (F[I, 36]=23.631, p<O.Ol).
- the subjects working with the horizontal premise presentation and the vertical
relationship produced more correct solutions than those working with the
horizontal premise presentation and the horizontal relationship (F[1, 36]=18.092,
p<O.Ol).
- the subj ects working with the vertical premise presentation and the horizontal
relationship produced more correct solutions than those working with the
vertical premise presentation and the vertical relationship (F[I, 36]=15.600,
p<O.Ol).
Thus, for all comparisons, incongruent task and premise presentation relationships
were significantly better than congruent ones.
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Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 8.6 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) for each experimental group.
Table 8.6: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Presentation
Horizontal Vertical
Relationship Horizontal 21.79 (2.48) 17.26 (1.17)
Vertical 19.10 (1.26) 25.40 (2.45)
An ANOVA [2 (relationship) x 2 (presentation), both between subjects factors] was
carried out on the above data. Again, this revealed a significant interaction between the
two factors (F[l, 36]=77.875, p<O.Ol - see Fig. 8.18). There was also a main effect of
task relationship (F[1, 36]=19.757, p<O.Ol) such that those children working with the
horizontal relationship produced correct solutions more quickly.
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Fig. 8.18: Rclalionship x prescnlalion interaction (time taken to correctly solve tasks)
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Further analysis of the data revealed the following significant simple main effects:
- the subjects working with the horizontal relation and vertical premise
presentation produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
the horizontal relation and horizontal premise presentation (F[l, 36]=27.280,
p<O.Ol).
- the subjects working with the vertical relation and horizontal premise
presentation produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
the vertical relation and vertical premise presentation (F[1, 36]=52.663, p<O.Ol).
- the subjects working with the horizontal premise presentation and the vertical
relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with the
horizontal premise presentation and the horizontal relationship (F[1, 36]=9.591,
p<O.Ol).
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- the subjects working with the vertical premise presentation and the horizontal
relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with the
vertical premise presentation and the vertical relationship (F(1,36]=88.041,
p<O.Ol).
Again, for all comparisons, incongruent task and premise presentation relationships
were significantly better than congruent ones.
8.2.3 Discussion
The results obtained from this study replicate those from Experiment 8, with one exception
i.e. there was a main effect of task relationship for one of the dependent variables. This
showed that the subjects produced correct solutions more quickly when working with the
horizontal relationship. There was however no main effect of task relationship for the
number of correct solutions produced.
It is suggested that the apparent increase in problem solving time for the children working
with the vertical task (toy crane) is actually due to the design of the toy used. Hooks and
eyes were used to enable the crates to be linked together (a hook was situated on the end of
the crane arm and on the bottom of each crate, together with an eye on the top of each
crate). However, this meant that the top and bottom of the blocks were not
interchangeable, but that the differences between them were not sufficiently salient. The
experimenter noticed a marked tendency for the children to become very confused when
they couldn't link adjacent blocks as they had the two eyes next to each other. This was
not a problem for the children working with the toy train, as the front of the carriage was
very clearly marked by the use of a model person facing forwards.
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In other aspects, this study replicates Experiment 7. For both measures, and for all
comparisons, incongruent task and premise presentation relationships were
significantly better than congruent ones.
It could be that this effect is due to an inappropriate choice of 'real task', and that with
different objects to work with, performance would not have been inhibited by
congruent relationships. This appears unlikely, however. As in Experiment 4, the
children who used the toys certainly seemed more 'at home' with the task, and there
were no puzzled expressions or inappropriate questions, as there were with the children
who used the queue and tower tasks. It could be that the presentation of premise
information using real objects, rather than drawings, would have an effect, although it
is not obvious exactly how this would facilitate performance. On the contrary, asking
the children to order using duplicates of the objects used in the premises might cause
some confusion.
It seems, therefore, that the 'congruence constraint' observed in Experiment 7 is not
due to familiarity or representational factors. This means that the construction of an
integrated array is inhibited when children are required to reason using the spatial
relationship as the one in which the task information is presented (i.e. the two
relationships are congruent). Performance can be improved by using incongruent
relationships, thus making the gaps between different premise pairs salient. This
'congruence constraint' experienced by 7 year old children is still operational when they
work with familiar task materials which are real objects rather than representations of
objects. The evidence from the current study, together with that from Experiment 8,
suggests that this constraint is very salient for a large proportion of 7 year olds.
I I summary, Experiments 8 and 9 demonstrated the existence of a 'congruence
constraint' in the solving of series problems using dimensional relationships.
Congruent task and premise presentation relationships significantly inhibited
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performance when compared with incongruent ones. AB a result of these findings it
has been suggested that this constraint is preventing the successful building of
structural representations of problems.
Both of these studies have used 7 year old children, as the level of complexity of the
task was considered appropriate for this age group. However, the first study in this
thesis (Experiment 1) looked at the performance of 5 year old children when building a
structured array very similar to that used in the later studies. The subjects in this study
found the task extremely difficult (performance was approaching 'floor'), and for that
reason all the following experiments used only older children (7 and 9 year olds), The
task used with the 5 year old children in Experiment 1 was to order a five person array
using the horizontal relationship 'behind' and horizontal premise presentation.
Based on the results from Experiments 8 and 9 we can now suggest two potential
manipulations which might improve the 5 year old's performance:
1. Number of items in the array.
It has always seemed likely that a reduction in the number of array items will
facilitate performance, by reducing the amount of working memory required to
solve the task. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 4. However, the
constraints which are operating in this situation can be divided into two types
i. e. those arising primarily from the problem solving capabilities of the child
and those arising primarily from the task presentation, though obviously these
will interact with each other. k the emphasis of this research programme has
been to look at task constraints, a reduction in the number of array items has not
been previously investigated.
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2. Removal of the 'congruence constraint'
Congruent task and premise presentation relationships significantly inhibited
performance for the 7 year olds on a very similar task, so it could be that the
removal of this constraint for younger children will also improve their
performance.
In view of the above, it was decided to replicate Experiment 8 (a comparison of
congruent task relationships and premise presentations with incongruent), but using a
younger age group (5 year olds rather than 7 year olds). However, because of the
likely working memory constraint, it was decided to use 3 item arrays rather 4 items.
This was to give the younger children a much better chance of achieving some success
(i.e. not performing at 'floor').* Nonetheless, if we see significant facilitation of
performance in the congruent conditions, we can conclude that the 'congruence
constraint' is not limited to 7 year old children.
8.3 EXPERIMENT 10 - THE EFFECT OF REASONING WITH
CONGRUENT AND INCONGRUENT CONDITIONS IN 5 YEAR OLD
CHILDREN
Rationale
The aims of this study are to investigate whether the poor performance demonstrated by
the 5 year old children when building the structured array in Experiment 1 can be
facilitated by the removal of the 'congruence constraint'. This manipulation has been
showed to improve performance in 7 year old children when solving a similar task (see
Experiment 8 above). The following experiment will enable us to ascertain whether the
'congruence constraint' identified in Experiment 8 is limited to 7 year olds. The term
• a pilot study has indicated that 5 year olds have some success with ordering 3 item arrays.
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'congruence constraint' refers to the congruent dimension which was used for both the
task relationship and for the presentation of the premise information. This is illustrated
in Fig. 8.19 below.
Fig. 8.19: Example of congruent dimensions for task relationship and premise
information presentation
Premise presentation
Yellow G ~ e n n Red. Yellow G ~ e n n Purple
Correctly completed array (described to the subjects as a bus queue)
Red. Yellow Green. P-urple
In the figure above, the premises are presented in a horizontal manner, and the
relationship between individual characters which the subject is required to reason about
is also horizontal.
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8.3.1 Method
Design
A two factorial between subject design was used. The two factors were as follows:
1. Type of spatial relationship used (horizontal or vertical).
2. Ordering of premise information (horizontal or vertical).
Thus there were four experimental groups.
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task.
Participants
The participants in this study were 40 mixed ability 5 year aIds (mean age 5 years 1
month, range 4 years 11 months to 5 years 4 months) from a state nursery school, with
a predominantly middle class catchment area. The subjects were from the one of the
same schools used in Experiment 3, and were randomly assigned to one of four
experimental groups (relation horizontal, presentation horizontal; relation horizontal,
presentation vertical; relation vertical, presentation vertical; relation vertical,
presentation horizontal).
Task description
As in Experiment 8, except that all the subjects worked with 3 item arrays instead of 4,
thus only three different colours were used throughout (red, green and yellow). This
number of items used resulted in two possible premise orderings: AB BC and BC
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AB. All the trials used ordering Be AB, so that some manipulation of premise item
orderings would be required in order to correctly build the array. Three trials were
completed by each subject".
The premises were presented as in Experiment 8, again depending on whether
horizontal or vertical task premise presentation was applicable.
Materials
As in Experiment 8, but drawings of 3 item arrays were used (either of women viewed
'side-on' in a queue, or acrobats standing on each others shoulders). Copies of the
task materials (but with 4 items) are given in Appendix C.
Procedure
The WISC-R digit span sub test was administered to the participants.
As in Experiment 8 except that the children worked through three trials, rather than six,
after they had been showed the worked example. Also, all the references to four
women/acrobats were changed to three.
As previously described, the premises were presented in a horizontal array for half of
the subjects working with each of the spatial relationships, and in a vertical array for the
other half.
• This was because an informal pilot study in the same nursery school had indicated that a greater
number of trials resulted in loss of interest.
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8.3.2 Results
Note Each subject completed three experimental trials in total. However, a large
number of the subjects in the previous studies erroneously tried to complete the first
trial by recalling the demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable
with earlier ones the first trial from each subject has been discounted.
WIse scores
The results from the WISe digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (relation horizontal, presentation vertical) 6.3
Group 2 (relation vertical, presentation vertical) 6.4
Group 3 (relation vertical, presentation horizontal) 6.2
Group 4 (relation horizontal, presentation horizontal) 6.3
Number of correct answers
Table 8.7 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
Table 8.7: Mean number of correct trials (max=2)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Presentation
Horizontal Vertical
Relationship Horizontal 1.2 (0.42) 1.7 (0.48)
Vertical 1.7 (0.48) 1.1 (0.32)
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An ANOVA [2 (relationship) x 2 (presentation), both between subjects factors] was
carried out on the above data. This revealed a significant interaction between the two
factors (F[1, 36]=16.254, p<O.Ol - see Fig. 1), with no main effects' .
Fig. 8.20 below shows the interaction between relationship and premise presentation
for the mean number of correct answers.
* The data is not normally distributed. This is because all the subjects scored either 1 or 2 correct
answers. In view of this, analysis using the equivalent non parametric test (Fishers exact), was also
carried out. This showed that the distribution of correct answers between the four experimental groups
was significantly different from chance (p<0.01) The frequencies of correct answers for each of the
conditions are shown in the table below. There were 10 subjects in each condition and each subject
could score a maximum of 2. Thus the maximum number of correct answers for each condition is 20.
Frequencies of correct trials (max=20)
Presentation
Horizontal Vertical
Relationship Horizontal 12 17
Vertical 17 11
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Fig. 8.20: Relationship x presentation interaction (number of correct answers)
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Further analysis of the data revealed the following significant simple main effects:
- the subjects working with the horizontal relation and vertical premise
presentation scored more correct answers than those working with the horizontal
relation and horizontal premise presentation (F[1, 36]=6.716, p<O.05).
- the subjects working with the vertical relation and horizontal premise
presentation scored more correct answers than those working with the vertical
relation and vertical premise presentation ffjj 36]=9.672, p<O.Ol).
- the subjects working with the horizontal premise presentation and the vertical
relationship scored more correct answers than those working with the horizontal
premise presentation and the horizontal relationship (F[l, 36]=6.716, p<O.05).
_ the subjects working with the vertical premise presentation and the horizontal
relationship scored more correct answers than those working with the vertical
premise presentation and the vertical relationship (F[l, 36]=9.672, p<O.Ol).
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Thus, for all comparisons, incongruent task and premise presentations were
significantly better than congruent ones.
Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 8.8 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) for each experimental group
Table 8.8: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Presentation
Horizontal Vertical
Relationship Horizontal 21.29 (2.18) 15.58 (0.92)
Vertical 16.12 (1.28) 21.13 (1.38)
An ANOYA [2 (relationship) x 2 (presentation), both between subjects factors] was
carried out on the above data. Again, this revealed a significant interaction between the
two factors (F[1, 36]=125.253, p<O.Ol - see Fig. 8.21), with no main effects.
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Further analysis of the data revealed the following significant simple main effects:
- the subjects working with the horizontal relation and vertical premise
presentation produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
the horizontal relation and horizontal premise presentation (F[l, 36]=71.140,
p<O.Ol).
- the subj ects working with the vertical relation and horizontal premise
presentation produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
the vertical relation and vertical premise presentation (F[1, 36]=54.665, p<O.Ol).
- the subjects working with the horizontal premise presentation and the vertical
relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
the horizontal premise presentation and the horizontal relationship
(F[1,36]=58.206, p<O.Ol).
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- the subjects working with the vertical premise presentation and the horizontal
relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
the vertical premise presentation and the vertical relationship (F[l, 36]=67.208,
p<O.Ol).
Again, for all comparisons, incongruent task and premise presentations were
significantly better than congruent ones.
8.3.3 Discussion
This study replicates the results from Experiment 7, but with a younger age group. For
both measures, and for all comparisons, incongruent task and premise presentation
relationships were significantly better than congruent ones. Thus, although the task
was made easier so that the 5 year olds were not performing at 'floor', the 'congruence
constraint' was still significantly inhibiting performance.
We now have evidence that the 'congruence constraint' operates with simpler tasks and
a younger age group. It is possible that the removal of this constraint might raise the
level of performance of the 5 year oids to that of the 7 year oids. This would question
the assumption that working memory limitations are having a significant effect on the
integration of premises into a single ordered array. In order to test for this we would
need to compare the performance of 5 year olds working with 4 item arrays and
incongruent relationships to that of 7 year olds.
8.4 GENERAL SUMMARY
The three experiments reported in this chapter have demonstrated the existence of a task
constraint which is affecting the construction of systematic relational representations in
children. These representations were constructed by integrating separate items of
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relational information (known as premises) When the dimensions of the task
relationship and premise information were congruent, performance was inhibited. This
has been termed the 'congruence constraint'. Examples of congruent and incongruent
tasks are given below.
Fig. 8.22: Example of a congruent task (both the task relationship and the premise
presentation are horizontal.
Yellow Grun Red Ydlow Green
Fig. 8.23: Example of an incongruent task (the task relationship is horizontal, whereas
the premise presentation is vertical.
Yellow
Red
Green.
Green.
Yellow
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Studies have shown that the performance of both 5 and 7 year old children using
drawings of items was affected, as well as that of 7 year olds using familiar toys. It is
likely that this constraint operates by withdrawing or reducing the significance of the
gap between premise pairs. As a result of this, the children are encouraged to apply an
inappropriate left to right rule, which often results in incorrect ordering and so a correct
structural task representation cannot be built.
It is relevant here to consider the results reported by Pears and Bryant (1990) and also
those obtained in Experiment 2 (which was a replication of Pears and Bryant). Both of
these two studies used a vertical task relationship, with an incongruent premise
presentation relationship, in that the children (5 year olds in both cases) were required
to order coloured bricks in a tower (a vertical relationship) whilst the premises (in the
form of pairs of bricks) were presented to the child horizontally (see Figs. 8.24 and
6.25 below)
Fig. 8.24: Example of premise presentation - Experiment 2 and Pears and Brvant
(1990)
Red
Green
Green
Yellow
Blue
Red
Bhck
Blue
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Fig. 8.25: Example of fully ordered array for the above premises- Expenmcr-.: ~ __
Pears and Bryant (1990)
BlAck
Blue
Red
Green.
Yellow
Although no direct comparisons between congruent and incongruent conditions were
made, it did seem that performance in both of these studies was better than that shown
in Experiment 1, where the same aged children worked with a similar task, except that
they were ordering in a horizontal dimension (family members were placed in a queue).
Premises were also presented horizontally in Experiment 1, resulting in congruent task
and premise presentation relationships. An example of this is given in Figs. 8.26 and
8.27 below.
Fig. 8.26: Example of premise presentation - Experiment 1
G)
~ .
......
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Fig. 8.27: Example of fully ordered array for the above premises- Experiment 1
There are two possible reasons for the improved performance demonstrated in these
two studies; the dimension of-the actual relationship (vertical rather than horizontal) and
the incongruence of task and premise presentation relationships. However, none of the
three experiments in the current chapter found a main effect of task relationship when
vertical and horizontal conditions were compared. Both real objects (toys) and
drawings were used, and the performance of 5 and 7 year olds was investigated. It is
suggested therefore, that the performance found by Pears and Bryant and also reported
in Experiment 2, was due to the incongruence of task and premise presentation
relationships, rather than because a vertical relationship was used. This is interesting,
particularly if we consider work reported by Handel, DeSoto and London (1968) which
claimed that people find the vertical representation of relationships easier than the
horizontal. This is an important point, and will be returned to in Chapter 10.
It has been argued in earlier chapters that children solve series problems (the tasks used
in this thesis to study structural representations) by performing an analogical mapping
with orderings which they have abstracted from everyday life (Halford, 1992). This
abstraction has been termed a generalised ordering schema, after Cheng and Holyoak,
1985.
We have evidence from the studies reported in this chapter that successful mapping is
prevented in 'near' analogies due to the 'congruence constraint' described above. A
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'near' analogy is one in which surface features are common to both base and target
structures (Gentner, 1989). In the case of series problems; near analogies have been
defined as those in which both structures share the same actual relation. Thus, in the
problems studied here, the children have been required to reason about actual spatial
relationships, both in the horizontal dimension ('behind') and in the vertical one ('on
top of' and 'underneath'). These are the same relations as the one which Halford has
used in the abstracted ordering schema (the base structure).
It is now necessary to see whether the 'congruence constraint' also applies to 'far'
analogies, i.e. those which have no surface features in common with the generalised
schema. Chapter 9 will address this issue.
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CHAPTER 9 : STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS AND 'FAR'
ANALOGICAL MAPPING
Introduction
The primary goal of this thesis is to explore the role of structural task representations in
the development of analogical reasoning. This has been investigated using series
problems, as Halford (1992) has claimed that these types of problems are solved by
analogy to an 'internalised ordering schema' which has been abstracted from interaction
with orderings which occur during everyday play etc. Because the solving of series
problems is heavily dependent on the construction of an internal spatial array (Trabasso
et al, 1975: Riley, 1976), they are well suited to an exploration of the way in which
children actually construct a task representation where the relevant objects and their
relationships to each other are depicted.
Experiments 2 to 10 have studied the effects of task constraints on series problems
which use a spatial task relationship (either vertical or horizontal). These have been
termed' near' analogies (after Gentner, 1989) because they have surface features in
common with the ordering schema put forward by Halford. Fig. 9.1 below reproduces
this schema. It can be seen from this that the actual relationship used is a spatial one.
This constitutes the common surface feature shared with spatial series problems.
28-+
Fig. 9.1: Series problem mapped into an ordering schema (Halford. 1992)
above above
taller than
base schema
target schema
TOP .MIDDLE BOTTOM
JOHN PETER TOM
taller than
From Halford (1992)
The studies referred to above have demonstrated that there are at least two task
constraints operating on primary aged children's ability to combine separate spatial
relations into a single integrated representation. These have been identified as follows:
1. An effect of information ordering (Chapters 5 and 6).
2. An effect of congruity between task and information presentation relations
(Chapter 8).
These constraints are therefore preventing successful mapping from the 'base' domain
(the ordering schema) to the' target' domain (the actual problem).
Halford claimed that children solve all types of series problems, including those using
more complex, abstract relationships, by making analogies to the 'ordering schema'.
Abstract relationships are' far' analogies (Gentner, 1989) as they have only the
285
relational structure in common with the 'ordering schema'. It is now necessary to
ascertain whether the effects listed above are present when children solve abstract series
problems.
Experiment 1 demonstrated very little success when young children were asked to solve
abstract series problems. However, a similar lack of success was demonstrated in
spatial series problems, that is, those where mapping relations over from spatial to
abstract domains was not required. These results were therefore suggesting that there
were no differences in 7 year old children's performance between spatial ('near') and
abstract ('far') problems. This evidence is interesting when we consider Gentner's
(1989) account of the 'relational shift' in analogical reasoning. She claims that there is
a developmental shift from reliance on surface similarity to the use of relational
structure. We might therefore expect that young children would find spatial series
problems easier than abstract ones, as the former have surface features (the actual task
relation) in common with the ordering schema.
Later studies in this thesis have shown that performance in concrete (spatial) problems
was facilitated by consideration of the factors listed above. If the initial results from
Experiment 1 are correct and there is no difference between spatial and abstract series
problems, then we would expect both domains to result in similar patterns of
performance when congruent and incongruent task and premise presentation
relationships are compared. Experiment 8 reported these results for spatial problems.
On the other hand, if Gentner is correct and young children find 'near' analogies easier,
then the facilitative effect observed for incongruent conditions when reasoning with
spatial series problems might not be replicated for abstract ones. The initial study
reported in this chapter will therefore investigate the 'congruence constraint' using
abstract series problems.
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This will enable us to ascertain whether the previously observed facilitation effects are
gencralisahlc to non-spatial domains and also to observe whether children can use
'spatial' bases to reason about abstract relationships. Comparison with the data from
Experiment 8 will allow us to conclude whether or not children find abstract series
problems more difficult than spatial ones.
9.1 EXPERIMENT 11 - THE EFFECT OF CONGRUENT AND
INCONGRUENT BASE AND PREMISE PRESENTATION
RELATIONSHIPS WHEN REASONING WITH 'FAR' ANALOGIES.
Rationale
Chapter 8 indicated that, in some circumstances, primary aged children were more
successful in solving spatial series problems when the task and premise presentation
relationships were incongruent that is, they both employed either a vertical or
horizontal dimension. This effect, termed the' congruence constraint' has been
demonstrated to significantly affect 7 year old children's performance when integrating
spatial relational information from both drawings and real objects, and also 5 year old's
performance when integrating this information from drawings.
The current study was designed to ascertain whether this effect is also present when
children solve abstract series problems. It has previously been demonstrated that
children use spatially ordered arrays to solve evaluative 'non-spatial' series problems
e.g. Riley, 1975; Experiment 1, this thesis). In view of this, and as in the previous
experiments, the subjects will be encouraged to order the abstract relational information
by using a spatial array. However, we have no clear evidence which satisfactorily
discriminates between vertical and horizontal arrays. The studies reported in Chapter 8
found no differences in performance when comparing the direction of ordering required
by the task. However, work by DeSoto, London and Handel (1965), discussed in
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Chapters 3 and 4, suggested that some abstract evaluative relations are spatially tied to a
vertical cognitive array. They claimed that these are relationships which have an
everyday linguistic linkage to words which describe vertical positions. The example
they used was 'better-worse', stating that the dictionary definition of the word 'high'
shows definite vertical ties to this relationship.
The significance of their proposition for this thesis will be fully investigated in
Experiment 12. For the purposes of this experiment, it was decided to compare both
vertical and horizontal spatial arrays when reasoning about a relation which appeared to
have no obvious tie to a spatial dimension. This will enable us to gain some insights
concerning the 'congruence constraint' in abstract series problems without any possible
confound caused by the implied 'vertical spatial tie' [or some evaluative relations.
9.1.1 lVlethod
Design
A two factorial between subject design was used. The two factors were as follows:
1. Dimension of base relationship (vertical or horizontal).
2. Ordering of premise presentation (vertical or horizontal).
Thus there were four experimental groups.
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task.
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Participants
The participants in this study were 40 mixed ability 7 year olds (mean age 6 years 11
months, range 6 years 5 months to 7 years 3 months) from state first and primary
schools, with predominantly middle class catchment areas. The subjects were from the
same schools used in Experiment 3, and were randomly assigned to one of the four
experimental groups.
Task descriptions and materials
These were the same as reported in Experiment 8, except that the subjects were told to
use the concrete arrays to reason about the neutral abstract relationship 'louder than'
(see Procedure section). All the conditions used' left to right' premise ordering (BC
CD AB and BC AB CD). Further details of the task descriptions are given below.
Horizontal base relationship
The four-item array of women viewed 'side-on', used for Experiments 3, 5, 6 and 8
formed the horizontal base array. Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix C.
The subjects in the horizontal presentation group were presented with the premises laid
out as follows: BC CD AB. An example of this is given in Fig. 9.2 below.
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Fig. 9.2: Example of horizontal spatial relationship and horizontal presentation.
Yellow Green. Red Yellow Green.
The subjects in the vertical presentation group were presented with the premises laid
out as follows: BC
CD
AB
An example of this is given in Fig. 9.3 below.
Fig. 9.3: Example of horizontal spatial relationship and vertical presentation.
Yellow
Red
Green.
Yellow
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Vertical spatial relationship
The four-item array of acrobats in a 'human tower,' used for Experiment 8 formed the
vertical base array. Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix F.
The subjects in the horizontal presentation group were presented with the premises laid
out as follows : B C A
C D B
An example of this is given in Fig. 9.4 below.
Fig. 9.4: Example of vertical spatial relationship and horizontal p r e s e n t ~ t i o n n
Yellow
Green.
Red.
Yellow
G ~ e D D
Pwple
The subjects in the vertical presentation group were presented with the premises laid out
as follows: B
C
C
D
A
B
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An example of this is given in Fig. 9.5 below.
Fig. 9.5: Example of vertical spatial relationship and vertical presentation.
Yellow
Green.
Red
Yellow
Green.
PlJ11>le
Procedure
This was as similar as possible to Experiment 8. However, because a large part of the
instructions given to the subj ects related to the mapping of the actual task relationship
into the concrete base relationship, the procedure is described in full below.
Subjects were tested individually in a quiet room. The experimenter first explained the
task, using a complete photograph and serial ordering of premises as a worked
example. The children then worked through the six examples, using copies of the
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individual 4 items to build a concrete array. Final ordering, time taken and order of
item placement were recorded by the experimenter.
Wording of Instructions
"I've done some drawings of four people standing in a queue/children
standing on each others shoulders...Look, like this one ... Can you see
that they're all wearing different coloured jumpers/tee-shirts? You see
that the person wearing the <yellow> jumper/tee-shirt is first/on top,
then the <red> and then the <green> and last of all/at the bottom the
<purple> one. I also made some copies....they were exactly the same.
I cut one of the copies down/across the middle, so that the first/top two
people/children in the queue/tower were in the first/top half and the
last/bottom two people/children were in the secondlbottom
half.. .... .look...like this .... .1 then got another copy and cut off the
first/top and last/bottom people/children in the queue/tower and threw
them away, so that I only had the middle two people/children left in this
part...look. ..like this .....The other drawings have got the same
people/children in, but they're in a different order in each one. I've got
some puzzles for you to do, where you have to work out who has the
loudest voice, and then the next loudest, and then the next loudest, and
then finally the person with the least loudest voice. I want you to use
these part drawings as clues to help you do the puzzle because you
won't be able to look at the whole drawing until after you've
finished .look, I'll show you how <Use serial ordering> Here
are four separate drawings of the four people/children. \Ve can use
these to build up our own queue/tower from the clues. Look at these
two people/children here. The drawing shows us that the person
wearing the green jumper/tee-shirt has a louder voice than the person
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wearing the red jumper/tee-shirt...OK? So you use your little drawings
to start to build the queuc/tower.. ...now look at this next one .. Who's
got a louder voice than the person/child with the green jumper/tee-
shirt? ...OK, so now you usc your drawings again.....Now use them
again when you've worked out what this last drawing is showing
you ...... Right, now you've put all of the people/children in the order
which these three part drawings told you about and so you've finished
this puzzle. Well done.....There are six more for you to do. They all
use the same people/children but the order of the people/children will be
different and the order of the drawings which I give you might make the
puzzles a little bit harder."
As previously described, the premises were presented horizontally for half of the
subjects working with each of the spatial relationships, and vertically for the other half.
WISC-R digit recall scores were also taken from each subject.
9.1.2 Results
Note Each subject completed six experimental trials in total. However, a large number
of the subjects in the previous studies erroneously tried to complete the first trial by
recalling the demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable with
earlier ones the first trial from each subject has been discounted.
The results from the WISe digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (base relation vertical, presentation vertical)
Group 2 (base relation vertical, presentation horizontal)
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8.7
8.5
Group 3 (base relation horizontal, presentation vertical) 8.8
Group 4 (base relation horizontal, presentation horizontal) 8.5
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 6 years 8 months and
7 years is a score of 8 (WISC-R Manual, 1974).
Number of correct answers
Table 9.1 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
Table 9.1: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Presentation
Horizontal Vertical
Base Horizontal 2.8 (0.62) 2.6 (0.84)
Relatio nshi p Vertical 4.1 (0.57) 2.9 (0.88)
An ANOYA [2 (base relationship) x 2 (presentation), both between subjects factors]
was carried out on the above data. This revealed a significant interaction between the
two factors (F[I, 36]=4.128, p<0.05 - see Fig. 9.6). The two main effects were also
significant:
1. Base relationship.
Those children working with the vertical base relationship produced a greater
number of correct trials overall than those working with the horizontal base
relationship (F[I, 36]=10.569, p<O.Ol).
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2. Dimension of premise presentation.
Those children working with the horizontal premise present ti da Ion pro uced a
greater number of correct trials overall than those working with the vertical
premise presentation (F[l, 36]=8.092, p<0.01).
Fig. 9.6: Base relationship x premise presentation interaction
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Base relationship
Further analysis of the above data revealed the following significant simple main
effects:
_the subjects working with the vertical base relationship and the horizontal
premise presentation produced a greater number of correct solutions than those
working with the vertical base relationship and the vertical premise presentation
(F[1, 36]=11.890, p<0.01).
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- the subjects working with the horizontal premise presentation and the vertical
base relationship produced a greater number of correct solutions than those
working with the horizontal premise presentation and the horizontal base
relationship (F[I, 36]=13.954, p<O.Ol).
Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 9.2 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) to correctly complete the trials for
each experimental group.
Table 9.2: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Presentation
Horizontal Vertical
Base Horizontal 17.57 (1.47) 17.26 (1.69)
Relatio nshi p Vertical 12.73 (0.81) 16.96 (1.28)
An ANOVA [2 (base relationship) x 2 (presentation), both between subjects factors]
was carried out on the above data. This revealed a significant interaction between the
two factors (F(1, 36]=28.135, p<O.Ol - see Fig. 9.7). The two main effects were also
significant:
1. Base relationship.
Those children working with the vertical relationship produced correct solutions
more quickly overall than those working with the horizontal relationship
(F[I,36]=35.834, p<O.Ol).
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2. Premise presentation.
Those children working with the horizontal premise presentation produced
correct solutions more quickly overall than those working with the vertical
premise presentation (F[1, 36]=20.980, p<O.Ol).
Fig7.7: Base relationship x premise presentation interaction (time taken to correct!v
solve tasks)
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Further analysis of the above data revealed the following significant simple main
effects:
_the subjects working with the vertical base relationship and the horizontal
premise presentation produced correct solutions more quickly than those
working with the vertical base relationship and the vertical premise presentation
(F[1, 36]=48.853, p<O.Ol).
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- the subjects working with the horizontal premise presentation and the vertical
base relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those working
with the horizontal premise presentation and the horizontal base relationship
(F[l, 36]=63.737, p<O.Ol).
Comparison with data from Experiment 8 (incongruent conditions)
Because the subjects in Experiment 8 and this study were taken from the same schools,
and the same type of materials and procedure were used throughout, it was decided to
combine the relevant data from the two studies in a direct statistical comparison. If we
consider just the two incongruent conditions (i.e. using both horizontal and vertical task
relationships) the only difference between the studies is the task relationship. The
subjects in Experiment 8 used the ordering of the array to reason about a concrete
dimensional relationship ('in front' or 'on top of') whereas those in this study used the
same array to reason about an abstract relationship ('louder than').
Number of correct answers
Table 9.3: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Task relationship
Concrete Abstract
Base Horizontal 4.5 (0.53) 2.6 (0.84)
relatio nshi p Vertical 4.6 (0.52) 4.1 (0.5n
An ANOVA [2 (base relationship) x 2 (task relationship), both between subjects
factors] was carried out on the above data. This revealed a significant interaction
between the two factors (F[1, 36]=12.423, p<O.Ol - see Fig. 9.8). The two main
effects were also significant:
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1. Base relationship.
Those children working with the vertical relationship produced a greater number
of correct trials overall than those working with the horizontal relationship
(F[1,36]=16.225, p<O.Ol).
2. Task relationship.
Those children working with the concrete relationship produced a greater
number of correct trials overall than those working with the abstract relationship
(F[1,36]=36.507, p<O.Ol).
Fig 7.8: Base relationship x task presentation interaction (number of correct answers)
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Further analysis of the above data revealed the following significant simple main
effects:
_the subjects working with the horizontal base relationship and the concrete task
relationship produced more correct solutions than those working with the
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horizontal base relationship and the abstract task relationship (F =45 761[1,36] . ,
p<O.Ol).
- the subjects working with the abstract task relationship ~ n n the vertical base
relationship produced more correct solutions than those working with the
abstract task relationship and the horizontal base relationship (F[1, 36]=28.521,
p<O.Ol).
Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 9.4 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) for each experimental group.
Table 9.4: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Task relationship
Concrete Abstract
Base Horizontal 12.59 (1.50) 17.26 (1.7)
rela tio nshi p Vertical 12.06 (1.44) 12.73 (0.81)
An ANOVA [2 (base relationship) x 2 (task relationship), both between subjects
factors] was carried out on the above data. Again, this revealed a significant interaction
between the two factors (F[i, 36]=20.426, p<O.OI - see Fig. 9.9). Also, the main
effects were again significant:
1. Base relationship.
Those children working with the vertical relationship produced correct solutions
more quickly overall than those working with the horizontal relationship
(F[1,36j=32.499, p<O.Ol).
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2. Task relationship.
Those children working with the concrete relationship produced correct
solutions more quickly overall than those working with the abstract relationship
(F[l, 36]=36.314, p<O.Ol).
Fig 7.9: Base relationship x task presentation interaction (time taken to correctly solve
tasks)
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Further analysis of the above data revealed the following significant simple main
effects:
_ the subjects working with the horizontal base relationship and the concrete task
relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
the horizontal base relationship and the abstract task relationship
(F[1,36]=55.605, p<O.Ol).
_ the subjects working with the abstract task relationship and the vertical base
relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with
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the abstract task relationship and the horizontal base relationship
(F[1,36]=52.228, p<O.Ol).
9.1.3 Discussion
Both dependent variables (number of correct trials and time taken to correctly order the
array) show very similar patterns of results and so the following discussion refers to both
measurements.
The aim of this experiment was to ascertain whether the 'congruence constraint' identified
for spatial series problems ('near' analogies) also has an effect on performance when
children are ordering arrays concerning abstract relationships ('far' analogies). It can be
seen from the interaction that incongruent task and premise presentation relationships did
have a facilitative effect on performance, but only for the vertical base and horizontal
premise presentation relationships. There was no difference between the congruent
(horizontal premise presentation) and incongruent (vertical premise presentation) conditions
for the horizontal base relationships. Similarly, there was no difference between congruent
(vertical base relationship) and incongruent (horizontal base relationship) conditions for the
vertical premise presentation. Thus it appears that, when mapping 'far' analogies, the
facilitative effect demonstrated for incongruent task and premise presentation relationships
is only present for the vertical base.
It was decided to directly compare performance using spatial and abstract tasks, to see
whether this claim could be substantiated. The current study and Experiment 8 both
employed the same design, but whereas the former used an abstract task, Experiment 8
used a spatial one. Both incongruent conditions (horizontal base relationship, vertical
premise presentation and vertical base relationship, horizontal premise presentation) from
the two studies were therefore compared in one analysis. This showed both an interaction
and main effects of base and task relationships. It was found that, whilst there was no
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effect of the task dimension for concrete problems, inhibition of performance was caused
by the use of a horizontal base when reasoning with the abstract task. Also, the
performance of subjects in this condition was significantly worse than that of the subjects
who used the vertical base for reasoning about the abstract task. These results are therefore
consistent with those obtained by the analysis carried out solely on the current study,
referred to above. Ordering arrays using a horizontal base and an abstract task relationship
means that performance cannot be facilitated by the use of incongruent task and premise
presentation relationships. On the other hand, the use of a vertical base, or a concrete
relationship, or both, does result in such facilitation.
It would seem therefore, that we have some evidence to support the claim that incongruent
task and premise presentation relationships boost performance for 'near' analogies,
irrespective of the dimension of the task relationship. However, when this relationship is
used as a base for mapping 'far' analogies, facilitation of performance only occurs when a
vertical base is used. It could therefore be that abstract ('far') analogies are, in some
circumstances at least, more difficult than ('near') analogies. Thus, even when the task is
made easier by the use of incongruent base and premise presentation relationships, children
are unable to take advantage of this unless a vertical base relationship is used.
At first sight, this appears inconsistent with the results from Experiment 1, which showed
that 7 year old children were equally successful using either concrete or abstract
relationships in a similar type of task. However, it must be remembered that the subjects in
Experiment 1 were using a random selection of all levels of difficulty of premise orderings
with a five-item array, and were also working with congruent task and premise presentation
relationships. It could well be that these difficulties were swamping any differences which
we might have found between 'near' (spatial) and 'far' (abstract) mappings.
We must also consider the actual relationships chosen for these studies. Experiment 1
used 'happier than', whereas this study used 'louder than'. The latter relation was
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originally chosen because it was thought to be neutral. However, it could be that this is
in fact easier to map onto a vertical relationship than a horizontal one. Although the
relationship actually compared volume ('louder than'), it could be that the children were
more successful when using a vertical array as they have imported terminology from
the 'high-low' continuum which is used to describe differences in pitch. This is
consistent with work reported by Handel, DeSoto and London (1968), which
suggested that, for adults, some relations are 'spatially tied' to a vertical dimension.
Their subjects (undergraduate students) were first asked to give spatial assignments to
relation words. Each subject was given sheets containing a statement, for example,
Tom is better than Bob, and also a diagram, with vertical and horizontal lines crossing
at 90 degrees. A box was situated at both ends of either line. The subjects were asked
to write the name of the statement items in whichever two of the four boxes seemed
most appropriate. They found that the relationships 'better-worse', 'father-son' and
'more-less' were assigned to the vertical dimension for 71% to 78% of the time.
Relations such as 'faster-slower' and 'farther-nearer' were assigned to the horizontal
dimension for about 50% of the time, though there were also inconsistent assignments
for 25% and 43% of the time respectively. Following this, they presented their
subjects with three term series problems and found that relationships having similar
patterns of spatial assignment also had similar patterns of premise combination
difficulty (these combinations were formed by varying the position of opposite relations
in each task - for example, 'better' and 'worse') They concluded from this that adults
did use spatial arrays to order evaluative relationships. Furthermore, based on the
results from the spatial assignment task, they also claimed that it was easier for adult
subjects to represent relations vertically when ordering series problems. However, it
must be remembered that this related to written series problems solved without the
ordering of any external arrays.
Nonetheless, there is a suggestion that it might be easier for people to map relations
vertically, rather than horizontally. DeSoto, London and Handel (1965), working with
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series problems with no explicit spatial relationship, suggest that this could be due to
linguistic conventions, as there is often a tie to the vertical dimension for many
evaluative relations. This is demonstrated by metaphorical phrases such as 'upper-
crust', 'high status', 'top dog' etc. It could be that this preference for vertical ordering
is also affecting the children in the current study, such that they can only map 'far'
analogies onto vertical orderings.
However, it is also considered that a horizontal ordering could well be salient for 7 year
old children. They are used to 'lining-up' in order in the classroom (a horizontal
ordering) and also to 'lining-up' long strings of toy cars or animals during play. In a
similar vein, Johnson (1987) when asserting that spatial structure is mapped onto
mental structures, places equal emphasis on vertical and horizontal schemas. Indeed, it
might be suggested that young children are more used to horizontal rather than vertical
orderings as they have more opportunity for the former. These can be constructed on
any table or floor, whereas the opportunity to order toys vertically requires surfaces at
different heights. These may not always be available.
It seems that we are left with two possibilities. Either young children conform to the
suggestion made by Handel et al (1968), and show a definite preference for vertical
mappings, or they can show a preference for either dimension, depending on the actual
task relation. If horizontal relations are salient for young children, then it would seem
that there are many relations for which these would be more appropriate. Comparisons
such as 'nearer to' or 'faster than' or perhaps 'wider than' could well be viewed as
more similar to horizontal orderings which, it is argued, children encounter everyday.
It could also be that there are some relationships which are not semantically tied to
either dimension. However, 'louder than' does not appear to be one of them! If this is
the case, then we might expect to find either that 7 year old children can use either
dimension to map such relations, or that they have difficulty in using any.
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In view of the above, it was decided to investigate the effect of the dimension of the
base relationshi p on success in mapping various different target relations.
9.2 EXPERIMENT 12 - THE EFFECT OF THE DIMENSIONALITY OF
THE BASE STRUCTURE ON THE MAPPING OF 'FAR' RELATIONAL
ANALOGIES.
Rationale
Experiment 11 (reported above) suggested that, for young children, some types of non-
spatial series problems might be spatially tied to either vertical or horizontal orderings.
Thus, when using a spatially ordered array as an analogical base for reasoning about an
abstract series problem (a 'far' analogy), we might see differences in performance
between vertical and horizontal arrays, depending on the abstract task relationship used.
It was therefore necessary to identify some abstract relationships which could vary
according to the spatial dimension to which they are tied.
The study discussed above (Handel et al, 1968) reported that, for adults, the relation
'better/worse' was tied to a vertical ordering for 78% of the time. They did not
however claim that any evaluative relations were tied to horizontal orderings.
Nonetheless, their results showed that the relation most consistently assigned to a
horizontal ordering was 'faster/slower' (48% of the time).
It was therefore decided to use these two relationships to investigate the claim that, for
7 year olds, evaluative relations are 'spatially tied' to whatever dimension of ordering
they have closer semantic links to. This is contrary to Handel et at's position, which
was that evaluative relations are tied to vertical orderings. For comparison purposes, it
was also decided to identify a possible neutral relationship (one which is not spatially
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tied). This might enable us to see whether such relations are more comparable to
situations where the base and target (task) relations are compatible (spatially tied) or to
those situations where they are not compatible (because the target relation is spatially
tied to the dimension opposite to that used for the base relationship). The research
reported by Handel et at could not be drawn on here. The relation which had the most
inconsistent spatial assignment was darker hair/lighter hair. This obviously could not
be used, as the subjects will be required to order using drawings, where actual hair
colour will be apparent. The relation 'older than' was chosen. This is because the
women in the drawings used as task materials do not appear to differ in age, so visual
cues cannot be used. It is also considered likely that this relation is not closely linked
with either a vertical or horizontal base relationship.
This study will therefore test the hypothesis that the relationship 'better than' is tied to a
vertical ordering for 7 year old children, whereas the relationship' faster than' is tied to
a horizontal one. * No definite predictions can be made about the relationship 'older
than'.
9.2.1 Method
Design
A two factorial between subject design was used. The two factors were as follows:
1. Dimension of base relationship (vertical or horizontal).
2. Task (target) relationship (best, fastest or oldest).
* l' . 1 . nment task (described onAn informal pilot study attempted to carry out Handel et a s spatia assig . d f h
page 16) However, this was unsuccessful as the children did not understand what was require a tern.
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Thus there were six experimental groups.
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task.
Partici pants
The participants in this study were 60 mixed ability 7 year olds (mean age 6 years 10
months, range 6 years 5 months to 7 years 6 months) from two state primary schools
with predominantly middle class catchment areas. The subjects were randomly
assigned to one of the six experimental groups.
Task descriptions and materials
These were the same as reported in Experiment 11, except that the subjects were told to
use the concrete arrays to reason about the abstract relationship 'better than', 'faster
than' or 'older than' (see Procedure section). All premises were presented in the
opposite dimension to that of the base relationship (i.e. they were always incongruent).
Further details of the task descriptions are given below.
Horizontal base relationship
The four-item array of women viewed' side-on', used for Experiments 3, 5, 6, 8 and
11 formed the horizontal base array. Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix
C.
The premises were laid out as follows: Be
CD
AB
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An example of this is given in Fig. 9.10 below.
Fig. 9.10: Example of horizontal base relationship.
Red
Yellow
Yellow
Green.
Red.
Vertical spatial relationship
The four-item array of acrobats in a 'human tower,' used for Experiments 8 and 11
formed the vertical base array. Copies of the task materials are given in Appendix F.
The premises were laid out as follows: B C A
C D B
An example of this is given in Fig. 9.11 below.
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Fig. 9.11: Example or vertical base relationship.
Red
Yellow
Procedure
Yellow
Green Red
This was identical in all respects to Experiment 11, with one exception. Instead of
referring to the person /child with the loudest voice, and then the next loudest etc., the
appropriate task relationship was used. Thus:
- for those subjects using the relationship 'best', reference was made to the
person/child who was the best at sums, and then the next best etc.
- for those subjects using the relationship' fastest', reference was made to the
person/child who was the fastest, and then the next fastest etc.
- for those subjects using the relationship 'oldest', reference was made to the
person/child who was the oldest, and then the next oldest etc.
WISC-R digit recall scores were also taken from each subject.
9.2.2 Results
Note Each subject completed six experimental trials in total. However, a large number
of the subjects in the previous studies erroneously tried to complete the first trial by
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recalling the demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable with
earlier ones the first trial from each subject has been discounted.
The results from the WISe digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (base relation vertical, task relation best) 8.3
Group 2 (base relation vertical, task relation fastest) 8.1
Group 3 (base relation vertical, task relation oldest) 8.5
Group 4 (base relation horizontal, task relation best) 8.5
Group 5 (base relation horizontal, task relation fastest) 8.8
Group 6 (base relation horizontal, task relation oldest) 8.2
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 6 years 8 months and
7 years is a score of 8 (WISe-R Manual, 1974).
Number of correct answers
Table 9.5 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
Table 9.5: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Task relationship
Best Fastest Oldest
Base Horizontal 3.2 (0.92) 4.4 (0.70) 3.9 (0.99)
Relationship Vertical 4.3 (1.06) 3.2 (1.03) 4.0 (0.67)
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An ANOY1\ [2 (base relationship) x 3 (task relationship) both bet bi, ween su jeers
factors1was carried out on the above data This revealed a signif t . .
. lcan interaction
between the two factors (F[2, 54]=8.052, p<O.Ol - see Fig. 9.12).
Fig. 9.12: Base relationship x task relationship interaction,
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Task relationship
Further analysis of the above data revealed the following significant simple main
effects:
_the subjects ordering the task relationship 'best' and using the vertical base
relationship scored more correct answers than those ordering the task
relationship 'best' and using the horizontal base relationship (F[1, 54]=7.325,
p<O.Ol).
_the subj ects ordering the task relationship' fastest' and using the horizontal
base relationship scored more correct answers than those ordering the task
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relationship' fastest' and using the vertical base relationship (F[1, 54]=8.717,
p<O.O] ).
- a significant simple main effect of the task relationship when the horizontal
base relationship was used (F[2, 54]=4.399, p<O.05).
- a significant simple main effect of the task relationship when the vertical base
relationship was used (F[2, 54]=3.915, p<O.05).
Tukey comparisons were then carried out between the different levels of task
relationship for both the horizontal and vertical base relationships. These revealed the
following significant effects:
- when using the horizontal base relationship, subjects who were ordering the
task relationship 'fastest' scored more correct answers than those ordering the
task relationship 'best' (q=4.18, p<O.Ol).
- when using the vertical base relationship, subjects who were ordering the
task relationship 'best' scored more correct answers than those ordering the
task relationship' fastest' (q=3.8, p<O.05).
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Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 9.6 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) to correctly complete the trials for
each experimental group.
Table 9.6: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Task relationshi p
Best Fastest Oldest
Base Horizontal 17.99 (2.31) 12.00 (1.02) 13.47 (1.42)
Relationship Vertical 13.19 (0.87) 17.90 (1.93) 13.58 (1.74)
AnANOVA [2 (base relationship) x 2 (task relationship), both between subjects
factors] was carried out on the above data. This revealed a significant interaction
between the two factors (F[2, 54]=54.269, p<O.Ol - see Fig. 9.13).
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Fig 7.13: Base relationship x premise presentation interaction
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Further analysis of the above data revealed the following significant simple main
effects:
- the subjects ordering the task relationship 'best' and using the vertical base
relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those ordering the
task relationship 'best' and using the horizontal base relationship
(F[1,54)=43.631, p<O.Ol).
- the subjects ordering the task relationship 'fastest' and using the horizontal
base relationship produced correct solutions more quickly than those ordering
the task relationship 'fastest' and using the vertical base relationship
(F[l, 54]=65.805, p<O.Ol).
_ a significant simple main effect of the task relationship when the horizontal
base relationship was used (F[2, 54]=36.883, p<O.Ol).
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- a significant simple main effect of the task relationship when the vertical base
relationship was used (F[2, 54]=25.845, p<O.Ol).
Tukey comparisons were then carried out between the different levels of task
relationship for both the horizontal and vertical base relationships. These revealed the
following significant effects:
- when using the horizontal base relationship, subjects who were ordering the
task relationship' fastest' produced correct solutions more quickly than those
ordering the task relationship 'best' (q=11.65, p<O.Ol).
- when using the horizontal base relationship, subjects who were ordering the
task relationship 'oldest' produced correct solutions more quickly than those
ordering the task relationship 'best' (q=11.80, p<O.Ol).
- when using the vertical base relationship, subjects who were ordering the
task relationship 'best' produced correct solutions more quickly than those
ordering the task relationship 'fastest' (q=9.16, p<O.Ol).
- when using the vertical base relationship, subjects who were ordering the
task relationship 'oldest' produced correct solutions more quickly than those
ordering the task relationship' fastest' (q=8.40, p<O.Ol).
9.2.3 Discussio n
Both dependent variables have provided us with evidence to support the primary
hypothesis. It is the case that performance using the relationship 'better than' is
facilitated by the use of a vertical base relationship, whilst performance using the
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relationship' faster than' is facilitated by the use of a horizontal base relationship. Thus
it seems that these two relations arc spatially tied, the former to a vertical ordering and
the latter to a horizontal ordering. The claim made by DeSoto et al (1968), concerning
a preference for only vertical orderings is therefore not upheld, at least for 7 year old
children.
The position concerning the relation 'older than' is not so straightforward. If we
consider the number of correct orderings, there are no significant differences between
the dimension of the base relationship for that relation. There are also no differences
between the 'older than' relationship and either of the two others ('better than' and
'faster than'). "This applies to both vertical and horizontal base relationships. Thus it
seems that children are just as likely to order the evaluative relation 'older than'
correctly with either dimension (horizontal or vertical) of base relationship. Also, [or
both base dimensions, 'older than' seems to be at an intermediate level of difficulty
when compared to 'better than' and 'faster than'.
A similar pattern of results concerning the dimension of the base relationship when
ordering with 'older than' is also apparent for the time taken to correctly complete the
trials. However, there are also some inconsistencies between the two dependent
variables. The 'time' data showed that the relationship 'older than' was easier than
'better than' when using the horizontal base, and was also more difficult than 'faster
than'. Considering the data from the vertical base, 'older than' was easier than' faster
than', but there were no significant differences between it and 'better than'.
The situation concerning' neutral' relations therefore appears inconclusive. The error
data demonstrates that children show no preference concerning the dimension of the
base relationship, and find neutral relations to be at an intermediate level of difficulty.
The' time' data suggest that, whilst no preferences are demonstrated concerning the
dimension of the base relationship, performance with the neutral relation 'older than' is
318
equivalent to that using the relation 'better than' when reasoning with the vertical base.
It would seem therefore that perhaps performance is facilitated when using a vertical
dimension, at least when we consider the time taken to correctly order the arrays.
However, further studies are necessary to tease out the difference in performance
patterns between the two dependent variables, and also to ascertain whether the effect
can be replicated for other relationships. This is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the
design of possible studies, together with their implications, will be discussed in the
concluding chapters.
It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which this facilitation is dependent on the
similarity of the base to the abstracted schema, hypothesised by Halford (1992). Very
few details are given concerning this, other than that spatial orderings are used
(probably 'above' or 'on top of'). Halford does however state that orderings are
abstracted from the child's everyday life, in which spatial orderings will be frequently
be encountered. The child's common experience of orderings is with objects which can
plausibly be ordered vertically. They will therefore be items such as toy bricks or other
'piling toys', or else will be placed such that they are visibly supported, for example on
shelves or in dolls houses.
The studies in this thesis have used objects which can plausibly be ordered vertically.
We have made use of towers of bricks, of acrobats and of crates hanging from a crane.
Thus the objects are very similar to the child's everyday experience and presumably the
children have had no problems in conceiving these objects as able to be ordered
vertically. If their' generalised ordering schema' is still closely tied to everyday
experience, then it could be that only plausible vertical orderings will be able to be used
as bases for ordering evaluative relationships. On the other hand, if the schema has
been fully abstracted, then the actual situation in which the base ordering occurs will
have no effect on performance.
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In view of this, it was decided to conduct a study which looked at the eff t f .
ec a mappmg
from plausible and implausible base relationships onto' far' series problems.
9.3 EXPERIMENT 13 - THE EFFECT OF IMPLAUSIBLE BASE
RELATIONSHIP SITUATIONS ON THE MAPPING OF 'FAR'
ANALOGIES
Rationale
This study is being carried out to ascertain whether 7 year old children are able to order
abstract relationships using implausible base relationships. This will give us some idea
as to the extent to which children are still relying on their everyday experience when
performing 'far' analogical mappings. It was decided to use drawings of task objects,
as before. Also, in view of the results obtained from previous studies in this thesis,
incongruent task and premise relationships were used and the subjects worked with the
relationship 'better than' and ordered using a vertical base. This was to ensure the best
situation possible for successful performance using an abstract relationship (a 'far'
analogy). The hypothesis being tested is that children will perform better when
ordering with items in plausible base relationship situations.
9.3.1 lVlethod
Design
A one factorial between subject design was used. The two levels of situation of base
relation were as follows:
Condition 1 Plausible
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Condition 2 Implausible
Measures were taken of the number of correct versus incorrect orderings achieved, and
also the time taken to successfully complete each task.
Participants
The participants in this study were 20 mixed ability 7 year olds (mean age 7 years 9
months, range 7 years 3 months to 8 years 1 month) from state first and primary
schools, with predominantly middle class catchment areas. The children had all
previously participated in a series problem experiment, reasoning with a horizontal
spatial relationship. This had occurred between 5 and 7 months previously. The
subjects were assigned to the experimental groups according to the length of time which
had elapsed since the previous study. This resulted in an even split of recency of
experience between the two experimental groups.
Task descriptions and materials
4 item arrays were used throughout. The base relationship used was always 'on top
of'. Premise were always presented horizontally, resulting in incongruous base and
premise presentation relationships. For all conditions, the children were asked to
reason about the relationship 'better than'.
Implausible base situations
The task items were side views of different coloured cars. The orders colours used
were randomly varied, so as to give 6 different orderings of four colours (yellow,
green, red, purple). The subj ects were also given a rectangular piece of cardboard,
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suck to the desk in front of them in a vertical manner, by means of adhesive putty.
Appendix H shows an example of a fully ordered array.
Plausible base situations
The task items were identical to those used in the implausible situation. However, the
children were told that the cars were in a multi-storey car park (see Procedure section)
and a piece of cardboard, divided vertically into equal sections, was stuck onto the desk
with adhesive putty. The subjects were told to use this when working out the answer
to the puzzle (see Procedure section for a full description of this). Appendix H shows
an example of a fully ordered array.
Procedure
This was as similar as possible to Experiment 12. However, because a large part of the
inslructions given to the subjects related to the mapping of the actual task relationship
into the base relationship, the procedure is described in full below.
Subjects were tested individually in a quiet room. The experimenter first explained the
task, using a complete photograph and serial ordering of premises as a worked
example. The children then worked through the six examples, using copies of the
individual 4 items to build a concrete array. Final ordering, time taken and order of
item placement were recorded by the experimenter.
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Implausible base situations
Wording of Instructions
"Can you remember the puzzles you did when you worked with me last
time? They were a bit like this here's some little drawings of 2
people standing in a bus queue you can use them as clues to work
out the order of all four people in the queue....Do you remember how
we did it? Have a go with these <child then worked through
serial ordering of horizontal spatial relationship...any who were
unsuccessful were excluded> Now, here are some drawings of
cars .... "
I've got some puzzles for you to do, where you have to work out which
car is the best, and then the next best, and then the next best, and so on.
I want you to use these part drawings as clues to help you do the puzzle
because you won't be able to look at the whole drawing until after
you've finished.... Here are four separate drawings of the four
cars see if you can use these to solve the puzzles, like you did
before .I want you to use this piece of cardboard to put the drawings
on There are six puzzles for you to do. They all use the same cars.
The order they're supposed to be in will be different and the order of the
drawings which I give you might make the puzzles a little bit harder."
Plausible base situations
Wording of Instructions
"Can you remember the puzzles you did when you worked with me last
time? They were a bit like this here's some little drawings of 2
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people standing in a bus queue..... you can use them as clues to work
out the order of all four people in the queue....Do you remember how
we did it? ......Have a go with these...<child then worked through
serial ordering of horizontal spatial relationship...any who were
unsuccessful were excluded> Now, here are some drawings of
cars in a multi-storey car park. .I've got some puzzles for you to do,
where you have to work out which car is the best and then the next best,
and then the next best, and so on. I want you to use these part drawings
as clues to help you do the puzzle because you won't be able to look at
the whole drawing until after you've finished .... Here are four separate
drawings of the four cars: See if you can use these to solve the
puzzles, like you did before .I want you to use this piece of
cardboard to put the drawings on, because it's the car park. ....There are
six puzzles for you to do. They all use the same cars. The order they're
supposed to be in will be different and the order of the drawings which I
give you might make the puzzles a little bit harder."
WISC-R digit recall scores were also taken from each subject.
9.3.2 Results
1. Each subject completed six experimental trials in total. However, a large number of
the subjects in the previous studies erroneously tried to complete the first trial by
recalling the demonstration ordering. In order to make the analyses comparable with
earlier ones the first trial from each subj ect has been discounted.
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2. Two subjects in total were unsuccessful in ordering the horl'zont 1 d
a anay use as an
example and so were excluded from the experiment.
The results from the WISC digit recall test showed that the mean scores were as
follows:
Group 1 (plausible situation) 8.5
Group 2 (implausible situation 8.6
The average performance on the digit span test for ages between 7 years 9 months and
8 years is a score of 8 (WISC-R Manual, 1974).
Number of correct answers
Table 9.7 shows the mean number of correct answers for each experimental group.
Table 9.7: Mean number of correct trials (max=5)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Base relationship situation
Im plausible Plausible
3.3 (0.82) 4.3 (0.67)
An one-way ANOVA was carried out on the above data. This revealed a significant
effect of the base relationship situation, such that the subjects working with the
plausible situation scored more correct answers than those working with the
implausible situation (F[l, 18J=8.824, p<O.Ol)
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Time taken to complete trials (correct answers only)
Table 9.8 shows the mean time taken (in seconds) to correctly complete the trials for
each experimental group.
Table 9.8: Mean time taken to complete trials (correct answers only
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses
Base relationship situation
Implausible Plausible
13.24 (0.89) 11.96 (0.77)
An one-way ANOVA was carried out on the above data. This revealed a significant
effect of the base relationship situation, such that the subjects working with the
plausible situation produced correct solutions more quickly than those working with the
implausible situation (F[1, 18]=11.855, p<O.Ol).
9.3.3 Discussion
The results discussed above have provided evidence in support of the experimental
hypothesis. It was shown that 7 year old children are more successful at integrating
abstract relational information into a single ordered array when they reason using a
plausible base relationship, rather than an implausible one.
It would seem from this that the' abstracted base schema' (Halford, 1992) is still
closely tied to the everyday situations in which spatial orderings are encountered. 7
year old children seem unable to fully abstract the ordering relationship from these
situations and they still require a familiar contextual situation in order that successful
mapping will take place.
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9.4 GENERAL SUMMARY
The three experiments reported in this chapter have investigated the existence of
structural constraints on the mapping of abstract series problems ('far' analogies). It
was shown that some evaluative relationships used in these types of tasks are tied to
either a vertical or a horizontal array for 7 year old children. Furthermore, their
performance when integrating separate pieces of this type of relational information can
be significantly improved if the appropriate dimensional array is used as a base for
analogical mapping. The children are then able to take advantage of the incongruence
of task and premise presentation relationships which facilitates performance in spatial
series problems. It seems that some evaluative relations are not spatially tied, but
further research is necessary to substantiate this claim.
It is unclear from these studies whether the children are actually mapping from their
internalised ordering schema (as hypothesised by Halford, 1992) to the abstract target
domain, or whether they are mapping across from the external array (the drawings
provided as part of the experimental materials) to the target domain. This will be fully
discussed in Chapter 10. However, work reported by Riley, 1975 (reviewed in
Chapter 4), claims that children use the external array purely as a memory aid, and that
it is equivalent to the internalised array. If we accept this, then it seems from the last
experiment in this chapter that the internalised array is still closely linked to the child's
everyday experience of ordering. When the array is manipulated such that it represents
an implausible situation, performance becomes worse.
The current chapter has presented the last of the empirical work undertaken for this
thesis. It has shown that, whilst the situation is more complex, the constraints on
integrating spatial information identified in earlier chapters also exist for abstract tasks.
The following chapter will present and discuss a theoretical integration of the research
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reported in Chapters 4 to 9. The limitations of this work, together with suggestions for
further work to follow up the findings, will also be discussed.
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CHAPTER 10 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
10.1 OVERVIEW OF THESIS
This thesis has been concerned with the role of structural task representations in
the performance of children on analogical reasoning tasks.
Recent work in the area of the development of analogical reasoning has shown that
children are able to recognise and use the relational similarity constraint to solve
both classical and problem analogies from a very early age. Many experiments
(for example, Goswami and Brown, 1989) have provided evidence that 4-5 year
old children can answer problems using relational reasoning rather than by using
associative reasoning, as long as they possess the necessary domain knowledge.
This research contradicts earlier claims in the Piagetian tradition concerning the late
development of analogical reasoning ability.
Although there is now ample evidence from studies such as those discussed by
Goswami, 1992, that young children can, in optimum conditions, map individual
and systems of relationships from base to target domains, we have little
knowledge of what might affect this ability. Obviously, as these studies have
shown, relevant domain knowledge is cruciaL However, this thesis has argued
that there are other factors which will affect whether children can recognise and
map relational similarity. In classical analogies, the relational structure of the task
is very salient to the subjects, in that it is presented as part of that task. Provided
that the child knows how the A & B items are related to each other, they can apply
this same relationship to the C item and thus solve the problem. In many
situations however the task structure is not as obvious and there may be more,
than one way to represent the task objects and relationships between them.
Because of this, the claim was made that the ability to construct a structural task
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representation will affect the ability to reason analogically and that I
, or many types
of analogical problems, representation of salient task objects and the relations
between them is a necessary precursor to the recognition and use of the relational
similarity constraint. For this reason, the research here has concentrated on how
children build up a representation of the system of relationships in a problem,
which can be used for analogical mapping. This has been carried out by building
on Halford's (1992) theory that children solve series problems by analogy to a
generalised ordering schema (a base domain) which has been abstracted from
everyday life.
Experiment 1 was mainly exploratory, and was designed to look at differences in
the use of the generalised schema when children reason with either 'far' or 'near'
analogical target problems. However, regardless of the 'nearness' of base and
target domains, it was found that 5 and 7 year old children were unable to integrate
task items into a single external task representation and were also unable to answer
questions about the relationships existing between task objects. It was therefore
concluded that these children were experiencing difficulty in constructing an
appropriate structural task representation and that this difficulty was affecting their
ability to map relations between base and target domains.
There are of course two problems with this conclusion:
1) The observed performance of the children when constructing an external
integrated representation of the relational information may not reflect
similar performance when constructing a similar internal representation.
This is a claim which can never be directly tested, as we have no direct
access to internal representations. However, previous research by Riley,
discussed in Chapter 3, showed that children working both with and
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without external task representations displayed ve "1
ry SImI ar patterns of
results when solving series problems. Thus it is argued that we are
justified in using subject's performance in working with a t 1
n ex erna array
as an indication of how they are constructing a mental representation of the
task.
2) There may be no direct causal link between the children's inability to
correctly represent the relational structure of a series problem and their
inability to answer the inferential questions.
The link between structural task representations and the successful
answering of inferential questions was not directly tested by the
manipulation of the presence or absence of integrated relational
information. However, there is a wealth of evidence (reviewed in Chapter
2) which shows that children and adult novices solve series problems by
the construction of integrated internal array. If we accept this evidence,
then it follows that the lack of the ability to construct such a representation
will result in poor performance. Experiments 1 and 2 provided us with
more evidence in support of this claim, in that the subjects were unable
both to answer the inferential questions and to correctly integrate the
relational information into an ordered array.
Because of the evidence obtained from Experiments 1 and 2, that is, that children
were unable to integrate separate items of information such that relations between
objects were correctly represented, it was decided to carry out a series of further
studies which would investigate some factors which, it was hypothesised, were
contributing to this inability. Because our aim was to look at the development of
analogical reasoning, rather than the solving of successful problems, the children
were no longer asked to answer inferential questions. We were interested purely
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in how the subjects constructed a structural task representation such that the
relational information encoded in that representation could be successfully mapped
[rom base to target domains.
Experiments 3-13, with 3 exceptions, were all carried out with 7 year old childreno
This was because the aim of the research was to investigate what factors might
affect young children's ability to reason analogically, rather that to develop an age-
based account of how children's ability to construct structural task representations
might develop. Thus the approach adopted is to consider constraints inherent in
the task which are having a significant effect on a crucial cognitive skill; that of
recognising and using relational similarity. It could well be that these constraints
are having an effect because of the children's lack of experience in structural
reasoning, rather than because of an age based difference per se.
It could well be that there are other age related differences which are also having an
effect; the suggested limited capacity of working memory is an obvious candidate.
However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to give any comments on this.
Nonetheless, we have evidence from Experiments 3 to 13 that there are pragmatic
task constraints which are affecting analogical mapping from base to target,
because they are affecting the construction of structural task representations.
The results reported in this thesis could have occurred because young children are
relatively inexperienced at some types of analogical reasoning. Thus, when they
are presented with a task for which the requirement to represent it at the structural
level is both necessary and nontrivial, their ability to use the relational similarity
constraint is significantly affected. Individuals with more experience will probably
be able to overcome difficulties caused by the task features, as their ability to
represent task objects and their relations to each other will be better developed and
practised. However, it could be that more complex tasks will result in similar
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effects from task constraints in adult problem solvers.
The point of this thesis is not that children of a particular age are able or unable to
construct task representations, but that there are factors external to the individual
(i.e. in the task) which can have an effect on the ability to reason analogically.
Experiments 3 to 13 investigated two possible reasons inherent in the task for the
inability of young children to construct an integrated relational task representation.
The following section will take each of the hypothesised task constraints in turn
and discuss the empirical evidence which was collected.
10. 2 TASI( CONSTRAINTS AFFECTING THE CONSTRUCTION
OF AN INTEGRATED EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION.
The two exploratory studies described in Chapter 4 indicated that 5 and 7 year old
children were unable to correctly integrate separate premises containing relational
information into a single array. Because of this, Experiment 3 investigated two
possible factors, information ordering and type of stimulus material, which might
have been having an effect on performance. An example of a task presentation,
together with the corresponding correctly ordered array, is given in Fig. 10.1
below.
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Fig. 10.1: Presentation of relational information and corr tl d
ec y or ered array.
Green.
Red
Yellow
Green.
Red
Yellow
GreeD.
Purple
Yellow
The results from Experiment 3 to 10 will now be discussed in terms of two
underlying factors. One of these, that concerning an inability to recognise that mid
items (i.e. the 'red' and 'green' items in the example above) are represented twice
in the relational information such that there is some redundancy of information,
was explicitly raised in the introduction to Experiment 3. The second factor has
emerged gradually during the implementation of the experimental work, as a
means of explaining several of the results. It will be suggested that the common
explanatory feature for the results in Experiments 3 to 6 and 8 to 10 concerns a
failure to understand the significance of the gap between separate pieces of
information.
1 . The redundancy of mid item information.
It was suggested that the reason that the subjects were unsuccessful in constructing
a single task representation was because they did not realise
that this required an integration of separate items of relational information, such
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that the mid items in the array (which were represented twice) needed to be
amalgamated into a single instantiation of each item. If the children did not
appreciate that mid items were represented twice only so that their relationships
with both adjoining items could be represented, then they would not understand
that forming a single integrated array necessarily meant that only one of each mid
item would be required. This claim was tested in two ways. The first involved
contrasting the effects of using photographs and drawings as stimulus material
(Experiment 3). There was no significant difference between these two
conditions. We could not therefore conclude that the use of photographs, rather
than drawings, will aid children in realising that two similar tokens are in fact of
the same character and need to be amalgamated. Thus previous evidence
concerning the use of photographs as easy graphic representations for young
children, which was used as the rationale for this experiment, did not aid us in
facilitating children's performance. A second experiment (Experiment 7) directly
tested the hypothesis that 7 year old children are unaware that only one token for
each mid item needs to be present in the completed single representation. This was
done by presenting different groups of children with either one of each item to
work with whilst constructing the array, or six of each item.
Again, there is no evidence that this had an effect on performance, as the
experimental manipulation resulted in no significant difference between the
different groups of subjects. The children appeared to be aware that they only
needed one of each item as duplicate items, when available, were quickly
discarded.
Given the lack of any differences for both of the experiments mentioned above, it
seems unlikely that an inability to recognise the redundancy of mid item premise
. f thi alternative reason wasinformation was affecting performance. In VIew 0 s, an
investigated.
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2. The psychological significance of the gap between relational
i nfurmatiun
This was initially suggested as a result of Experiment 1, where it seemed that some
arrangements of premise orderings were easier than others. This was followed up
in Experiment 3, which found that those orderings which required an item to be
placed at the front of a partially ordered array posed particular problems. An
examination of the order in which the subjects placed individual items also showed
that they dealt with information in the order in which it was presented to them.
This meant that a representation would be built up by initially considering the first
presented premise. In Fig. 10.1, this gives the relation between the 'red' and
'green' items. The second premise concerns the relation between the 'green' and
'yellow' items. The children appeared to have no problems in realising that only a
'yellow' token (because it is the only novel item) needs to be added to the array.
At this stage, they do not need to appreciate the significance of the gap between the
two premises in order to correctly place the novel item. This is because they can
reproduce the simple left to right ordering in the premise information and place the
'yellow' item to the right of the' green' one. This, however, is not the case when
they consider the last premise, where the 'red' item is novel. The following of the
left to right ordering pattern in this instance results in an incorrect placement, as the
'red' item should be placed to the left of (at the front of) the partially ordered array.
However the fact that the children do not realise that the gap between the second,
and third premises is significant for their goal, means that they fail to recognise
that the familiar left to right ordering pattern is inappropriate.
It is interesting to note that this limitation to a successful relational task
representation is quite robust. The relational information used in these
experiments consisted of parts of the complete photograph and drawing of the
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array. Thus, each premise and each piece of relational information was one item
of information (usually one drawing) with two different task objects (usually
people) depicted on it. An example of this is given in Appendix C. The three
premises were placed one at a time on a desk in front of the child. It therefore
seems that the gaps between premises were made relatively obvious. Items
immediately adjacent to each other were shown on one single premise drawing,
with no desk space between them. On the other hand, items which were not
necessarily immediately adjacent to each other in the integrated representation were
in separate drawings, with typically 70 to 100 centimetres of desk space between
them. However, it does seem that this was not sufficient to make the significance
of the gap salient to the children. This is because those orderings which required
items to be placed to the left of a partially ordered array resulted in inhibition of
performance. This pattern of results was replicated in Experiment 4, but using
familiar toys in an everyday context as the stimulus material.
Experiment 6 investigated the existence of a similar inhibition in performance for 9
year old children. The results of this study showed a slightly different pattern,
however, in that the children's performance was only affected for one of a
possible six orderings. An example of this ordering, together with the appropriate
integrated array, is shown in Fig. 10.2 below.
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Fig. 10 2: Example of CD All BC ordering and the a '.ppropnate mtegrated array
Purple Yellow
Red
G ~ e I l l
P"U1ple
Red
Yellow
Red P1J11lle
For all the other orderings which required novel items to be placed to the left of the
partially ordered array, performance was not affected. This is because the 9 year
olds were able to spontaneously self-correct partially ordered arrays. Typically, an
incorrect item placed to the right of a partially ordered array was noticed when the
subject checked their answer by scanning all three pieces of relational information.
They were usually able to correct their error at this stage. However, the children
working with the ordering above were unable to engage in successful self-
correction. Typically they would re-order the B item (the 'red' item in the example
above) after scanning the third premise. However, they would not move the' A'
item (the 'yellow' item) with this, and so the ordering would still be incorrect. It
is unclear, however, whether the children did not notice that their answer was
incorrect or whether they were unable to correct their error. Nonetheless, this has
been interpreted as a failure to make use of the special status of the relational
information given as part of the task. Although 9 year olds are able to overcome
the propensity to order in a left to right manner, they are still unable to correctly
integrate the relational information as their self-correction means that they become
misled. Of course, this may well be a problem for the 7 year olds too. However,
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their performance was inhibited by the incorrect left to right 0 d .
r enng pattern, such
that errors due to the status of relational information could not be isolated. It
seems therefore, that the studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6 wer d .
e emonstratmg
a tendency for both age groups to order the array in a left to right pattern, even
when this resulted in incorrect placements. The 9 year old children could correct
this, but were unable to recognise that they needed to preserve relations between
items which were given as task information.
This could be explained as an over generalisation of the ordering schema
hypothesised by Halford, 1992. The familiar left to right ordering pattern is firmly
in place, but the children have not recognised the importance of integrating and
maintaining relational information in order to arrive at the correct left to right
ordering. If this were the case, then the situation for the use of analogies in
structured tasks would appear rather bleak. It would seem that children are unable
to derive the correct structural relations for a domain, if this means that they have
to deviate from well used ordering patterns. Thus, we would have to be very
cautious in situations where children are asked to structure complex relational
information in order to perform analogical mappings.
Chapter 8, however, investigated the factor which was underlying the incorrect left
to right ordering patterns. Rather than a simple and undifferentiated application of
a left to right pattern, we have evidence that this error was due to a lack of
appreciation of the importance of the gap between premise information. This was
shown by manipulating the congruence of the dimension of the task relationships
(vertical or horizontal) and the dimension in which the relational information was
presented. Incongruent conditions (where the task and information presentation
relationships were different) resulted in significantly improved perfonnance.
These conditions highlighted the gap between the separate pieces of relation
information. Fig. 10. 3 below shows an example of an incongruent condition.
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Fig. 10.3: Example of incongruent task and informal" .Ion presentatIon relation
Red.
Yellow
Yellow
Green
Red.
In the task represented above, the child cannot simply order the array in the way it
was originally presented, because the relations are not congruent. Thus, in order
to construct the horizontal array, the pieces of relational information must
necessarily be placed in a different dimensional relation to the one in which they
are presented. This highlights the gap between each piece of relational
information, as the subjects are forced to consider each set of paired items as a
discrete and separate piece of data. This pattern of results was replicated with
familiar toys in an everyday context, and also with 5 year old children ordering 3-
item arrays. Thus, the very poor performance demonstrated by the 5 year old
children might be due to the same factor. However, we would need to carry out
..-
further studies with this age group, using a larger number of items and a variety of
different orderings before any firm conclusions could be reached.
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The experiments carried out in Chapter 8 also ruled out the possibility that the
incorrect ordering pattern was due to the cultural effects of learning to read and
write. Similar patterns of inhibition for congruent task and information
presentation relations were found when subjects were required to order a vertical
array from the bottom upwards (Experiment 8) and from the top downwards
(Experiment 9).
To summarise, therefore, children are constrained by factors inherent in the task
when they are performing relational mappings. These factors are the ordering of
the relational information and the congruence of task and information presentation
relations. Unless the gap between pieces of relational information is made salient,
children are unable to identify and preserve such information when they are
constructing structural task representations. This results in incorrect analogical
mappings.
10. 3 STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND 'FAR'
ANALOGIES
The experiments described above looked only at 'near' analogies. These are those
tasks which share the same spatial relation with the generalised ordering schema.
The final three studies used the insights gained to investigate the construction of
structural task representations when reasoning with 'far' analogies; those which
share only the relational structure with the generalised schema.
Experiment 11 (the first in Chapter 9) was designed to ascertain whether the
facilitation effect gained for incongruent task and information presentation relations
would still be present when the task was a 'far' analogy when compared to the
. . ' d . il tt n of results This evidencegeneralised schema. Again we achieve a sun ar pa er .
. . . d i Ch t '"' maintaining thatadds further weight to the literature reviewe In ap er -',
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children solve abstract series problems by integrating the premi .ises Into a single
spatially ordered array. If we accept Halford's claim that this isdb'
one Ymapping
[rom a generalised ordering schema, then it appears that for both spatial (' near')
and abstract ('far') analogies, the generalised schema is vulnerable to features
inherent in the presentation of the task. These features can inhibit the correct
integration of relational information by causing the child to join the task items in
the way they are presented, that is, by following a simple directional pattern (left to
right, top to bottom or bottom to top). It is not that the child has an explicit
misunderstanding that this is the correct action, otherwise we would not be able to
affect performance by manipulating task and information presentation relations.
Rather, it seems that their ordering schema is not robust, such that it can be
influenced by external features.
Experiment 13 provided further evidence concerning the vulnerability of the
subject's ordering schema. It was shown that the implausibility of the situation
used to externally demonstrate the ordering schema adversely affected
performance. Thus, when the children were reasoning with an abstract evaluate
relation, they were unable to successfully integrate the separate pieces of
information if the task items (cars) were ordered in a vertical relation with no
visible means of support. As we had already established that the actual dimension
used for the ordering resulted in successful performance for the particular relation
used, it seems likely that the fact that the cars appeared to be suspended in mid air
meant that the children could not successfully order the array. Doing the same task
but with the cars in a multi-storey car park resulted in significantly better
performance.
. .' f I t memoryIt seems therefore that the schema IS not retneved mtact rom ong erm - ,
., I b t the child is
as Halford suggested. The general ordering pattern IS III pace, u
. . . I d i d pendent on constraints in
reconstructing the ordenng schema piecernea , an IS e
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each specific task.
Experiment 12 investigated the claims made by Handel and colleagues that certain
evaluative relations are tied to a vertical relation. The results showed that whilst
some evaluative relations appear to be linked to a vertical generalised schema
,
others are linked to an horizontal one and some appear to be linked to neither.
This finding provides us with some evidence that there is not a prior preference for
vertical spatial orderings, as suggested by Handel et al.
It also adds more weight to our assertion that children's generalised ordering
schemas are still quite closely tied to everyday, real-world experiences. This is
because the children were sometimes unable to utilise the 'given' schema for the
evaluative relations. This implies that they have two generalised ordering
schemas, one which orders vertically and the other horizontally. For the tasks
which they were performing, they could not use a schema which was not tied to
the relation. This also calls into question Halford's implicit assumption that the
child's generalised schema is a vertical one, using the relation 'above'. However,
it is difficult to give much weight to this, as Halford himself, whilst using the
vertical relation 'above' to verbally describe the schema, depicts it
diagrammatically in the horizontal dimension!
To summarise, the research in the thesis has shown that:
1. Children's structural representations are adversely affected
by features inherent in the task.
2. The features prevent the children from recognising and
using the gaps between individual pieces of relational information.
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3. The resultant incorrect structural representat' dIOns aversely
affect analogical mapping.
4. Children's generalised schemas (i.e. their structural
representations) which are used in analogical rnapping, are not
retrieved intact from long term memory, but appear to be
reconstructed using information from the target domain.
10.4 LIlVIITATIONS
The above conclusions have been drawn by making two major assumptions, based
on evidence which has been reported previously in the literature. These will be
discussed briefly below.
1. Are series problems solved by analogy?
The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate the construction of structural task
representations for the purposes of analogical mapping. Previously, reasoning
using relational similarity (i.e. analogical reasoning) has been investigated by
using either classical or problem analogies. However, they were both unsuitable
for the studies reported here. Classical analogies have an obvious structure
inherent in their presentation. Problem analogies, on the other hand, have their
relational structure embedded in a narrative. In order to discover how the child is
representing this, it was argued that we would inadvertently begin to structure the
task ourselves, by asking the relevant questions. Because of this, a decision was
made to follow Halford's theory that series problems are solved by analogy to
generalised ordering schemas. This seemed intuitively appealing and allowed us
to look in detail at the actual integration of separate pieces of information into a
single structural representation. Thus we have gained several insights into how
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children go about representing knowledge at a structural level d . I
,an particu arly
how this can be affected by external localised features This the . . .
. n IS Important ill
its own right. However, the assumption that series problems are solved bv
analogy has made the explicit addressing of structural representations for the
purposes of analogical mapping possible. We can now use the findings from this
thesis and see if they generalise to other forms of analogical reasoning.
2. The nature of the base schema
This research followed Halford, 1992, in asserting that these types of analogies
are solved by the mapping of relations from a generalised ordering schema,
abstracted from everyday life into the target domain. We made claims about the
status of the subject's mental representation by using evidence from how they
actually built up an external array of concrete task items. This was based on
Riley's (1975) work which showed a strong similarity in patterns of results from
children who either did or did not use external ordering aids when solving series
problems. However, we can never be completely sure that these external arrays
are a true and complete example of mental representations.
We have assumed that the external array is a representation of the generalised
schema used as a base domain. Again, we can never be completely sure of this.
However, for both concrete and abstract analogies, the children were happy to use
spatially ordered arrays. Because abstract (' far') analogies share only relational
structure with the spatially ordered array, then subjects have to be mapping
relational structure in order to use the spatial array as a base domain. Thus it
seems that the children did have a generalised spatially based ordering schema
which they could bring to bear on problems.
. . I h hild n solve series problemsWIthout the two assumptions above, name y, t at c re
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by analogy and that the external array is a representation of the' l' dIf genera ise
ordering schema, it would have been impossible to address the' . dIssues raise
during the course of this research. It is therefore argued that the ass t'
ump Ions were
necessary and adequately justified by previous research.
10.5 A RECONSIDERATION OF THE TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE
REQUIRED FOR ANALOGICAL REASONING
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature concerning analogical reasoning in both children
and adults. Research with adults has emphasised both the importance of the
representation of task structure and the induction of generalised schemas from the
use of common relational structures (e.g. Holyoak, 1985). Recent work by
Keane (1994) has called for a much broader view of the domain, with more
research being carried out into the way pragmatic task constraints such as task
instructions or the presentation of material can affect analogical mapping. This
view is consistent with the argument which has been presented in this thesis,
which has shown that young children's abilities are affected by factors inherent in
the task presentation.
Over the last decade or so, work with young children has shown that they are
capable of reasoning by analogy providing that they have the relevant domain
knowledge (e.g. Goswami, 1992). Thus it appears that Piagetian claims that
children below the age of 11 years were unable to reason using relational similarity
were confounded as his subjects had not been pretested for possession of the
necessary knowledge about the subject in which they were required to reason.
. d si . h the task structure has beenHowever these studies have all use situations were,
. . f th c A . B .. C . ? are necessarily
made very explicit. Classical analogies 0 e l.orm . .. ..
. . Th . only one relationship (thatpresented WIth an integral task structure. ere IS
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between A and B) which can be mapped over onto the C and D t
erms and the
necessity to do this is made explicit by the stated task goal R h usi .
. esearc using sunple
problem analogies with young children have also made the goal of the task explicit
and have used a narrative in which only relationships which require mapping have
been emphasised (e.g. Brown, Kane and Long, 1989). Further studies have
trained children to use an analogical problem solving strategy (Brown and Kane,
1988) and have also resulted in improved performance. However, manipulations
such as these which have increased children's meta-knowledge of analogy have
still not resulted in total success. Thus there must be factors other than domain
and meta knowledge which are affecting performance. This thesis considered the
role of structural knowledge in the development of the ability to reason
analogically.
Both classical and problem analogies are unable to directly address the issue of
how the structural representation is constructed. This is because classical
analogies have their structure explicitly represented as part of the task. On the
other hand, problem analogies are inherently ill defined and as such the crucial
relations are embedded within a narrative which could contain some irrelevant
details. It would therefore be difficult to explicitly ask children to represent the
relational structure of the problem, as they may not be aware of exactly what we
are requiring them to do. Asking them questions about relational structure as we
see it does mean that we can highlight its importance, but provides no insight into
how children would represent relationships if they had not been cued to do so by
the experimenter.
The class of problems used in the research reported in this thesis has shown that
the construction of an appropriate task representation can provide problems for
. h . th level of knowledzc whichyoung children. Thus we can argue that t ere IS ana er ....
. f th I ti al similarity constraint,children need to be able to use for a full use 0 e re alan
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in addition to those already documented. These are:
1. Domain level i.e. knowledge of the actual subject area.
2. 'Meta-level' knowledge i.e, knowledge that reasoning by analogy is an
appropriate way to solve the task.
The third level of knowledge investigated in this thesis concerns the ability to
correctly represent relational structure. Evidence has been provided that children
have to be able to represent tasks at the appropriate structural level before they can
perform the necessary relational mappings between base and target domains.
10.6 IMPLICATIONS
There are two main implications which can be drawn from the research reported in
this thesis. They are as follows:
1. The importance of structural representations in analogical
reasoning.
This research has shown that children are affected by external task constraints
when they perform analogical mappings. In other words, how the task is
presented can affect the construction of a representation which depicts objects and
their relations to each other. This structural representation in tum affects how
children make analogical mappings between base and target domains. It therefore
follows that if we think carefully about how we present tasks to children, we may
well be able to affect what aspects of the base domain are mapped into the target
domain. Presentation of a task in an appropriate manner will facilitate successful
. '11 f se differ
analogical transfer. The appropriateness of task presentation WI ,0 cour ,
348
according to individual tasks. However, it seems likely that we must Structure
children's learning such that the important features i b th b
n 0 ase and target domains
are highlighted and mapped, rather than mapping occurring sol I b
e y etween those
features which are most obvious. The representation of a task at the structural
level is neither trivial nor obvious for many young children If .
. we can support this
ability by highlighting appropriate mappings, then we should be able to improve
children's use of analogy as a knowledge acquisition device.
2. How to structure the task.
The way in which performance was facilitated was by making the children
structure the task in an opposite dimension to the way in which it had been
presented. Thus the significance of the relational information was highlighted.
This has some implications for the realm of scaffolded learning (Wood, Bruner
and Ross, 1976). This term is used to describe the process by which difficult
tasks are broken down into a series of smaller tasks which children can manage.
Eventually these small tasks are arranged so that the children can eventually carry
the whole cognitive task themselves. Wood (1988) emphasises that "built well,
such scaffolds help children to learn how to achieve heights that they cannot scale
alone" (p.80).
The research reported in this thesis highlights the care with which learning
environments need to be structured. When young children solve series problems,
their performance is inhibited by structuring the task such that they need to expend
less cognitive effort. Instead, we were required to present the task such that the
subjects were made to explicitly focus on the gap between relational information
by presenting task information in an opposite domain to the task relation. In other
k d . t ponents and carryingwords, rather than simply breaking the tas own III 0 com b
b· tually structured the task soout some of these components for the su jeers, we ac
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that the children's attention was drawn to the important task components. This is
an alternative means of scaffolding the task, by highlighting the features which
children need to be aware of.
10.7 FURTHER RESEARCH
There are three main areas in which further studies based on the research reported
in this thesis could be carried out.
1. Using the domain of series problems
As previously discussed, these are useful types of analogical problems in which to
investigate children's construction of structural task representations. This is
because the task structure, whilst not being presented to the child as part of the
task, as in classical analogies, is a necessary and salient part of the problem
solving process, so that the children are required to make the structural
representation explicit. There has been little research which directly addresses
children's ability to construct such representations. These types of tasks could
therefore be usefully employed in looking at younger children's abilities in this
area. Experiment 10 in this thesis showed that 5 year old children's performance
with 3 item arrays can be facilitated by varying the way in which the task is
presented. The children's performance was then similar to that of the 7 year olds,
except that fewer task items were used. This meant that the 5 year olds were able
to correctly integrate separate pieces of relational information when the gaps
between these pieces of information was made salient.
We now need to carry out the same type of study, but with an increase in the
number of task items which the 5 year old children are required to reason with. If
this manipulation results in equivalent performance to that of the 7 year olds with
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the same number of task items, we will have some evidence that incorrect
structural task representations, caused by task constraints, are affecting
performance, rather than working memory limitations per se. This result would
also explain the successful performance reported by Pears and Bryant (1990)
when 5 year old children were ordering 5 or 6 bricks in a single tower. This is
because the relational information was presented to the children in a horizontal
dimension whereas they were required to order vertically. Thus the task
presentation made the gaps between the relational information salient.
This line of research could also be extended to look at 5 year olds performance
using abstract evaluative relations. One of the original aims of this thesis was to
investigate any differences between 'near' and 'far' analogies (Gentner, 1989).
For the purposes of the research described here, a 'near' analogy has been defined
as a spatial series problem, whilst a 'far' analogy has been defined as an abstract
series problem. Because our first experiment showed that 5 year olds were not
successful with the types of problems we were studying, their performance with
abstract series problems was not investigated further. However, now that we have
some insight into the factors which are affecting spatial series problems with 5
year olds, and also abstract series problems with 7 year olds, we can begin to
investigate whether manipulation of these factors will also facilitate 5 year olds
performance when working with abstract series problems.
The studies reported in this thesis have investigated the presence of the
'congruence constraint' when working with left to right, top to bottom and bottom
to top orderings. Similar patterns of results have been obtained for all these types
of problems. 'rVe have not however investigated any effects when working with
right to left orderings. It could be that these will be less strong, as there may be a
strong preference for left to right ordering patterns due to the direction in which the
English language is written. Nonetheless, we have also obtained an effect due to
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the 'congruence constraint' for both directions of vertical orderings. It would
seem therefore that the 'congruence constraint' is not solely due to the cultural
effects of literacy, and should be present for all types of orderings. The
investigation of right to left orderings will test this hypothesis.
Most of the research reported here has looked at children's performance when
working with spatial series problems. The last three reported studies, however,
began to explore the construction of structural task representations when children
are reasoning using abstract evaluative relations. It seems from these experiments
that performance is affected by the dimension of the schema with which the
children reason, and also the degree of plausibility of that schema. Handel and
colleagues, working in the 1960's, claimed that some evaluative relationships were
tied to vertical orderings, whilst others were 'neutral'. However, the research
reported here has provided us with some evidence that evaluative relationships can
also be tied to horizontal orderings. This work needs to be extended, so that other
types of evaluative relationships can be investigated. If we can find evidence that
some of these are tied to one dimension of ordering, then we will have an
important piece of information which could help us in deciding how scaffold the
structural representation of analogical tasks in educational contexts.
The degree of plausibility of the ordering schema was also shown to have an effect
in the last reported experiment. Again, this could be an important result when we
are thinking about task presentation, but first of all it needs to be replicated and
extended, using task items other than cars and relationships other than 'better
than'. In the study reported here, the plausible schema was supported with both a
verbal cue (in the instructions) and with a visual cue (the surface which the
children used to order on). Varying just one of these cues would give us some
insights into the extent of support needed to facilitate performance.
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2 Further research with problem analogies
Problem analogies were rejected as a suitable task for the research reported in this
thesis as they were not sufficiently well-specified to directly investigate the
hypothesis that the way in which children represent relational structure will
significantly affect their performance. However, now that we have evidence that
the role structural knowledge is indeed important, we can return to the domain of
problem analogies and begin to investigate what factors impinge on the correct
structural representation of the problem. Some candidates could be irrelevant
details given as part of the base problem, the order in which information is
presented and the use of familiar relationships or objects in new or unfamiliar
contexts. These could encourage inappropriate mappings from the child's current
knowledge to the target domain.. Further investigation of these will add to our
knowledge of the extent to which young children can apply the relational similarity
constraint.
3. Using insights from this thesis to look at other types of
analogical reasoning.
One of the original aims of this research was to look at the development of
structural representations for the purposes of analogical reasoning in educational
contexts. Because of the results obtained from the initial experiments, further
studies concentrated on the domain of series problems and so there has been no
opportunity to look at other areas of analogical reasoning. However, now that
some factors have been isolated which affect children's performance, the next
phase of research can go on to determine their effects on the use of analogy for
problem solving in educational settings.
We have shown that children are unable to correctly construct structural task
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representations when the relational information is not made sufficiently salient, and
that the resultant incorrect task representations adversely affect analogical
mappings. It has also been claimed that children are more successful when
reasoning with some evaluative relations if they use an ordering schema to which
the relationship is spatially tied and that generalised mapping schemas might well
be reconstructed using information from specific tasks. These findings could
explain some of the lack of success reported in the literature when analogies are
used for teaching purposes.
Concrete analogies are widely used in the teaching of fractions They are
commonly compared either to pieces of a cake or pie ('sub-area of a whole'
analogy) or to separate items in a collection, for example 4 pieces of an 8-piece bar
of chocolate ('a subset-set' analogy). Hart (1980) found that 30% to 40% of 11
year old children were unable to answer simple problems based on an
understanding of fractions. A typical question would be "I have eaten 3 pieces of
a 9-piece bar of chocolate. What fraction of the chocolate have 1eaten?"
Goswami, 1992, has emphasised the importance of beginning an early age, by
using familiar concepts, when we teach fractions by using concrete analogies.
This should ensure that the analogy is transparent to the child and that they learn
procedures about the concrete materials at the same time as they learn about written
representations. This should prevent the embedding of parallel but separate
strands of knowledge in either the concrete materials or in the written
representations.
However, an interesting extension to the research reported here would be to make
the necessary relationships between the task items in the two domains salient, thus
supporting the construction of structural task representations. This could be done
by requiring the children to explicitly represent the same fraction in different ways,
either diagrammatically or in a written form, and by presenting several different
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types of task materials in parallel, i.e. pieces of cake, groups of objects and groups
of people. The children could then be asked to pick out the common relationships
in the three domains, so that they could represent all three domains in a common
structure, using either diagrammatic or written representations.
It has previously been suggested (Gelman, 1991) that children incorrectly focus on
the number of pieces of cake when they are thinking about the 'sub-area of a
whole' analogy. This means that they reach the conclusion that 1/4 is bigger than
1/3, because 4 is bigger than 3. Goswami suggests that this is because they are
thinking about the cake being shared out between a number of recipients, rather
than considering the size of the piece of cake which each one will receive. This
seems intuitively plausible. However, a different but connected reason could be
that the children are not sufficiently aware of what the denominator of the fraction
represents. If this so, then perhaps they are importing an incorrect simple
counting pattern over from their prior arithmetical experience, just as the children
studied in this thesis imported an incorrect simple ordering strategy. It could be
that we need to make the children aware of the inappropriateness of this by
scaffolding the task in an appropriate way, just as we did for the 'incongruent'
series problems. This could be done by explicitly focusing on what happens to the
written representation as areas or sets are divided into smaller or larger fractions,
and the reason for this relationship.
Another area of primary mathematics where young children commonly experience
difficulty is arithmetic word problems (Halpern, 1992). These are formal
problems which are based on situations found in the real world, and which can be
solved by the application of an arithmetic algorithm. This difficulty is not confined
to young children, and indeed extends up to undergraduate level and beyond
(Steen, 1987). Most of the research in this area has been carried out with
secondary school children and college students, however. For example,
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Schoenfeld (1985), taught college students five strategies to use in mathematical
problem solving. These were:
1. Draw a diagram
2. Consider a similar problem
3. Try to establish sub-goals.
4. Look for patterns
5 . Use contradiction.
It was found that students who were taught these strategies were performing
significantly better after five training sessions than those who did not. It would be
interesting to ascertain whether this facilitation in performance could be replicated
in primary aged children. However, if we consider the five strategies, at least
three of them (numbers 1, 2 and 4) are concerned with the representation of tasks
at the structural level and the mapping of similar structures from base to target
problems.
We now have evidence from this thesis that these processes are often difficult for
young children, but that they can be successful, given appropriate support. It
seems that if we encourage children to focus on the common structural patterns
which exist between problem isomorphs, they will be able to perform the
appropriate analogical mappings. This could be facilitated by presenting several
isomorphic word problems in parallel, and requiring the children to complete
structural representations depicting the common relationships, by using the
appropriate task items. This would highlight the fact that different surface features
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can still share common deep (i.e. structural) features, and would also scaffold the
children's learning by requiring them to consider the structural relationships
inherent in the task. Once the importance of these had been learnt, we could
present more problems but without cueing the construction of a structural task
representation, to ensure that the children were able to build one without needing
any support. This type of experiment would also enable us to directly test the
claim that the representation of a task at the structural level facilitates analogical
mapping. The performance of different groups of children on the same set of
isomorphic problems, but with or without the provision of an appropriate
structural representation could be compared.
10.8 GENERAL SUMMARY
This thesis has demonstrated the importance of structural task representations for
the purposes of analogical mapping. In doing so, it has taken advantage of a large
body of literature which exists concerning series problems, but has used these
types of problems for a very different purpose. We have also shown that features
external to the individual problem-solver, that is, those inherent in the task, can
have a significant effect on performance, perhaps by affecting the reconstruction of
generalised schemas. It is suggested that these findings could affect the use of
analogy in educational settings.
357
REFERENCES
Adams, M. J. (1978). Logical competence and transitive inference in young children
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 25, 477-489. .
Anderson, A., T o l m i e e A., Howe, G., Hayes, J. T. C., & MacKenzie, M. (1992).
M e n t ~ ~ models of motion. !n Rodgers Y., Rutherford A, & Bibby P.(Eds.), Models in
the Mmd London: Academic Press.
Bibby, P. A., & Payne, S. J. (1993). Internalization and the use specificity of device
knowledge. Human Computer Interation, .a, 25-56.
Breslow, L. (1981). Re-evaluation of the literature on the development of transitive
inferences. Psychology Bulletin, 89, 325-351.
Brown, A. L. (1989). Analogical learning and transfer: What develops? In Vosniadou
S. & Ortony A. (Eds.), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Brown, A. L., & Kane, M. J. (1988). Pre-School children can learn to transfer:
Learning to learn and learning from people. Cognitive Psychology, 20, 493-523.
Brown, A. L., Kane, M. J., & Echols, C. H. (1992). Young children's mental models
determine analogical transfer across problems with a common goal structure. Cognitive
Development, 1, 103-121.
Brown, A. L., Kane, M. J., & Long, C. (1989). Analogical transfer in young children:
Analogies as tools for communication and exposition. Applied Cognitive Psychology,
1,275-293.
Carraher, T. N., Carraher, D. W., & Schliemann, A. D. (1985). Mathematics in the
streets and in schools. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1 21-29.
Case, R. (1972). Validation of a neo-Piagetian capacity construct. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 14, 287-302.
Catherall, E. (1984). Investigating Fractions. Have, U.K.: Wayland Ltd.
Catrambone, R., & Holyoak, K. J. (1985). The function of s ~ h e m a a in a n a l ~ g i c a a
problem-solving. Poster presented at the meeting of the Amencan Psychological
Association, Los Angeles, California.
Chen, Z., & Daehler, M. W. (1989). Positive and negative transfer in analogical
problem solving. Cognitive Development, 1, 327-344.
Cheng, P. W., & Holyoak, K. 1. (1985). Pragmatic reasoning schemas. Cognitive
Psychology, 17, 391-416.
Chi, M. T. H., Fe1tovich, P. J., & Glaser, P. (1981). ~ a t e g o r i z a t . i ~ ~ and. 1
representation of physics problems by experts and novices. Cogmtlve SCIence, ~ 12_-
152.
C o l l i n s s A., & Burstein, M. (1989). A framework ~ o r . . theory of c o m p ~ r i s o o and .
mapping. In Vosniadou S. and Ortony A. (Eds.), SImilantv and AnalogIcal Reasonmg
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
358
C r i s a f ~ ~ !VI. A., & Brown, A. L. (1986). Analogical Transfer in very young children'
Combining two separately learned solutions to reach a goal. Child Development 57'
953-968. , ,
D e ~ a c h e e J. S. (1991). S y ~ b o l i i functioning in very young children: Understandin
of pictures and models. ChIld Deveopment, .Q2, 736-752. g
DeSoto, C. B., London, M., & Handel, S. (1965). Social reasoning and spatial
paralogic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, b 13-521.
Donaldson, M. (1978). Childrens Minds. London: Fontana.
G a l l a g ~ e r r J. ~ . . &, Wright, R. J. (1977). Childre1!-'s solution of verbal analogies:
Extension of Piaget s concept of reflexive abstraction, Paper presented to the Society
for Research in Child Development, New Orleans.
Gallagher, J. M., & Wright, R. J. (1979). Piaget and the study of analogy: structural
analysis of items. In Megary J. (Ed.), Piaget and the helping professions Vol 8 (pp.
114-119). Los Angeles, USA: University of Southern California.
Gelmen, R. (1981). Epigenetic foundations of knowledge structures: Initial and
transcendent constructions. In Carey, S. & Gelman, R. (Eds.),_Hillsdale, New Jersey:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure mapping: a theoretical framework for analogy.
Cognitive Science, 1, 155-170.
Gentner, D. (1988). Metaphor as structure mapping - the relational shift. Child
Development,22., 47-59.
Gentner, D. (1989). The mechanisms of analogical learning. In Vosniadou S. &
Ortony A. (Eds.), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press.
Gentner, D., & Gentner, D. R. (1983). Flowing waters or teeming crowds: mental
models of electricity. In Gentner D. and Stevens A. L. (Eds.), Mental Models
Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Gentner, D., & Toupin, C. (1986). Systemacity and surface similarity in the
development of analogy. Cognitive Science, 10, 277-300.
Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1980). Analogical problem solving. Cognitive
Psychology, 12, 306-355.
Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1983). Schema induction and analogical transfer.
Cognitive Psychology, 15, 1-38.
Goswami, U. (1989). Relational complexity and the development of analogical
reasoning. Cognitive Development, 4, 251-268.
Goswami, U. (1991). Analogical Reasoning: What develops? A review of research
and theory. Child Development, 62, 1-22.
Goswami, U. (1992a). Analogical Reasoning in Children. Hove, U.K.: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Goswami, TJ. (1992b). Commmentary: Analogical reasoning and conceptual
complexity in cognitive development. Human development, 35, 193-21/.
359
Goswami, V., & Brown, A. L. (1989). Melting chocolate and melting snowmen'
analogical reasoning and causal relations. Cognition, 35, 60-95. .
Goswarni, V., & Br?wn, A. L ..(1990). H i g h e e order.structure and relational
reasoning: Contrasting analogical and thematic relations, Cognition, 36, 207-226.
Halasz, K. G., & M o r ~ n n T. ~ ~ ( 1 9 ~ 3 ) ) Mental Models. and problem solving using a
calculator. In ProceedIngs of CHI 83:Human Factors m Computing systems New
York:ACM
Halford, G. S. (1984). Can young children integrate premises in transitivity and serial
order tasks? Cognitive Psychology, 16, 65-93.
Halford, G. S. (1992). Analogical reasoning and conceptual complexity in cognitive
development. Human Development, 35, 193-217.
Halford, G. S., & Kelly, M. E. (1984). On the basis of early transitivity judgements.
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 38, 42-63.
_.
Halpern, D. F. (Ed.) (1992) Enhancing thinking skills in the sciences and mathematics
Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Handel, S., DeSoto, C. B., & London, M. (1968). Reasoning and spatial
representations. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour, 1, 351-357.
Hart, K. M. (1980). Secondary school children's understanding of mathematics.
Research Monograph. Chelsea College, University of London
Hayes, J. N., & Simon, H. A. (1974). Understanding written problem instructions. In
Gregg L. W. (Ed.), Knowledge & Cognition Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum.
Holland, J. H., Holyoak, K. J., Nisbett, R. E., & Thagard, P. R. (1986). Induction -
processes of inference, learning and discovery. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Holyoak, K. 1. (1985). The pragmatics of analogical transfer. Psychology of Learning
and Motivation Vol. 19 New York: Academic Press.
Holyoak, K. J., Junn, E. N.& Billman D. 0.(1984). Development of analogical
problem-solving skill. Child Development, 55, 2042-2055.
Hunter, 1. (1957). The solving of three-term series problems. British Journal of
Psychology, 48, 286-298.
Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1958). The growth of logical thinking f:om childhood to
adolescence (Parsons, A. & Pilgram, S., Trans.). New York: BaSIC Books.
Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1964). The early growth of logic in the child (Larger, E. &
Papert, D., Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan-Paul,
Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind: The B ~ d i l l Basis of Meaning,
Imagination and Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jones, S. (1970). Visual and verbal processes in problem solving. Cognitive
Psvchology,1, 201-214.
Kallio, K. D. (1982). Developmental change of a five-term transitive inference. Journal
QJ Experimental Child Psychology, 33, 142-164.
360
Keane, ~ ~ T., ~ e d g e w a y y T., & Duff, S: p 9 9 4 ~ ~ Constraints on analogical rna in:
a companson 01 the three models. CogmtIve SCIence, 18,387-438. pp g
Keane, M. T. (199.0). Incremental analogizing: .theory a ~ ~ ~ o d e l l In Gilhooly K. H.,
Keane M. T., Logie, R. and Erdos, G. (Eds.), LInes of thInkIng: Reflections on the
psychology of thought New York.: Wiley.
Kieras, D. E., & Bovair, S. (1984). The role of a mental model in learning to operate a
device. Cognitive Science, 8, 255-273.
Levinson, P. J., & Carpenter, R. L. (1974). An analysis of analogical reasoning in
children. Child Development, 45, 857-861.
Lunzer, E. A. (1965). Problems of formal reasoning in test situations. In Mussen P.
H. (Ed.), Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development. Vol. 30 (pp.
19-46). Society for Research in Child Development.
Markham, E., & Hutchinson, J. (1984). Children's sensitivity to constraints on word
meaning: Taxonomic versus thematic relations. Cognitive Psychology, 16, 1-27.
Man, D. (1982). Vision. New York: Freeman.
Novick, L. R. (1988). Analogical transfer, problem similarity and expertise. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, memory and cognition, 14, 398-415.
O'Connor, J., Beilin, H., & Kose, G. (1981). Children's belief in photographic
fidelity. Developmental Psychology, 17, 859-865.
Ortony, A. (1979). Beyond literal similarity. Psychological Review, g 161-180.
Pascual-Leone, 1., & Goodman, D. (1979). Intelligence & experience: A neo-
Piagetian approach. Instructional Science, 8, 301-367.
Pears, R., & Bryant, P. (1990). Transitive Inferences by young children about spatial
position. British Journal of Psychology, 81, 497-510.
Piaget, J. (1921). Une forme verbale de la comparison chez l'enfant. Archives de
Psychologie, 18, 141-172.
Piaget, 1. (1970). Genetic Epistemology (Duckworth, E., Trans.). New York:
Columbia University Press.
Piaget, J. (1972). Essai de logique operatoire. Paris: Dunod.
Piaget, J., Montangero, J., & Billeter, J. (1977). Les correlats. In Piaget J. (Ed.),
L1Abstraction Reflechissante Paris: Presses.
Polya, G. (1957). How to solve it. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor.
Riley, C. A. (1976). The Representation of comparitive relations and the transitive
inference task. Journal of Experimental Child Psychologv, 22, 1-22.
Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive Development in Social
Context. New York: Oxford University Press.
Samburski, S. (1973). Physics of the stoics. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press.
361
Schoenfield, A. ~ .. ( 1 9 8 ~ ) ) What's all the f u ~ ~ about m.eta-cognition? In Schoenfield,
A. H. (Ed.) Cogmtlve SCience and mathematics educatIOn. Hillsdale New Je .
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ' rsey.
Smedslund, J. (1963). Development of concrete transitivity of length in children. Child
Development, ~ 389-405.
Spearman, C. ( 1 9 2 3 ~ ~ The Nature of 'Intelligence' and the Principles of Cognition.
London, UK: Macmillan,
Steen, L. A. (1987) Mathematics education: a predictor of scientific competence
Sclence,237,251-252 .
Sternbe.rg, R. J. (1977). I n t e l ~ g e n c e e Information Processing and Analogical
Reasonmg : The ComponentIal Analysis of Human Abilities. Hillsdale New Jersey'
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ,.
Sternberg, R. 1., & Nigro, G. (1980). Developmental patterns in the solution of verbal
analogies. Child Development, 51, 353-378.
Sternberg, R. J., & Rifkin, B. (1979). The development of analogical reasoning
processes. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 27, 195-232.
Trabasso, T. (1975). Representation, memory and reasoning: How do we make
transitive inferences? In Pick A. D.(Ed.), Minnesota Symposia on Child Psychology,
Vol. 9 . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Trabasso, T., Riley, C., & Wilson, E. (1975). The representation of linear & spatial
strategies in reasoning: A developmental study. In Falmagne R. J. (Ed.), Reasoning:
Representation & Process in Children and Adults Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum.
Trabasso, T. C., & Riley, C. (1975). On the construction and use of representations
involving linear order. In Solso R. L. (Ed.), Information Processing and Cognition:
The Loyola Symposium Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum,
Vosniadou, S. (1989). Analogical reasoning as a mechanism in knowledge acquisition:
A developmental perspective. In Vosniadou S.& Ortony A.(Eds.), Similarity and
Analogical Reasoning Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Vosniadou, S., & Ortony, A. (1989). Similarity & analogical reasoning: a synt?esis.
In Vosniadou S.& Ortony A.(Eds.), Similarity & Analogical Reasoning Cambndge,
U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Wagner, S., Winner, E., Cicchetti, D., & Gardner, H. (1981). 'Metaphorical'
mapping in human infants. Child Development, 52, 728-731.
Walkerdine, V., & Sinha, C. (1975). Object properties, context rules and c ? ~ n i t i v v
structure: the three terms of the three term series. Paper presented at the British
Psychological Society Developmental Section Conference, Cambridge, UK.
Wechsler,D. (1976). Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Revised. Windsor,
U.K.: Nelson.
Willatts, P. (1991). Infant planning: What develops early, and what d e v ~ l o p p late?
Paper presented at the British Psychological Society Developmental Section
Conference, Cambridge, UK.
362
Winston P. H. (1980). Learning and reasoning by analogy. Communications of the
ACM, 2.1 689-703.
Wood, D. J. (1969). The ~ a t u r r and. Developn:ent of Problem Solving Strategies.
Unpublished Ph.D. TheSIS, University of Nottingham.
Wood, D. J. (1988). How Children Think and Learn. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwells.
Wood, D. J., Bruner, 1. S., & Ross, G. (1976). The role of tutoring in problem
solving. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 17, 89-100.
363
z
LIST OF APPENDICES
A Task materials 5 person queue
B Task materials Towers of bricks
C Task materials 4 person queue (drawings)
D Task materials : 4 person queue (photographs)
E Task materials: 4 carriage train
F Task materials : 4 person human tower
G Task materials : 4 crate crane
H Task materials : 4 car 'stack'
I F tables : Chapter 4
J F tables : Chapter 5
K F tables : Chapter 6
L F tables : Chapter 7
M F tables : Chapter 8
N F tables : Chapter 9
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APPENDIX A Task materials 5 person queue
Used in Experiment 1
Example premise presentation (original materials, which were in
colour, have been photocopied and reduced by 76%)
APPENDIX B Task mater ia ls Towers of bricks
Used in Experiment 2
Tower of 4 : Example premise presenta tion (original materials
photographed)
Tower of 4 : Completed array using premise information as abo ve
(or igina l materials photographed)
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Tower of 5 : Exam ple premise presentation (original materials
photographed)
Tower of 5 : Completed array using premise information as above
(or igina l materials photographed)
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Tower of 6 : Example premise presentation (original materials
photographed)
Tower of 6 : Completed array using premise information as abo ve
(or igina l materials photographed)
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APPE DIX C Task mater ia ls : 4 person queue (d ra ina
Used with horizontal p r em ise presen ta tion in Experiments ~ , 7 "
10 (with only 3 items) a n d l I .
Used with vertical premise presen ta t ion in Exper iments 8, 1 .ith
only 3 items), 11 and 12.
Example horizontal premise presen tation (or iginal ma ter ial
photocopied and reduced by SO %)
.
r
Completed array using premise in formation as abo e (original
materials photocopied and reduced b. 50 0/0)
370
APPE NDIX D Tas k materials : 4 person queue (photographs)
Used in Experiments 3, 5 and 6.
Example horizontal pr emise presentation (original materials)
Note The page should be rotated through 90°. T he premises are
~
placed closer together than they were in the experi ments. The actual
gap was approximately 6 ems
Completed array using premise information as above (or iginal
materials)
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APPE DIX E Task mater ia ls : 4 carriage train
Used with horizontal premise presentation in Ex periments 4 and 9.
Used with vertical premise presenta t ion in Experiment 9.
Example horizontal premise presenta tion (or iginal materials
photocopied and reduced by 65 0/0)
ote The page should be rotated through 90°.
I
. \
Completed array using premise information as above (original
materials photographed)
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APPE DIX F Task m a teri a ls : 4 person human tower
Used with horizontal p rem ise presentation in Expe riments 8, 10
(wit h onl y 3 items) and 11.
Used with vertical premise presen ta t ion in Ex per iments 8, 10 wit h
only 3 items), 11 and 12.
Example vertical premise presen ta tion (or iginal materials photoco pied
and reduced by 65 0/0)
Completed array using p r em ise information as above (or igina l
materials photocopied and reduced by 65 0/0 )
j/ \ \
APP E TDI G Task materia ls : 4 crate crane
Used wit h both ho r izonta l and vertical premise presenta tion In
Exper im en t 9.
Exa m ple ver tica l premise prese nta ti on (or igina l ma te rials photocopied
and reduced by 50 % )
Completed array using premise infonnation as above (original
materials photographed)
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APPE DIX H Task materials : 4 car 'stack '
Used in Experiment 13
Example premise presentation (original materials photocopied and
reduced by 500/0 )
Completed ' plausible' ar ra y using premi e inform tion bo e
(original materials ph ot ocopied and redu ed by -0 %)
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Completed 'implausible' array using premise information as ove
(original materials photocopied and reduced by 50%)
381
APPENDIX I
Experiment 1
F tables (Chapter 4)
Mean percentage of correct answers: 4 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
variation squares squares
A (order) 77.006 1 77.006 0.150 0.7009
B (age) 19470.156 1 19470.156 37.896 0.0000
C (question) 1775.556 1 1775.556 2.893 0.0976
D (task) 1066.056 1 1066.056 2.710 0.1084
AB 1981.056 1 1981.056 3.856 0.0573
AC 223.256 1 223.256 0.364 0.5502
AD 24.806 1 24.806 0.063 0.8032
BC 2763.906 1 2763.906 4.503 0.0408
BD 79.806_ -, 1 79.806 0.203 0.6551
CD 218.556 1 218.556 0.644 0.4275
ABC 24.806 1 24.806 0.040 0.8418
ABD 21.756 1 21.756 0.055 0.8154
ACD 709.806 1 709.806 2.092 0.1567
BCD 514.806 1 514.806 1.517 0.2260
ABCD 124.256 1 124.256 0.366 0.5488
Between 18496.225 36 513.784
Error
(Error CxS) 22096.225 36 613.784
(Error DxS) 14163.325 36 393.426
(Error CDxS) 12213.325 36 339.259
Mean percentage of correct answers: Simple main effects (age x
question)
Source of Sum of df Mean F P
Variation Squares Squares
age at
3781.250 6.707 0.0116critical 3781.250 1
non-critical 18452.812 1 18452.812 32.730 0.0000
Error Term 40592.450 72 563.784
question at
1 54.450 0.089 0.76757 years 54.450
9 years 4485.013 1 4485.013 7.307 0.0104
Error Term 22096.225 36 613.784
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Mean number of correctly ordered arrays: 3 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (order) 0.800 1 0.800 1.025 0.3181
B (age) 8.450 1 8.450 10.826 0.0022
C (task) 1.250 1 1.250 3.659 0.0638
AB 0.200 1 0.200 0.256 0.6158
AC 16.200 1 16.200 47.415 0.0000
BC 0.450 1 0.450 1.317 0.2587
ABC 1.800 1 1.800 5.268 0.0277
Between Error 28.100 36 0.781
(Error CxS) 12.300 36 0.342
Mean number of correctly ordered arrays: simple simple main effects
(order x age x task)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
order at
7 yrs spatial 6.050 1 6.050 7.751 0.0085
7 yrs abstract 8.450 1 8.450 10.826 0.0022
9 yrs spatial 0.450 1 0.450 0.577 0.4526
9 yrs abstract 4.050 1 4.050 5.189 0.0288
Error Term 28.100 36 0.781
age at
7.200 9.224 0.0044spat f spatial 7.200 1
spat f abstract 0.450 1 0.450 0.577 0.4526
abst f spatial 0.800 1 0.800 1.025 0.3181
abst f abstract 2.450 1 2.450 3.139 0.0849
Error Term 28.100 36 0.781
task at 17.707 0.0002spat f 7 yrs 6.050 1 6.050
spat f 9 yrs 0.200 1 0.200 0.585 0.4492
abst f 7 yrs 8.450 1 8.450 24.732 0.0000
abst f 9 yrs 5.000 1 5.000 14.634 0.0005
Error Term 12.300 36 0.342
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Building the tower with serial re-ordering: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (order) 640.000 1 64.000 1.555 0.2284
B (task) 44.100 1 44.100 0.115 0.7380
AB 16.900 1 16.900 0.044 0.8358
Between 7409.000 18 411.611
Error
(Error BxS) 6876.000 18 382.000
Experiment 2
Mean number of successful tower completions: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean
Variation Squares Squares
Subjects 21.644 14 1.546
A (no. of 16.178 2 8.089
bricks)
(Error AxS) 11.156 28 0.398
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F
20.303
p
0.0000
APPENDIX J
Experiment 3
F tables (Chapter 5)
Mean number of correct answers: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (stimulus) 0.017 1 0.017 0.017 0.8953
B (ordering) 63.333 2 31.667 33.204 0.0000
AB 0.133 2 0.067 0.070 0.9326
Error 51.500 54 0.954
Data collapsed across type of stimulusr l factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variance Squares Squares
A (ordering) 63.333 2 31.667 34.947 0.0000
Error 51.650 57 0.906
Mean time taken to complete trials: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (stimulus) 50.380 1 50.380 3.591 0.0635
B (ordering) 3679.875 2 1839.938 131.135 0.0000
AB 2.624 2 1.312 0.093 0.9109
Error 757.667 54 14.031
Data collapsed across type of stimulus: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares 0.0000A (ordering) 3679.875 2 1839.938 129.370
Error 810.671 57 14.222
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ExperiInent 4
Mean number of correct answers: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of SUI11 of df Mean F pVariation Squares Squares
A (stimulus) 0.200 1 0.200 0.138 0.714
Error 26.000 18 1.444
Mean time taken to complete trials: Comparison with Experiment 3
(insert ordering): 1 factor ANOVA
Source of
Variation
A (stimulus)
Error
Sum of
Squares
5.639
32.092
df
1
18
Mean
Squares
5.639
1.783
F
3.163
P
0.092
Mean time taken to complete trials: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (ordering) 18.164 1 18.164 1.711 0.207
Error 191.037 18 10.613
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APPENDIX K
Experiment 5
F tables (Chapter 6)
Mean number of correct answers: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (ordering) 5.400 2 2.700 9.346 0.0008
Error 7.800 27 0.289
Mean time taken to complete trials: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (ordering) 124.480 2 62.240 7.372 0.0028
Error 227.968 27 8.443
Comparison of Experiments 5 and 3
Mean number of correct answers: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (age) 8.067 1 8.067 13.444 0.0006
B (ordering) 31.033 2 15.517 25.861 0.0000
AB 6.433 2 3.217 5.361 0.0075
Error 32.400 54 0.600
Mean number of correct answers: Simple main effects (age x
ordering)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
age at
1 0.050 0.083 0.7739insert 0.050
left to right 3.200 1 3.200 5.333 0.0248
mixed 11.250 1 11.250 18.750 0.0001
Error Term 32.400 54 0.600
ordering at
32.067 2 16.033 26.722 0.00007 years
9 years 5.400 2 2.700 4.500 0.0156
Error Term 32.400 54 0.600
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p0.0000
0.0000
44.359
51.333
Mean time taken to complete trials: 2 factor ANOVA (age x ordering)
Source of Sum of d f Mean F
Variation Squares Squares
A (age) 558.821 1 558.821
B (ordering) 1293.351 2 646.675
AB
Error
574.132
680.274
2
54
287.066
12.598
22.787 0.0000
Mean time taken to complete trials: Simple main effects (age x
ordering)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
age at
insert 20.503 1 20.503 1.628 0.2075
left to right 271.216 1 271.216 21.529 0.0000
mixed 841.234 1 841.234 66.777 0.0000
Error Term 680.274 54 12.598
ordering at
871.501 69.180 0.00007 years 1743.003 2
9 years 124.480 2 62.240 4.941 0.0107
Error Term 680.274 54 12.598
Experiment 6
Mean number of correct answers: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F
Variation Squares Squares 75.000A (ordering) 20.000 1 20.000
Error 4.800 18 0.267
p
0.0000
Mean time taken to complete trials: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of SUIn of df Mean F
p
Variation Squares Squares 173.487 0.0000A (ordering) 613.389 1 613.389
Error 63.642 18 3.536
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Comparison of Experiments 6 and 5
Mean number of correct answers: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (ordering) 28.275 3 9.425 32.314 0.0000
Error 10.500 36 0.292
Mean time taken to complete trials: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (ordering) 757.707 3 252.569 38.189 0.0000
Error 238.089 36 6.614
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APPENDIX L
Experiment 7
F tables (Chapter 7)
Mean number of correct answers: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (number of 0.2000 1 0.200 0.277 0.605
items)
Error 13.000 18 0.722
Mean time taken to complete trials: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (number of 11.011 1 11.011 0.746 0.399
items)
Error 265.682 18 14.760
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APPENDIX M
Experiment 8
F tables (Chapter 8)
Mean number of correct answers: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (task reI.) 0.100 1 0.100 0.133 0.7171
B (prem. reI.) 0.400 1 0.400 0.533 0.4699
AB 8.100 1 8.100 10.800 0.0023
Error 27.000 36 0.750
Mean number of correct answers: Simple main effects (task x premise
presentation relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
task rel. at
horizontal 3.200 1 3.200 4.267 0.0461
vertical 5.000 1 5.000 6.667 0.0140
Error Term 27.000 36 0.750
prern. rel. at
3.267 0.0791horizontal 2.450 1 2.450
vertical 6.050 1 6.050 8.067 0.0074
Error Term 27.000 36 0.750
Mean time taken to complete trials: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F P
Variation Squares Squares 0.6815A (task reI.) 0.967 1 0.967 0.171
B (prem. reI.) 8.575 1 8.575 1.518 0.2259
AB 527.221 1 527.221 93.322 0.0000
Error 203.382 36 5.650
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Mean time taken to complete trials: Simple main effects (task x
premise presentation relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
task reI. at
horizontal 241.513 1 241.513 42.749 0.0000
vertical 286.676 1 286.676 50.744 0.0000
Error Term 203.382 36 5.650
prem. reI. at
horizontal 200.661 1 200.661 35.518 0.0000
vertical 335.135 1 335.135 59.321 0.0000
Error Term 203.382 36 5.650
Comparison of Experiments 8 and 3
Mean number of correct answers: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (ordering) 0.867 2 0.433 2.017 0.153
Error 5.800 27 0.215
Mean time taken to complete trials: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (ordering) 30.419 2 15.209 6.137 0.0064
Error 66.916 27 2.478
Experiment 9
Mean number of correct answers: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F P
Variation Squares Squares 0.046 0.8311A (task reI.) 0.025 1 0.025
0.625 1 0.625 1.154 0.2899B (prem. reI.)
AB 18.225 1 18.225 33.646
0.0000
Error 19.500 36 0.542
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Mean number of correct answers: Simple main effects (task x premise
presentation relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F pVariation Squares Squares
task reI. at
horizontal 9.800 1 9.800 18.092 0.0001
vertical 8.450 1 8.450 15.600 0.0003
Error Term 19.500 36 0.542
premo reI. at
horizontal 6.050 1 6.050 11.169 0.0019
vertical 12.800 1 12.800 23.631 0.0000
Error Term 19.500 36 0.542
Mean time taken to complete trials: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (task reI.) 74.474 1 74.474 19.757 0.0001
B (prem. reI.) 7.797 1 7.797 2.068 0.1590
AB 293.547 1 293.547 77.875 0.0000
Error 135.701 36 3.769
Mean time taken to complete trials: Simple main effects (task x
premise presentation relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
task reI. at
9.591 0.0038horizontal 36.154 1 36.154
vertical 331.868 1 331.868 88.041 0.0000
Error Term 135.701 36 3.769
prem. reI. at
102.831 1 102.831 27.280 0.0000horizontal
vertical 198.513 1 198.513 52.663 0.0000
Error Term 135.701 36 3.769
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Experiment 10
Mean number of correct answers: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (prem. reI.) 0.025 1 0.025 0.134 0.7161
B (task reI.) 0.025 1 0.025 0.134 0.7161
AB 3.025 1 3.025 16.254 0.0003
Error 6.700 36 0.186
Mean number of correct answers: Simple main effects (task x premise
presentation relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
prem. reI. at
horizontal 1.250 1 1.250 6.716 0.0137
vertical 1.800 1 1.800 9.672 0.0036
Error Term 6.700 36 0.186
task reI. at
horizontal 1.250 1 1.250 6.716 0.0137
vertical 1.800 1 1.800 9.672 0.0036
Error Term 6.700 36 0.186
Mean time taken to complete trials: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares 0.542 0.4662A (task reI.) 1.243 1 1.243
B (prem. reI.) 0.371 1 0.371 0.162 0.6899
AB 286.921 1 286.921 125.253
0.0000
Error 82.467 36 2.291
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Mean time taken to complete trials: Simple main effects (task x
premise presentation relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
prem. rel, at
162.963 1 162.963horizontal 71.140 0.0000
vertical 125.200 1 125.200 54.655 0.0000
Error Term 82.467 36 2.291
task rel. at
horizontal 133.334 1 133.334 58.206 0.0000
vertical 153.957 1 153.957 67.208 0.0000
Error Term 82.467 36 2.291
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APPENDIX N
Experiment 11
F tables (Chapter 9)
Mean number of correct answers: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (base) 6.400 1 6.400 10.569 0.0025
B(prem. reI.) 4.900 1 4.900 8.092 0.0073
AB 2.500 1 2.500 4.128 0.0496
Error 21.800 36 0.606
Mean number of correct answers: Simple main effects (task x premise
presentation relation)
Source of SUIll of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
base at
vertical 0.450 1 0.450 0.743 0.3944
horizontal 8.450 1 8.450 13.954 0.0006
Error Term 21.800 36 0.606
premo rel, at
1 7.200 11.890 0.0015vertical 7.200
horizontal 0.200 1 0.200 0.330 0.5691
Error Term 21.800 36 0.606
Mean time taken to complete trials: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares 35.834 0.0000A (base) 65.715 1 65.715
B (prem. reI.) 38.475 1 38.475 20.980 0.0001
AB 51.597 1 51.597 28.135
0.0000
Error 66.020 36 1.834
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Mean time taken to complete trials: Simple main effects (task x
premise presentation relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F
Variation Squares Squares
p
base at
vertical 0.426 1 0.426 0.232 0.6326
horizontal 116.886 1 116.886 63.737 0.0000
Error Term 66.020 36 1.834
prern. reI. at
vertical 89.591 1 89.591 48.853 0.0000
horizontal 0.480 1 0.480 0.262 0.6119
Error Term 66.020 36 1.834
Comparisons of Experiments 11 and 8
Mean number of correct answers: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (task rel.) 14.400 1 14.400 36.507 0.0000
B (base rel.) 6.400 1 6.400 16.225 0.0003
AB 4.900 1 4.900 12.423 0.0012
Error 14.200 36 0.394
Mean number of correct answers: Simple main effects (task x premise
presentation relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F P
Variation Squares Squares
task rcl. at 3.169 0.0835
vertical 1.250 1 1.250
horizontal 18.050 1 18.050 45.761 0.0000
Error Term 14.200 36 0.394
base reI. at 11.250 28.521 0.0000abstract 11.250 1
concrete 0.050 1 0.050 0.127
0.7239
Error Term 14.200 36 0.394
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Mean time taken to complete trials: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F pVariation Squares Squares
A (task reI.) 71.182 1 71.182 36.314 0.0000
B (base reI.) 63.706 1 63.706 32.499 0.0000
AB 40.040 1 40.040 20.426 0.0001
Error 70.568 36 1.960
Mean time taken to complete trials: Simple main effects (task x
premise presentation relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
task reI. at
vertical 2.224 1 2.224 1.135 0.2938
horizontal 108.998 1 108.998 55.605 0.0000
Error Term 70.568 36 1.960
base rel. at
abstract 102.378 1 102.378 52.228 0.0000
concrete 1.368 1 1.368 0.698 0.4091
Error Term 70.568 36 1.960
Experiment 12
Mean number of correct answers: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares 0.000 1.0000A (base reI.) 0.000 1 0.000
0.433 2 0.217 0.262 0.7702B (task reI.)
AB 13.300 2 6.650 8.052 0.0009
Error 44.600 54 0.826
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Mean number of correct answers: Simple main effects (task relation x
base relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F pVariation Squares Squares
base rel. at
best 6.050 1 6.050 7.325 0.0091fastest 7.200 1 7.200 8.717 0.0047oldest 0.050 1 0.050 0.061 0.8066
Error Term 44.600 54 0.826
task reI. at
horizontal 7.267 2 3.633 4.399 0.0170
vertical 6.467 2 3.233 3.915 0.0258
Error Term 44.600 54 0.826
Mean time taken to complete trials: 2 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (base reI.) 2.440 1 2.440 0.922 0.3412
B (task reI.) 44.766 2 22.383 8.460 0.0006
AB 287.174 2 143.587 54.269 0.0000
Error 142.876 54 2.646
Mean time taken to complete trials: Simple main effects (task relation
x base relation)
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
base reI. at
43.631 0.0000best 115.440 1 115.440
fastest 174.109 1 174.109 65.805 0.0000
oldest 0.065 1 0.065 0.025 0.8761
Error Term 142.876 54 2.646
task reI. at
97.588 36.883 0.0000horizontal 195.176 2
vertical 136.764 2 68.382 25.845 0.0000
Error Term 142.876 54 2.646
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Experiment 13
Mean number of correct answers: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (base) 5.000 1 5.000 8.824 0.0082
Error 10.200 18 0.567
Mean time taken to complete trials: 1 factor ANOVA
Source of Sum of df Mean F p
Variation Squares Squares
A (base) 8.218 1 8.218 11.855 0.0029
Error 12.477 18 0.693
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